Dist. 14, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/14/q/bon-sent-IV-d14-p2-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first about this word of Isaiah, which is in the text: *Wash yourselves, be clean;* where Isidore says: *He is washed, and is not clean, who bewails the things he has done* etc. For it seems to be said badly, because *to wash* is nothing other than *to cleanse:* therefore *to be washed, and not to be clean,* is nothing other than *to be cleansed, and not to be clean,* and so they are opposites. — Likewise, when he says: *He is washed who bewails* etc.; either he understands of *outward* weeping, or of *inward.* If of the *outward,* then by this he is not washed. If of the *inward,* then it is settled that he is justified; if he does this from the heart: therefore he is clean.

**I respond:** It must be said that some expound this passage differently. For some say that *to be washed* and *to be clean* differ as act and habit; and thus he who repents, but at once relapses, is indeed washed, because he has the *act* of penitence, but a little after he falls, and so does not have the *habit,* and therefore is not called clean. — Otherwise it is expounded that *to be washed* and *to be clean* differ as the way and the terminus, or as disposition and preparation toward something. For the weeping and the sorrow of attrition disposes toward penitence. When therefore anyone grieves and is contrite, he is washed, because he is disposed toward cleanness; but yet, while he relapses, he again defiles himself, and therefore is not clean. And there is an example, if a woman were to wash a cloth and at once after a little washing were to plunge it into the mud. Whence the sayings are tropical and are to be expounded according to a certain metaphor.

As to what is asked, of what kind that washing is; I say that it is inward, and is not of contrition, but of attrition; or if it is of contrition, yet it does not denominate [one] clean, because it does not persevere, like a passion in the third species of quality.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that Augustine says *Lamentations profit nothing, when sins are repeated.* — For it seems to be said falsely, because they profit toward the remission of past sins, because at least those are forgiven: therefore they profit something, therefore not *nothing.* — Likewise, if you should say, as the Master says, that «they profit nothing toward salvation»; then by parity of reasoning he ought to say that baptism profits nothing, when sins are repeated.

**I respond:** It must be said that he understands of *habitual* repetition, because lamentations profit nothing when there is a will of repeating, because the foundation of penitence is lacking, and therefore those tears are feigned. — Or *Otherwise* it must be said, as the Master says, that «they profit nothing toward salvation». Nor is it similar with baptism, because, although it does not profit toward salvation, when sins are repeated, yet it profits on account of the impression of the character, and because the foundation of all the Sacraments is conferred; therefore it is not similar. But concerning penitence, when a man sins, nothing remains, and therefore it can and ought to be repeated.

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that Gregory says: *He who bewails the things committed, yet does not forsake [them], subjects himself to a graver penalty.* For it seems to be said badly, because *to bewail the things committed* is not a sin; but a man does not subject himself to a graver penalty except on account of fault: therefore etc. — Likewise, *to bewail* is good and penal: therefore it rather disposes toward grace than toward penalty.

**I respond:** It must be said that he does not say this of any weeping whatever, but of that of hypocrites, who in tears outwardly pretend sanctity and in the heart carry iniquity; and these sin doubly, and with respect to such Gregory speaks. — *Otherwise* it can be said that he speaks of him who weeps in an orderly way and in detestation of fault, that he subjects himself to a graver penalty not on account of the *weeping,* but on account of the *contempt.* For that weeping is from some gift of God; and when he *repeats* the sin, he despises the gift of God. — *Furthermore,* in the weeping itself the enormity of the sin is considered; therefore, when it is repeated, the offense is increased on account of the actual consideration. Whence, just as the habit of knowledge aggravates, and yet it is good to know and to recognize the sin; so to consider and bewail the enormity of the sin is good; and if anyone sins after this, the fault is aggravated *per accidens* [accidentally].

