Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/14/q/bon-sent-IV-d14-p1-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On penance in comparison.*
### Question I. *Which power of the soul is the subject of the virtue of penance.*

Consequently, as to the second article, it is asked concerning penance in comparison. And concerning this three matters are asked. First, it is asked concerning it by comparison to its subject. Second, as to its act or origin. Third, as to its order.

First, it is asked which power of the soul is the subject of the virtue of penance; and it is shown that it is in the irascible power of the soul.

1. Augustine in the book *On Penance*, defining penance, says that it is "a certain vengeance of one grieving"; but it is agreed that vengeance and to desire vengeance belong to the irascible [power]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, on that [verse] of the Psalm: *Be angry* etc.; the Gloss: "What is more just than that each one be angry rather at his own sins than at another's, and, punishing himself by penance, offer himself to God": therefore to be angry at sins is by penance; but it is agreed that to be angry belongs to the irascible [power]: therefore also to do penance.

3. Likewise, John Chrysostom: "Perfect penance compels the penitent to bear all things willingly"; but this belongs to the irascible [power]: therefore penance is in the irascible power.

4. Likewise, to do penance, as is clear from the meaning of the name, "is to hold punishment," and Augustine himself sets down this etymology; but the power which regards and sustains punishment is the irascible: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, penance is a virtue, not only according as it regards fault, but according as it is into [its] subject, namely into the man who offends, that he be punished, and through punishment amendment be made; and this is clear through two [things] which the Master says in the text. For he says that "penance is named from punishing"; he also says that through penance "we bewail evils with a purpose of amendment." Therefore, since the virtue by which we will that a sinning neighbor be punished is in the irascible [power], namely anger through zeal, by parity of reasoning penance too will be in the irascible [power].

**On the contrary:** 1. It seems that penance is in the synderesis: because to whatever the act belongs, to it belongs the habit; but the act of penance is to groan, and to groan belongs to the synderesis: therefore also penance. The first is clear; the second is proven, because it is written in Romans the eighth: *The Spirit asks on our behalf with unutterable groanings*; but the Gloss says that the spirit is the synderesis: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems that [it is] in the rational [power]: because penance is in that power whose [office] it is to do penance; but to do penance belongs to reason itself: therefore also penance. The first is clear; the minor is proven, on that [verse] of the Psalm: *Hope in God* etc.; the Gloss: "That is, that I may do penance for my sins"; and as is had in the Gloss: *Why are you sad* etc.: "Reason strengthens the sensible soul": therefore reason does penance: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems that [it is] in the concupiscible [power]: because "opposites are apt to come about concerning the same thing"; but delight and sadness are opposites, likewise grief and joy, love and hatred; but in penance there is grief, sadness, and hatred of sin: since therefore the opposites of these, namely love, joy, and delight, are in the concupiscible [power]; by the aforesaid rule penance is in the concupiscible [power]: therefore not in the irascible.

4. Likewise, it seems that it is in any power whatever of the soul: because things that mutually expel one another have their being concerning the same susceptible [subject]; but penance expels all sins: therefore, since the diverse kinds of sins are in diverse powers, penance is not in one power, but in diverse [powers].

> **Conclusion.** It is more probable that penance is in the will, and indeed in the irascible [part].

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this various [authors] have opined diversely.

For some have said that penance goes round all the powers, because it expels all sins and bewails all things. And since it bewails on behalf of all, and to perfect weeping there concurs the motion of all the powers, and to the expulsion of vices there concur the habits of all the virtues; they held that penance is in all the powers as a general justice.

And this they strive to show by the Gloss on that [verse] of Isaiah the sixteenth: *My belly shall sound to Moab like a harp* — the interlinear [Gloss] expounds it: "It shall sound by bewailing" — and the Gloss says: "Just as a harp does not emit a composed sound, if one string has been broken; so the spiritual belly of the Prophet, if one string of the virtues has been broken, will not resound sweet melodies." And from this they wish to hold that it is likewise in the mourning of penance, and thus that penance is in every power. And therefore they say that penance is defined by the acts of diverse powers; they also say that to it there correspond the acts of diverse powers. For the penitent makes satisfaction by praying, and this belongs to the rational [power]; by fasting, and this belongs to the concupiscible [power]; by showing mercy or by bestowing alms, and this likewise belongs to the concupiscible [power]; by bearing punishment, and this belongs to the irascible [power].

— But this position has been partly disproven above. For if penance is a special and single habit, as was shown above; one habit is also in one power, since one accident is in one subject, and the subject of a virtue is a power: it is necessary that penance be determinately not in every, but in some [one] power. — But that is what deceived those positing that it was in all the powers, [namely] that penance is commanded by all [the powers]; and hence it is that to the mourning of penance all the virtues concur as annexed, and it seems that penance is in all the powers and embraces the other virtues. — This also deceived them, because they did not regard the special and proper act of penance, which is not of every, but of some special power. And therefore this position is not very probable.

The second position is that penance is in a determinate power, but is not in any of the three aforesaid powers, but in a power superior to those three; and this they call free choice, in which are conjoined the cognitive and motive power, because it commands the other powers and is not commanded, and concerning which the merit on our part resides. And because a virtue is commanded by no power, since also a virtue is for meriting; they posited that all the virtues and penance are in free choice as in [their] subject. But because free choice rules the lower powers; and through one virtue can rule many powers, as through justice and penance: hence it is that penance seems to be in the lower powers, and seems also to be in several, although subjectively it is in one alone. — Nevertheless, as is better clear elsewhere, free choice does not name a power other than these, namely the rational, concupiscible, and irascible, although it names [them] in another manner — because it names [them] by way of mover and commander: but these powers are obedient to it, so that the same power insofar as it is free commands itself as nature — and therefore, if that position wishes to say that free choice names a power really and naturally distinct from these, the rational, concupiscible, and irascible; then I neither understand nor believe that it has truth. But if it wishes to say that they name the same power, but nevertheless according to another manner of holding itself; this I do not deny.

