Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/14/q/bon-sent-IV-d14-p1-a1-q1
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### Treatment of the Questions.

For the understanding of this part, inquiry is made concerning penance-as-a-virtue, and concerning this two things are principally asked.

*First*, [it is] asked concerning it absolutely.

*Second*, in comparison.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

*First*, it is asked whether penance is a virtue.

*Second*, granting that it is, it is asked whether it is a general or a special virtue.

*Third*, it is asked whether it is a theological or a cardinal virtue.

### Article I. *On the virtue of penance absolutely.*
### Question I. *Whether penance is a virtue.*

Concerning the first [point], one proceeds thus:

1. Matthew, chapter three: *Do penance*; the Gloss: «*The first virtue is, through penance, to slay the old man*»; the Master says this same thing in the text.

2. Likewise, as the Philosopher says, «*virtue is that which perfects the one having it and renders his work good*»; but such is penance: therefore it is a virtue.

3. Likewise, no act is praiseworthy or meritorious except an act of virtue; but to do penance is praiseworthy and meritorious: therefore it is an act of virtue. But it is the act of penance: therefore penance is a virtue.

4. Likewise, nothing expels vice and sin except grace or virtue; but penance expels these: therefore penance is grace, or virtue. But it is not grace, because grace expresses purely what is from God, whereas penance [expresses] our act: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, *to do penance* is not good because it is commanded, but rather the converse: therefore it is good in itself. And again, it is arduous and difficult to do penance in the due manner, and in this matter one happens to err: therefore we necessarily need a virtue ordering [us] to this; but this is nothing but penance: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Sacrament and virtue are divided by opposition; but penance is a Sacrament: therefore it is not a virtue. *If you say* that penance is taken in two ways and according to the two acceptations is a virtue and a Sacrament; it is asked: why penance rather than baptism, or another Sacrament?

2. Likewise, penance is a passion; but «*every virtue, as the Philosopher says, is a habit*»: therefore penance is not a virtue.

3. Likewise, «*every virtue has a good object, as knowledge [has] the true*»; but the object of penance is sin — for the penitent does not rightly repent except of fault — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, all the virtues are connected and remain in some manner in the fatherland and were in Christ and in the first man; but penance was not in Christ nor in the first man nor will it even be in the fatherland: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** Penance can rightly be called grace, virtue, Sacrament, act, and passion, and this in an analogous sense.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there was a manifold opinion. — For certain men wished to say that penance is not a virtue, but an act of virtue — not of one [virtue], but of all, and all concur toward this act; just as the strings of a harp [concur] toward one sound according to the rule of the one playing, so all the virtues [concur] according to the dictate of prudence. — But this position is not fitting. For if this act is good and difficult, and one in which one happens to err;

just as anger through zeal is a habit by which a man is angry at the vices of others, so penance is a habit by which a man is angry at his *own* vices. For if it were not a habit, then one would not be said to have penance except while actually repenting.

The second opinion was that it is a *habit*, not of virtue, but of *grace*; nor does it name grace only according to *substance*, but also according to *act*, so that just as *baptismal grace* is called innocence, so *the grace of justification* [is called] penance. — But this position cannot stand: because grace does not direct free choice toward any special motion of itself, except by the mediation of *virtue*; which penance does.

The third position is that penance is a *virtue*, but is not a virtue except by an *extended name* of virtue. For virtue *properly* consists in directing toward the good — for virtue is a quality of mind by which one lives rightly — but penance calls back from evil. — But this position does not yet seem sufficient, because penance does not only make [one] *grieve* over the fault committed, but also makes [one] *amend*; whence its [office] is to punish the subject and reconcile [it] to God; and this is clear from the definition, and so it is properly a virtue.

*The last position* is that penance is a *habit of virtue* and of virtue according to its proper acceptation, not only according to the common [acceptation]. — And this is more probable, as I believe, as will appear better in what follows.

But for the understanding of the objections it must be noted that penance is expulsive of actual sin, which is a stain *deforming* the soul and again inclining [it] to evil, or *disabling* [it] from the good and again *wounding* nature; which one has also committed *through an act of the will with delight and lust*. Since, therefore, to blot out fault as *deforming* belongs to *grace* reforming; as *disabling*, to *virtue* enabling; as *wounding*, to the *Sacrament* healing; as *actually committed*, through an *act* likewise *of the will*; as committed with *delight*, through a contrary *passion*: therefore penance is rightly called grace, virtue, Sacrament, act, and passion. And this manner [of speaking] is according to the diverse natures found in it, yet by an ordering toward one [thing]; whence penance is not called [by] these modes altogether equivocally, but analogically. — And on account of this the arguments for the first part are to be conceded.

1. 2. To that which is objected to the contrary, [namely] that it is a Sacrament and a passion; the response and the ground of that analogy is clear; for it is not so in the other Sacraments. For because penance regards *actual* fault, in whose deletion there concurs a motion of free choice agreeing with grace for the expulsion of fault, which motion indeed is right and virtuous; and on account of the displeasure at the sin, which it is necessary to have been committed, it cannot be without a *passion* of grief: it is clear why penance is more a *virtue* than the other Sacraments; it is clear also why it has a *passion* more conjoined [to it] than the others.

3. To that which is objected, [namely] that every virtue has a *good object*; it must be said that this is false — for there is a counterinstance in temperance, in piety, and also in fortitude — but it suffices that the act be good. Nevertheless penance has a twofold act, namely *to flee* or detest evil and *to amend*; these are ordered acts, and by reason of the second it has a *good object*.

4. To that, then, which is objected concerning the connection of the virtues and the like; it must be said that the virtues have connection and duration according to that which is of *perfection* in them; but penance has something of perfection, and this is *to will to amend*, if one happen to offend in anything. And this will indeed is in all the just; for it is impossible that there be a right will without this. It has also something of *imperfection*, such as is grief for the sin committed; and by reason of this neither connection nor duration is attended to, nay rather there comes about an evacuation, as of that which is *partial*.