Dist. 1, Part 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/1/q/bon-sent-IV-d1-p1-dubia
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### Doubts on the text of the Master.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there is a doubt about the definition of a Sacrament which the Master sets down: *A Sacrament is the sign of a sacred thing.* For it seems to be ill assigned, because it seems to fit other things which are not Sacraments and yet are signs of a sacred thing, as is this name *God*. *If you say* that it is a sign of a sacred thing and as sacred; then this name *holy* and *sanctifying* is a Sacrament. *If you say* that this is understood of a visible sign; then therefore this account is not *convertible*.

**I respond:** To this some say that "Sacrament" is taken in three ways, namely *commonly*, *properly*, and *most properly*; and accordingly the Master gives three definitions. And the first is of a Sacrament taken *most broadly*. — Yet it can be said, with Hugh, otherwise, that this is not a *definition* but an *interpretation of the name*; and the Master does not intend there to set down a definition of a Sacrament, but an interpretation of the name, or a notification of the word. And from the first interpretation it is had that a Sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing; from the second, that it is a visible sign of a sacred and sanctifying thing; from the third, that it is a sign of a sacred and sanctifying thing, in such a way that it efficaciously orders the recipient to obtaining it; and thus it is called a Sacrament properly, and so the Master hunts down the definition of a Sacrament. If therefore the first account be *determined* by these conditions, then it will be called the account of a Sacrament; but if it be *understood in its generality*, then it is only an *interpretation of the name*, not a *convertible definition*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *A Sacrament is the visible form of invisible grace.* For it seems not to be well defined, since the true body of Christ is a Sacrament, the character is a Sacrament, and yet neither is a visible form. *If you say* that *visible* is taken with respect to what is visible *by the exterior sense*,

according to what is said in Genesis chapter three: *The woman therefore saw*; and with respect to the visible as regards the *common sense*, according to what is said in Exodus chapter twenty: *And all the people saw the voices*, etc.; and with respect to the visible *according to the intellect*, according to what is said in Genesis chapter one: *God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good*; one objects against this that grace, according to this mode of seeing, is not invisible: therefore it is ill said to be of invisible grace. On account of this it is asked: in what sense is *visible* taken there; and why rather of a *visible* than of an *audible* sign, since the voice is a more expressive sign? And again, since a Sacrament is composite, it is asked how it is a form.

**I respond:** It must be said that *visible* is taken there for the sensible by the exterior sense, especially as regards the two *disciplinal* senses; whence the *visible* comprehends the *audible*. But it is rather called visible than audible on account of this, that the account of *signifying*, as will be seen below, rather resides in the element; and this is perceptible by sight, and both concur in the Sacrament. — As to the objection about the character, it must be said that it is not a Sacrament except because it is annexed to something sensible or visible exteriorly, and the Master defines principally what is exterior. — As to the objection about the form, it must be said that *form* in one way is called the *perfection of a thing*; in another way, a *paradigm* or *exemplar*; in a third way, form is called as it were *remaining outwardly*, that is, some likeness representing exteriorly; and so it is taken in the matter at hand.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *A Sacrament bears the likeness of that thing of which it is the sign.* For it seems to be ill said, since a Sacrament is a corporeal thing, and grace a spiritual thing: therefore, since there is no agreement in any quality between them, there is no likeness.

**I respond:** It must be said that *likeness* is considered in two ways: in one way according to the *property of one nature* or the participation of a nature; in another way according to the *comparison of one form*. The first is called the likeness of *proportion*, the second is called the likeness of *proportionality*. A Sacrament bears the likeness of grace in the second way, not the first, for the reason that, just as water washes the flesh, so grace cleanses the soul; and just as oil soothes exteriorly, so grace [soothes] interiorly. And this likeness is in four terms.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *The ashes of the heifer, when sprinkled, sanctify the defiled unto the cleansing of the flesh, not of the soul.* For it seems to say something false, since the uncleanness of the flesh was not removed, but rather the flesh was the more infected.

**I respond:** It is called uncleanness of the flesh, not because it was purely carnal, but because it was an *irregularity* contracted from a carnal act alone; just as touching a dead body, from which one was called *unclean*, not because there was a stain in the soul or in the flesh, but because from this he had contracted some irregularity, so that he was not fit to enter into the temple.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *But he was purified according to the Law on the third and the seventh day*;

whence was it that the priest had to be purified according to the Law, since the same thing ought not to be the cause both of purification and of defilement?