But still the same doubt remains, if the powers of the soul are diverse, in which one [penance] is really; because either it is necessary to come to this, that those three powers be in one power really; or that free choice be a power distinct from them; or that every virtue be in some one of those three, namely either in the rational, or concupiscible, or irascible, in which the three theological virtues are commonly wont to be placed by our doctors and fathers, since the acts of these powers tend immediately into God. And certainly, if the theological [virtues] are placed there, why not also the cardinal [virtues] according to their aspect toward the lower?

The third position is that penance is in the rational [power]; and the ground of this position is this, that penance is a part of cardinal justice. For since it is a virtue and is not theological, it is necessary that it be reduced to some [other] virtue. Since therefore the cardinal virtue is sufficiently divided into four both according to the Saints and according to the philosophers; and penance is not under any of the others: it is agreed that penance, as was premised, is contained under justice; but justice, since it is one habit, cannot be in several powers: therefore it is necessary that it be in one. — Again, since the act of justice, which is "to render to each one what is his," properly belongs to reason, because this is a judicial act, and reason is the judge in the kingdom of the soul; they say that justice is in reason, as it is judge, just as prudence is in it, as it is leader or counselor. And since

reason, as it is judge, commands the whole soul; hence it is that cardinal justice is said to go round all the powers of the soul. And hence it is that it contains habits which seem to pertain to affection, such as obedience and penance; and hence it is that penance is in one power, yet seems to go round many; and therefore it is in the rational [power], as it is the ruler of the irascible and concupiscible, so that it moves the concupiscible to groaning for fault, and the irascible to punishing the soul itself.

But neither is that very reasonable to one inspecting [it], that penance, which most resounds in affection, and humility, which is a species of justice, be in the rational [power]. — And further, the habit of a virtue ought not to be placed about the commanding virtue, but the eliciting [one]. For in eliciting is the difficulty, and with respect to it or by reason of it is the habituation; whence the motion of a virtue is not said to belong properly to this or that [power] except [to that] of the eliciting virtue: just as if charity should command continence or justice command fighting; nevertheless to be continent is always of continence, and to fight rightly is of fortitude. As therefore to do penance belongs to nothing but penance, so the habit is not in the commanding power, but in the eliciting [one]; but this is not the rational power, but the affective power, and most of all the irascible, as is clear from the reasons seen before. For penance regards not so much the vice, which it abominates, as the subject of sin, against which it rises up and which by rising up it punishes; and it regards not so much the fault or offense, as also the amendment; and this amendment is in the bearing of punishment, and therefore it is rightly called vengeance.

And therefore there is another opinion, that penance, as it is a special virtue, is in the irascible [power]. This position I believe more probable. For I do not grasp how penance could be in all the powers, since it is a special habit. — So neither do I grasp the second, how every virtue is in one power, supposing that the rational powers are several, which belong properly to the soul itself, as it is rational, whether they be several insofar as powers, or, as others say, several capacities. — Nor the third, how penance and humility are in reason, since they say that it is of affection, as even hope or charity itself is. — And therefore it must be said that, since penance of itself names a habit of affection, [it follows] that it is in the affective power. But since it names an affection of hatred or grief as of vengeance and as of one punishing, as is clear from manifold authority and reason in the objecting: and [since] that hatred which is with rising up is in the irascible power: [it follows] that penance itself is in the irascible [power].

1. To that therefore which is objected, that it is in the synderesis; it must be said that that argument fails, because to groan does not belong to the synderesis as eliciting nor as perfectly commanding, because thus it could command nothing to free choice; but rather as murmuring against evil and dictating good, because it naturally murmurs against evil; and in this it cannot err. And since a virtue is in the power in which resides the faculty and command of eliciting the act: therefore it is not in the synderesis, but in free choice. But the liberty of choice is not only in reason, but in the concupiscible and irascible, because it embraces reason and will; and the will contains the power of loving and of detesting, namely the concupiscible and the irascible.

2. To that which is objected, that it is in the rational [power]; it must be said that reason is named in many ways; yet as far as pertains to the proposal, it is named commonly and properly. Commonly it comprehends the whole portion of the soul divided against sensuality, in which three powers are placed; and so it is taken in the aforesaid Gloss. Properly it is taken for the power divided against the concupiscible and irascible; and thus it is objected, and thus the objection does not avail.

3. To that which is objected, that it is in the concupiscible [power] on account of this, that hatred is in the same;

it must be said that hatred is named in two ways: either with a certain displeasure, or with rising up, vengeance, and anger; and the first is in the concupiscible, the second in the irascible; and such is [the hatred] in penance. For just as a man is angered by anger and by zeal and is indignant at the sins of his neighbor; so by penance [he is angered] at his own sins.

4. To that which is objected, that it is in all [the powers]; it must be said that to expel all vices is in two ways; either by way of detesting, or by way of informing. By penance all vices are expelled by way of detesting and making satisfaction; but by way of informing each single vice is expelled by the virtue opposed to it. [The penance] which expels in the first way need not be in the same power, but [that which expels] in the second way [must]. And so that is clear.