Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/14/q/bon-sent-IV-d14-p1-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether penance is a theological or a cardinal virtue.*

Thirdly it is asked whether it is a theological or a cardinal virtue. And that it is theological, it seems:

1. Because it belongs to penance to reconcile [one] to God and to detest sin, insofar as it is offensive to God: therefore it regards God himself not only as an *end*, but also under the account of an *object*; but every such virtue is theological: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems that it is *charity*: because it belongs to penance to detest sin, since sin is offensive to God; but no one detests separation from someone unless because he loves to be joined to him; but this belongs to charity: therefore penance is charity.

3. Likewise, by the same natural power by which a man shuns evil, that it not be done, he spurns it when it has been done; but by charity a man shuns being separated from God: therefore by the same [power] he shuns a separation already made. But this belongs to penance: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. That it is a *cardinal* virtue, it seems: because every theological virtue according to its act passes over into God as into an *object*; but penance does not pass over into God as into an *object* as regards the act of repenting: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that it is *justice*, it seems: upon that [text] of the Psalm: *Sacrifice the sacrifice of justice*; the Gloss: "What is more just than that each one should be angry at his own sins rather than at the sins of others, and, punishing himself through penance and satisfaction, should offer himself to God?"

3. Likewise, Isidore: "Then does a man pass judgment upon himself, when through worthy penance he condemns his own depraved

deeds"; but to pass judgment belongs to justice: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** Penance is not a theological virtue, but a cardinal one, contained under justice.

**I respond:** It must be said that here there were two opinions.

For some have wished to say that penance is nothing other than *charity* according to substance, differing according to state. For it is called charity insofar as it loves God, but penance insofar as [the soul] is rising again, and it belongs to it to detest evil insofar as it is offensive to God.

— But surely, if *fear*, which makes [a man] turn away from evil, differs from charity, I do not see why penance should not differ. But because "habits are known through their acts" — not just any acts, but the formal, that is, the elicited and primary ones — it must be noted that the act of penance is to detest fault, that is, sin, because it is offensive to God, and this for reconciliation, that is, amendment. And because this account belongs to *justice* itself, I say that penance is a cardinal virtue, contained under justice. For just as *fortitude* has many branches proceeding from one root, such as patience, perseverance, confidence, which put on one account; so too *justice* [has many], such as liberality, piety, humility, obedience, penance, which are perhaps *potential* parts of the virtue of justice, as will better be made clear below.

But for the understanding of the objections it must be noted that the virtues *aid* one another and *command* one another, as is clear to one considering their motions. For one man obeys only because it is commanded; and this belongs to pure obedience. Another obeys the command of the Lord because he loves him; and this belongs to obedience commanded by charity. Another obeys in this precept of continence because he loves it; and this belongs to obedience commanded by continence. Whence to obey is always elicited from obedience, sometimes of itself, sometimes commanded by others. — Likewise it is clear in other cases; for *to be continent* is an act elicited by chastity. But if someone is continent *from love of chastity*, such an act is elicited and commanded by chastity; if *from love of God*, then it is elicited by chastity and commanded by charity; if on account of the *precept of God*, then it is commanded by obedience. — Likewise it must be said that penance detests sin either because it is *offensive to God*, that [the soul] may be reconciled to him and make amends, and this it does of itself; or because it is *separative from God*, and this it does as commanded by charity; or because it is *destructive of a particular virtue*, and this it does as commanded and aided by some particular virtue. And so it is clear that it is properly justice, yet it happens that the motions of the other virtues are mingled with it.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that it is theological because it has God for its object, it must be said that this is false; because, just as obedience properly regards the command of God, and *latria* the honor due to God, so penance [regards] the offense done to God and the amendment to be made.

2. To the other [objection] the response is clear: because that motion is from charity by way of *commanding*, but from penance by way of *eliciting*; whence, although charity moves [a man] to detest that which separates [him] from God, it nevertheless does not elicit [the act], because there is there a special difficulty, as in the other acts of the virtues; whence, just as charity moves to every good by *commanding*, but not by *eliciting* — nay, the special virtues are necessary — so it must be understood in the act of penance.

3. To that which is objected concerning natural virtue, it must be said that it is not similar: because a *natural* virtue does not bespeak so great an approximation to the act as an *infused* or *acquired* virtue; and therefore it is more diversified than the natural one. And this is clear, because several virtues are in the same natural potency; and therefore it does not follow that, if the natural [virtue] is the same, on this account it should be the same *moral* virtue.