Dist. 14, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/14/q/bon-sent-IV-d14-p2-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether penance restores to a man the good works previously mortified by sin.*

Thirdly it is asked whether penance restores to a man the good works previously mortified by sin. And that it does not, seems to be the case:

1. Hugh: "No one ought to sin in the hope of amendment, because what is once lost is no longer recovered": therefore if good works previously done have been lost through sin, it is impossible for them to be restored; therefore neither [can they] be revived.

2. Likewise, everything that is revived exists in some way; but what has altogether passed away exists in no way, and such are the good works previously done: therefore they can be neither revived nor recovered.

3. Likewise, it is impossible to recover again that same lost habit: therefore, by a like reasoning, it is impossible that the good works, previously mortified and lost, be recovered and revived as the same.

4. Likewise, if works are mortified and revived, then the same act in the same respect is susceptible of opposite conditions; which is impossible, because it is impossible that one motion in the same part be first swift and afterwards slow.

**On the contrary:** 1. Joel chapter two: *I will restore to you the years* etc.; the Gloss: "I will not allow that abundance to perish, which you lost amid your tribulations"; but that abundance was from the multitude of good works: therefore, if He does not allow it to perish, penance restores the good works mortified by sin.

2. Likewise, it appears by reason: because good works previously done were worthy of eternal reward; but that they are not now rewarded is because this man does not persevere in grace: therefore, if this man rises again and perseveres in grace, those works will be rewarded: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this man rejoices over the goods which he did before his fall, and rightly so: therefore he will rejoice in glory; but he would not rejoice in glory unless he had done them: therefore from those works mortified by sin eternal joy accrues: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the grace of penance can do more than sin can; but sin mortifies living works: therefore the mortified grace [restored] revives them.

> **Conclusion.** Good works which were first living and afterwards mortified by sin, when grace returns, come back to life.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is true and that common opinion holds it, that works which were previously living, because done out of charity and worthy of eternal life, afterwards, when sin comes, are mortified in this man — because, so long as sin is in him, they are no longer worthy of reward in him on account of his unworthiness — but again, when grace returns, which makes this man worthy of eternal life, the works are now worthy of reward in him, and therefore they are restored and revived. — And the reasons for this are to be conceded.

Now, for the understanding of the objections, it must be noted that some say that good works done in charity, because they are good and from God, are done unto the praise of God, and thence God ought to be praised; but because [they are done] in the unity of the mystical body and because in charity, they pertain to the mystical body; because [done] from a free and just will, [they pertain] to the reward of the root or to the merit of the doer. Hence, although this man, who did them, falls, the works nonetheless remain in the mystical body, because thence other members will rejoice, and God will thence be praised; yet nevertheless they do not remain unto the glory of the doer, and therefore they die in these men, when the man dies; but when he rises again from sin and is made [part] of the mystical body, the good works come back to life for him; and as to this they say that the saying of the Apocalypse, chapter three, is to be understood: *Hold fast what you have* etc.

Yet whatever be the case about this, whether they remain in the mystical body or not; it is true that they remain in the memory of the one who did them; and there is also no doubt that the works previously done remain in the memory of *God*; and so long as sin remains, they remain in the cognition of God, who beholds all things, and in the memory of the sinner. But there they do not remain unto rewarding, nor in the memory of the sinner unto rejoicing, but rather unto grieving, that from such great goods he has come to such great evils. But when he rises again, they remain in God unto rewarding, and in the memory of the sinner himself unto rejoicing. And therefore they remained before in some way, but dead, and afterwards they remain living.

1. To the objection from Hugh, therefore, it must be said that he understands it of that good work which a man could have done or would have done at the time at which he sinned, which indeed he will not recover: because, if at another time he wishes to do the work which he omitted, he loses the work which he ought to do at that [other] time. Hence Seneca says that the loss of time is the gravest loss, because it cannot be recovered.

2. To the second objection, it can be answered in two ways: either that they remain in the mystical body, as has been said, or that they remain in the memory of the one who did them, and of God, for whom he did them.

3. To the objection that it is impossible to recover the same habit, identical in number, that has been lost; it must be said that to be revived is one thing, to be recovered another. For recovery regards being, but revival

regards ordered being, or order, or being-such-and-such. And since that which ceases to be, if it begins to be again, is not the same in number but another; therefore a habit, if it is corrupted and lost, is not recovered as the same. But because it is possible that the same thing, remaining the same, should have one order and another; and according to this revival and mortification are reckoned in works, and perhaps in habits: therefore it is possible for a dead work to be revived, in such a way that it remains the same.

4. From this the last [objection] is solved: because, when a work is called living and mortified, this does not signify diverse dispositions about the work, but signifies about the work diverse orderings, namely an ordering to reward, while it lives, and the privation of that [ordering], when it is now dead or mortified. But in the recipient, or in the man, it signifies a diversity in respect of the quality of grace, which is an absolute accident of the subject itself, according to whose reception and loss the subject is now altered, and the man is called now dead, now living, now a sinner, now just, and so altered. But the work consequently is ordered to life, or is deprived of this order; and this does not signify a motion, because "in *the relative* there is per se no motion."