Dist. 11, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/11/q/bon-sent-IV-d11-p1-a1-q5
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### Question V. *Whether this conversion is sudden or successive.*

Fifth, it is asked whether this conversion is sudden or successive. And that it is *sudden*, it seems:

1. Because succession occurs through the resistance of the recipient, as is clear in the diffusion of light into air, since [there is succession only when] something resists; but on the side of the bread there is no resistance: therefore there is no succession either.

2. Likewise, "the more powerful the agent from which an operation proceeds, the swifter it is," as is clear in the sixth book of the *Physics*; but this [conversion] is from an infinite power: therefore it is in an instant.

3. Likewise, there is no succession in an operation except on account of the preparation and the introduction of properties; but here there is no preparation: therefore no succession.

4. Likewise, if there were succession, either it would be because the bread is cast off successively, or because the body is introduced successively.

Not because of the bread; for there is no ground for asserting why one part should be converted sooner than another, nor the matter sooner than the form. Nor because of Christ's *body*; for that cannot have any but a perfect and entire *being*.

**On the contrary:**

1. Although the divine power operates there immediately, it nevertheless operates at the utterance of the word; but the utterance of the word is successive: therefore the conversion also [is successive].

2. Likewise, if you say that it does not operate *through the discourse*; nevertheless it operates *together* with the discourse, since [it operates] neither before nor after; but the utterance of the discourse is successive: therefore, since what is successive is not simultaneous with what is instantaneous, it is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, if the conversion is in an instant, I ask: in that instant in which the change occurs, what is there? — either *bread* or *body*. Not bread, since bread is the term *from which*; not body, since [the body] is the term *to which* the change is; nor *anything else*: therefore nothing; but this is impossible: therefore the change does not occur in an instant.

4. Likewise, the bread in that conversion has its last *being*, and similarly Christ's body its first; [and this is] either in the *same instant* or in *another*. If in the *same*: then bread and body exist simultaneously. If in *one and another*; but between any two instants there falls an intervening time, and in that intervening [time] the conversion occurs: therefore etc.

> **CONCLUSION.**
>
> The conversion of the bread into the true body of Christ occurs in an instant, not successively.

**I respond:** It must be said that this conversion is sudden and in an instant. For although it occurs at the utterance of the word, it does not occur through the word as through an effective principle, but through the uncreated *Word*, which operates in an instant.

2. As for the objection that they are not simultaneous, it must be said that what is successive is not simultaneous with what is instantaneous as a whole nor according to a part, but nevertheless according to something of itself — for instance, its having-been-done or having-been-said, which is either in the character of a middle, or of a beginning, or of an end. Hence it is certain that when the whole has been said, the whole has been done; but when the Lord does it, He Himself knows.

3. As for the objection concerning that instant, whether it be bread; it must be said that in a sudden change the *coming-to-be* and the *having-been-made* are simultaneous, and the *ceasing* and the *having-ceased* are simultaneous; since therefore in an instant the bread ceases to be, it is not bread. *Again*, since it begins to be the body, or is converted into the body, it is the body of Christ.

4. As for what is asked concerning the last *being* of the bread, there are several positions.

For some say that, since the bread has *temporal* being but Christ's body *eternal* being, the last *being* of the bread is only in time, the first *being* of the body in an instant. Hence, just as the instant is joined to time so that there is nothing in between, so they say it holds in the case at hand. — But this is no probable evasion: first, because if the bread never had being in an instant, the objection would remain, and there is no solution here. Secondly, because the fact that Christ's body is upon the altar or under the species, this is temporal. Thirdly, because each has permanent *being*, and therefore the *being* of each is in an instant.

Therefore there is another position: that in the same instant there is the last *being of the bread* and the first *being of the body* — the same, I say, according to *substance*, differing according to *reason*; because insofar as it is the measure of the last *being* of the bread, it is the term of the *past*, [and] insofar as [it is the measure] of the first *being of the body*, it is the beginning of the *future*. — But this position cannot stand, because whatever diversity there may be in reason within one instant, contradictories are never simultaneously true in the same [instant]: therefore neither are *disparate* [things true] of the same. And *furthermore*, if the *past* were in its term, and the *future* in its beginning, they would never be continuous through one instant; rather, they would be simultaneous.

Therefore there is a third position: that it is in one instant according to *reality*, but several according to *virtual power*. For just as one point becomes two points by the division of a line and by commensuration — as, for instance, if a juncture of two lines is made upon an underlying continuous line; that one point at which they are joined is equivalent to *two*: so in the instant, although it is not multiplied (since time is not divided), nevertheless it is equivalent to *two* on account of the commensuration of two terms, namely of the duration of the bread and of the body. — But this cannot stand, because in *contiguous* things the terms are simultaneous; but in *durations*, which are ordered according to before and after,

it is impossible that the terms be simultaneous; whence in that *junction* the underlying point does not *become two*, but two points *are united in one*, yet they do not *merge* into one, on account of the distinction of the bodies in which they are. And *again*, however true it may be that two *indivisibles* are simultaneous, it is nevertheless never true that two *contradictory opposites* are simultaneously present in the same [subject], since they are incompossible; nor likewise those things which necessarily require an order — not only *causally* or according to nature, but also according to *being* in act and actual duration.

Therefore there is a fourth position: that it is in *one and another* instant according to *reality*, in the manner in which in time many instants are to be posited; because [time] is *one* according to its *essence*, whose flow is continuous; hence one must not posit several instants as ordered *consequently in themselves*; but nevertheless, insofar as it *measures* two discontinuous actions, two [instants] are to be marked in it; just as if a line cuts another, it marks two points. — But this cannot stand, because in no *continuum*, while it remains continuous, can two indivisibles truly be, or be understood, or be marked off, as ordered *consequently*; otherwise [the continuum] is of necessity understood as multiplied. If, then, time remains uninterrupted, it is clear, etc.

And therefore it must be said, lastly, that the time or instant which is the measure of the last *being* of the bread and the first *being* of the body can be taken in two ways: either in the *proper duration* of each, as the Philosopher says, that "each thing is measured by its proper period," which [duration] indeed begins and ceases with the thing; and thus there are *diverse discontinuous measures* and diverse instants *ordered consequently*, just as there are two *beings*, namely the *being* of the bread and of the body. But if the instant is taken according to the *common measure*, which is *continuous time*, uninterrupted, as it is the measure of the motion of the first mobile, or also as time is considered according to its *essence*, not according to its *being*; then it takes a *determinate instant* according to our marking. Let one instant then be marked *in time*, in which the bread last is; and let another instant be marked, in which the body first is? I say: let it not be marked, because one cannot mark *two instants ordered consequently* in a *continuum*, the continuum remaining; whence each of these can be marked *by itself*, but it is impossible to mark the two *simultaneously*. And thus it is clear that in one and another instant the bread and the body have being according to *reality*, and insofar as it is, [it is] a *real and proper measure*; although according to the *common measure* it does not happen that the two instants are marked immediately.

— Now this manner of solving seems more reasonable and more certain than all the aforesaid, since it is founded upon three certain principles. The first is that in the same *simple instant* it is impossible for contradictories to be, however much the instant may have diversity according to consideration. The second is that in a *continuum*, while it remains continuous, it is impossible for instants to be *consequent*, nor to be truly marked off. The third is that between *being bread* and [being] the *body* of Christ, or between two contradictories, there is nothing in between.