**I respond:** The reason for this was *literal*, *allegorical*, and *moral*: *literal*, because he touched the ash of a dead animal, and the high priest too shared in the sin of the people; therefore in the penalty of contracting it he shared in the uncleanness. The *allegorical* reason is that in this it was signified that the uncleanness of the Jews was not to be wholly taken away until the end, when *the remnant of Israel shall be saved*, to the Romans chapter nine. But the *moral* reason was that that uncleanness signified that a man ought to reckon himself unclean; and the priest, who prays for the purifying of others, ought to reckon himself unclean, since he ought to reckon the sins of others as if his own; or also he ought to believe that he has committed something in that office, according to that saying of Gregory: «It belongs to good minds to acknowledge fault there where there is no fault».

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *Those legal observances also sometimes cleansed from corporeal leprosy*; for, if this were true, then those things were of greater power than these are.

**I respond:** It must be said that they are called *to cleanse* because they showed cleansed. — And *if you ask* what utility there was, I respond: it must be said, a great one; because lepers were cast out beyond the camp and could not return unless they were purified and were clean by the judgment of the priest. — But then *you will object*: since leprosy is an incurable disease, it seems that no one would be cleansed. It can be said that some had the cause of the disease *radically*, and these were never cleansed, neither according to truth nor according to the judgment of the priest. But others had [only] *signs*, and these could be cleansed, that is, shown to be cleansed, when those signs now ceased.

### Doubt VII.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *Sacraments were instituted from a threefold cause.* For it seems to be ill said: since of one thing there is one end: therefore it seems that there is only one principal cause.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is one principal cause, namely the adornment or repair of the soul; but because the soul has several powers, the ends can be multiplied with respect to them, while one principal end nevertheless exists. For there is in us the *governing* power, and as regards this there is *instruction*; there is the *irascible* power, and as regards this there is *humiliation*; there is the *concupiscible*, and as regards this, lest it grow weary, there is *exercise*. — Or otherwise: *instruction* as regards the *cognitive* [power], *humiliation* as regards the *affective*, but *exercise* as regards the *operative*.

### Doubt VIII.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that *while a man subjects himself to sensible things which are by nature beneath him*. For it seems that in this the order is perverted: since the soul is above creatures of this kind: therefore if it subjects itself to them, the natural order is perverted in this.

**I respond:** It must be said that a man can subject himself to these things under four considerations: either on account of the *merit of sin*, or on account of the *precept of God*, or because they are a *sign of grace*, or because in them he *establishes the highest good* and ultimate end. From the first three causes it is meritorious, and there is no disorder. For on account of the *merit of sin* one is beneath them, and so his subjection with respect to such things is ordered. Likewise, he who subjects himself on account of the *precept* acts in an ordered way, because he subjects himself rather to the precept than to the sensible thing. And he who [subjects himself] on account of the *signification* subjects himself rather to the thing signified than to the sign. But in the fourth consideration the order is perverted, and it is sin; and thus it does not pertain to the matter at hand.

### Doubt IX.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *Man, who before sin saw God without a medium.* For it seems to say something false: because he who sees God without a medium sees God through his essence, sees also *face to face*; but everyone such is blessed: therefore, etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to see without a medium* is twofold: either without a *supporting* medium, or without an *obscuring* medium. The first medium is the mirror, the second the riddle. Man was not without the first, but he was without the second, into which he fell through sin; and therefore, because he was blind, he needed to be instructed and led by the hand; not so in the first state.

### Doubt X.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *They were instituted likewise for the sake of exercise*; for, if this be true, since *bodily exercise is profitable to little*, then, since the Sacraments are bodily things, therefore they are of little profit for the sake of exercise.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to be exercised* in the observance of the Sacraments themselves can be twofold: either in the *bare exterior rite*, and thus it avails to little; or *joined with devotion of mind*, and thus it is not bodily, but in a certain way spiritual, and through this much profitable.

### Doubt XI.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that *there are two things in which the Sacraments consist, namely the thing (res) and the words*. For it seems that he divides ill, since every word is a thing. — Likewise, it seems that he divides *insufficiently*, since Hugh says that they consist in *things*, *words [spoken]*, and *deeds [done]*.

**I respond:** It must be said that *thing* (res) is here restricted to visible things, and the Master takes the Sacraments more strictly than Hugh: for the latter took whatever institution of decency in the Church of God to be a Sacrament, but the Master takes them more strictly.

### Doubt XII.

Likewise it is asked about this which Augustine says, that *they only promised and signified*. For it seems to say something false: since either they promised to those who were of that time, or to those to come. Not to those to come, since no one promises anything to anyone unless he exist. If to those who were then, it is established that they did not attain to the Sacraments of the new law: therefore they were deceived in the promise.

**I respond:** It must be said that here the promise is taken not of justifying grace, but of glory; and that [grace] they promised but did not give, because the gate was not yet open; but these [Sacraments of the new law] promise and give, since the gate has been opened by Christ.

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