Dist. 12, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/12/q/bon-sent-IV-d12-p1-a1-q1
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### Treatment of the Questions.

For the understanding of this part, three things are principally asked.

*First*, concerning the existence of the species or accidents without a subject.

*Second*, concerning their action, or transmutation.

*Third*, concerning [their] breaking.

### Article I. *On the existence of the accidents without a subject.*
### Question I. *Whether the accidents can exist without a subject.*

Concerning the first [point], one proceeds thus, and it is shown that it is possible for the accidents to be without a subject.

1. Basil in the *Hexaëmeron*: «*For since God can do more than the intellect can understand*»; and [since] the intellect understands an accident apart from a subject: therefore God can bring it about that an accident be without a subject.

**On the contrary:** 1. By a miracle the defined cannot be separated from its definition, or from the parts of the definition, whence it cannot come about that something be a man and not be a rational and mortal animal; but an accident is defined by a subject: therefore it cannot by a miracle be without a subject.

2. Likewise, an accident is defined by relation to a subject and in relation to its *operation* — and it is established that the relation of the accident to the subject is prior to [its relation] to operation, since it receives [its] being from the former — but no accident can be separated from [its] definition in relation to its *act* by a miracle; whence it cannot come about that there be whiteness and that it not be a color dispersive of sight: therefore neither can it be separated from [its] definition by [removal of the] *subject* through a miracle.

3. Likewise, as *to-be* stands to a being, so *to-be-in* stands to that which inheres, because the *being* of an accident is *to-be-in*; but *to-be* cannot be separated from a being, so that it be a being and not be: therefore neither [can] *to-be-in* [be separated] from that which inheres: therefore, since an accident is something inhering, it is impossible that it *be* and not *be-in*.

4. Likewise, to bring it about that something *not participating* in the account of a thing should become *participating* [in it], is to transmute it into that [thing]; but the account of substance is being-through-itself: if therefore the accidents by a miracle become beings-through-themselves, this is to bring it about that they be substances: therefore those species become substances: since therefore they are accidents — that is established — therefore they are at the same time substances and accidents, which the intellect can in no way grasp.

5. Likewise, the opposition of species distant [from one another] is the same as that of differences, as is clear: because the opposition which is of man to ass is the same as [that] of the rational to the irrational; again, just as the ass is opposed to man, so is it opposed to the rational; whence, just as it cannot come about that the same thing be a man and an ass, so neither that it be an ass and be rational: therefore by a similar [reasoning], nay much more strongly, it cannot come about that the same thing be an *accident* and a *being-through-itself*, just as neither that the same thing be a substance and an accident.

> **Conclusion.** It can come about by a miracle that the accidents be without a subject.

**I respond:** It must be said that by a miracle it can come about that the accidents be without a subject or substance. For since they differ *by essence*, God can without any incongruity by his power separate them.

To the arguments to the contrary certain men respond that *being-through-itself* and *being-in-another* express the account of substance and of accident with respect to consequent modes which are inseparable according to natural power — therefore they are made known by such [modes], yet they can be taken away by a power above nature. And so they respond to the objections, because the oppositions run with respect to the accounts expressing essence. Likewise concerning the opposition with respect to essential differences.

It can however be said otherwise, that the accident both is an accident, and again is an accident according to its *species* or *specific* differences. For insofar as it is related to the subject, it has to be called *accident*; insofar as [it is related] to operation, it has to be called *this*. — It must be noted, therefore, that just as the relation of the accident to operation is twofold, namely according to *act* and according to *aptitude*; so also [is its relation] to the subject. But the relation of the accident to its proper *operation* according to *aptitude is essential and inseparable*; whence it cannot be that there be whiteness and that it not be dispersive. The relation according to *act* follows the essence; whence the accident could be separated from actual operation, whence whiteness does not always disperse. — Thus it must be said that the relation of the accident to the subject according to *aptitude* is essential; and this is never taken away from the accident nor from those species; for it is true to say that they are apt to be in a subject. But the actual relation, although it always inheres in act according to nature, nevertheless follows the essence, and therefore from this it can be separated without any incongruity by a power above nature. These things seen, the response to the objections is clear.

1. 2. To that which objects that the defined cannot be separated from the definition; it must be said that the nouns placed in the definition, and likewise the verbs, express aptitude, not always act; and therefore I say that the accident, although it is not in a subject, is nevertheless not separated from its definition, nay it belongs to it, because it is apt to be in a subject. — The response is also clear to the following [objection] concerning operation, because that definition, if it is understood according to act, is separable; if according to aptitude, neither is separable.

3. To that which is objected concerning *to-be*, it must be said that it is not similar: because *to-be* expresses the act of a being absolutely, but *to-be-in* [expresses] the act of an accident in relation to a thing of another genus; and because a thing of another genus is diverse, its understanding can be circumscribed from that thing, or separated; not so [can] *to-be* [be separated] from a being.

4. To that which is objected concerning substance, it must be said that those accidents never participate in the account of substance; for *substance* is called a thing existing through itself, in such a way that it is apt to exist through itself and in no way in another; but this in no way belongs to those accidents, nay they are apt to be in another.

5. To that which is objected concerning opposition, it must be said that the differences must express aptitude, as do the definitions. If therefore being-through-itself be taken according to natural aptitude — that is, that which is apt to be through itself — and likewise being-in-another — that is, that which is apt to be in another; just as the accident never participates in the name of substance, so neither [does it participate] in the difference in the said manner. But the accident is called *being-through-itself* with respect to act; and so it does not express an essential difference, but a mode following the essence; and in such differences the objection does not hold.