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this definition of the Master: *Penitence is a virtue or grace, by which the evils committed* etc. For it seems not to be fitting: because a definition ought to indicate the whole *being* of a thing; and the parts of penitence are confession and contrition and satisfaction: whence it seems that it ought to be defined not only by the act of contrition, which is to bewail and to hate sin, but also by the other acts. — Likewise, penitence is with respect to past [things] and not with respect to future [things]: therefore it is defined badly with respect to the future, when he says: *And not to commit again the things to be bewailed.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the principal act of penitence is the act of the heart and the inward act; and therefore by it he rather defines, and therefore he touches it explicitly. Whence *weeping* is here regarded not as to the effusion of outward tears, but of inward ones, because those outward [tears] are not of the *being* but of the *well-being.* Nevertheless it includes the other acts, when he says: «With a purpose of amendment», because *amendment* is made through confession and satisfaction; and since penitence, insofar as it is a virtue, regards *amendment,* and amendment does not stand with the repetition of fault: therefore *consequently* it regards the fault not to be repeated. And therefore the Master defines through the future, because, although penitence, as it is an *affection*, is with respect to the past; yet penitence-as-*virtue* also regards the future. Whence in the definition of penitence the Master touches a threefold act. One is the act of penitence insofar as it is *penitence;* and this is to grieve over the fault committed. Another is the act, insofar as penitence is a *virtue;* and this act is to will to amend, and he touches this, when he says: «With a purpose of amendment» etc. The third is annexed to both, namely *to be unwilling to offend* or to commit; and this perfects both. For no one truly repents of the past nor proposes to make amendment, unless he proposes no longer to offend.

### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *And, if penitence be done for a succeeding sin, both the penitence which preceded, and the other good [works] done before, revive.* For according to this it seems that *to vivify* is an act of penitence. But on the contrary: it seems that [it is] rather of *justice,* because to vivify the dead is nothing other than to justify; but justification is through general justice: therefore also vivification; and this seems [to be the case] from Ezekiel eighteen: *In the justice which he has wrought, he shall live and not die.* — Likewise it seems that this is of *faith,* [from] Hebrews ten and Habakkuk two: *The just lives by his faith.* — Likewise it seems that this is of *charity,* because «charity is the life of the soul», as Augustine and master Hugh of Saint Victor say. — Likewise it seems much rather to be of *grace*, because life is divided into the life of nature, of grace, and of glory.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as *to live* in natural things is sometimes called the *first act*, sometimes called a *sign* of life; so also sometimes life is attributed to that *from which it is,* sometimes to that *in which it is manifested.* It must be said therefore that that which vivifies is properly *grace;* but that through which it is manifested is *virtue*. Life can therefore be manifested as in *becoming,* or as in *accomplished being.* If as in *becoming,* thus it is attributed to the *virtue* of penitence, through which the vivification itself is manifested, because in contrition are perceived the signs of the expulsion of sin. If as in *accomplished being,* thus life can be manifested as to the *intellect,* and thus through *captivating faith;* or as to the *affect,* and thus through *invigorating charity,* or as to the *effect,* and thus through *regulating justice.* — And so the response is plain, why it is attributed to these, and the response to the objections, because life is not attributed to these as to a *principle,* but as to a *manifestative;* and such [things] can be several.

### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about this definition of Augustine which he places in the text: *Penitence is a certain vengeance of one grieving* etc. For it seems to be said badly; because no one in the same case can be both defendant and judge: therefore if anyone has sinned, he cannot reasonably punish himself. — Likewise, a man is more bound out of charity to love himself than another; but a man ought to spare another, not to take vengeance on himself: therefore he ought not to take vengeance nor to exact vengeance of himself. — Likewise, vengeance is of God alone, as is said to the Romans twelve: *Vengeance to me:* therefore penitence is of God alone, or vengeance in penitence.

**I respond:** It must be said that this account is fitting: because penitence is a virtue ordered to the destruction of the old man; and no one can begin a new life unless he repudiates the old; and no one can be made a friend of God unless he hates what God hates. Since therefore God hates sin with the hatred of vengeance, and [hates] the sinner himself; therefore the penitent ought to hate both the sin and to demand a reckoning of himself and vengeance.

To that, then, which is objected, that it does not pertain [to him]; it must be said that it does not pertain to him, insofar as he is the defendant, to judge; yet it pertains to him to be judged, insofar as he is the defendant, and to judge, insofar as he is just. Whence the *reason* itself, conformed to the eternal laws, punishes itself, inasmuch as it was conformed to the law of sin; and thus it receives authority from God, and it does not itself punish, but God. — Likewise, God has implanted in man a natural tribunal, to which he committed the kingdom of the soul to be judged; and *free choice,* conformed to it, ought to avenge transgression even in itself, not by its own authority, but by that of God and of the natural tribunal, which does not err. — When therefore it is said that the defendant and the judge are not the same, it is true: the same *in the same respect.*

What is objected, that he ought to spare; it must be said that although a man ought to spare his own injury; yet the injury of God is to be avenged by him to whom the care has been committed; and because the man has done injury to God, therefore he ought to be the minister of God in this part.

From this the last point is plain, that vengeance is God's; it is true of the vengeance by which someone *avenges himself,* because no one ought to avenge *himself,* but he ought to avenge *another* of himself, or of another. — Or it must be said that it is God's as of the *principal author,* man's as of the *minister.*

### Doubt VII

Likewise it is asked about this, that Augustine says: *Let him always grieve and rejoice over the grief.* For it seems to be said badly, because *joy* and *grief* are opposites; and «opposites are not naturally to be in the same [subject] at once»: therefore it is impossible that he always grieve and rejoice. *If you should say* that *grief* over sin and *joy* over grief do not have opposition; *on the contrary:* it seems that they do have opposition, because, whether of the same or of diverse [objects], it is impossible that the same soul be at once sorrowful and rejoicing: therefore it is impossible that he always grieve and rejoice. — Likewise, in grief the heart is moved according to constriction, in joy according to dilation; but «it cannot be moved by opposite motions at one and the same time»: therefore etc. *If you should say* that the joy is *in a certain respect,* and the grief *absolutely; on the contrary:* there is no virtue in which there is not delight, and if [it is] a virtue *absolutely,* there is delight *absolutely;* for virtue delights its possessor. — Likewise, joy is of the presence of a loved thing; therefore if the penitent greatly desires to grieve, it seems that if he greatly grieves, he rejoices absolutely.

**I respond:** It must be said that both are in the truly penitent, namely grief and joy; nor does the one diminish the other, but perfects [it]; just as *to will to grieve* or the desire of grief does not lessen the grief, but rather increases [it]; so also the *joy.* For in penitence, since it is a virtue, there is not only *grief,* but *voluntary grief;* and when anyone has what he loves and desires, he necessarily rejoices: therefore the penitent, when he has the grief which he desires, rejoices; nor does the joy remove the grief, but rather perfects [it], and there is grief and joy at once, just as Augustine says of himself in the fourth [book] of the *Confessions*, that «weeping alone was sweet to him», speaking of the dead friend, and this was on account of the vehemence of the grief; so also in the matter at hand.

As to what then is asked: how is it possible to be at once? it can be said that either they are not in the same power, but in diverse [powers], so that the grief be in the sensuality and the joy in the reason; and then there is nothing impossible, that one power rejoice over a grief existing in another. — Or it must be said that they are in the same power insofar as it turns upon itself; whence just as the *intellective power* turns upon the sin and upon the grief not with a simple act, but a composite one; so also the *affect.* Whence just as in reasoning we say that there is one act, yet the intellect turns itself upon several [things], which it knows in diverse ways; so also the consequent affect, without any repugnance, is affected in diverse ways. And thus the objections are plain.

### Doubt VIII

Likewise it is asked about this, that the Master says, that this: *Penitence is a vengeance always punishing* etc., is understood of the penitence of the perfect. For it seems to be said badly, because Augustine says that «if penitence is ended, nothing of pardon is left»: therefore *to punish always* pertains to all.

**I respond:** It must be said that one is called perfect in two ways: either as to *duration of time,* or as to *sublimity of state.* The first perfection is that which is co-divided against the *beginners* and the *proficient* according to advance in time. The other perfection consists in works of supererogation. But the Master understands of perfection in the first way and calls *the penitence of the perfect* that which lasts until the end of life; and of this he says that that [saying] of Augustine is understood, that it *always punishes.* — It must be noted, however, that it ought *to punish always* not absolutely, but so long as the fault lasts. And so that [saying] is plain.

### Doubt IX

It must be noted upon this, that he says that *solemn penitence is done outside the church,* where four [things] are to be noted: first, of what kind it is, or what its form is; and it must be said that *solemn* penitence is penitence adding upon *public* [penitence], because it is not only in the open, but because it is done with a certain solemnity. For at the head of Lent the penitent is cast out of the church, nor is he admitted until the day of the [Lord's] Supper, and then too he does not communicate. He is cast out, moreover, by an authoritative person, such as by the bishop, the priests being present, who have known the fault.

Secondly there is to be noted a threefold reason of this solemnity: one is for the terror of others, another on account of the shame of the offender, and the third on account of the signification of the casting-out of Adam from paradise. Whence the bishop ought to announce this with frequent sighs, and so [the penitent] is cast out, just as Adam was cast out from paradise; and therefore it is not to be repeated. And concerning this it is had in the fiftieth distinction, in the chapter *Poenitentes*, and in the following chapter, and in the same distinction in the chapter *Si quis post remissionem,* in the paragraph *Potest et aliter.*

It must also be noted that this penitence is not imposed except for a grave and enormous fault, especially for a fault which has moved the whole city, as is said there. Nor is it to be imposed for priests on account of the reverence of the Order; public penitence may indeed be imposed for a manifest sin.

Fourthly it must be noted that the penitent is not solemnly reconciled except by the bishop, or by a priest by mandate of the bishop, especially in the article of necessity. He can, moreover, be reconciled on the octave of Easter, if he has repented well, and have entrance to the church; but if not, he will remain thus until the end of life: and concerning this it is said in Cause twenty-six, question six.

### Doubt X

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says that this *is not observed in certain Churches.* For such Churches seem to sin, since they act against the rationale of the Sacrament and of the signification of solemn penitence.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is not of the necessity of penitence, but only of its *well-being;* yet, where there are hard peoples, this penitence is repeated for a cause, that the hardness may be broken by manifold confusion, which was not broken by a single one; and hardly could so prolonged a hidden penitence be imposed on such [people], that they would undertake or keep it: therefore such penitence is repeated for a cause.

### Doubt XI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *But that penitence be not done only once, but be frequently repeated.* For it seems to be said badly, because upon that [text] of Amos one: *For three crimes of Damascus and for four I will not convert him;* the Gloss of Jerome: «To one committing the same sins a fourth time he declares that he will give neither penitence nor indulgence»: therefore it does not seem [to be] frequently, but only four times.

**I respond:** It must be said that Jerome understands that the first sin is to consent in the heart, the second is to do [it] in deed, the third is to turn [it] into a custom, the fourth is finally not to repent; and of this he gives neither penitence nor pardon, because after death there is no place of penitence. From the other three he frees [him] and gives penitence and pardon at once, as is proven and intimated in the raising of the three dead, of whom one he raised in the house, another at the gate, and the third in the sepulcher.

### Doubt XII

Likewise it is asked about this, that Chrysostom says: *Even if anyone arrives at the summit of evils.* For it seems to be said badly, because no one is so evil but that he can still sin: therefore no one is so evil but that he can still become worse. — Likewise, in the Psalm it is said: *The pride of those who hate you ascends always:* therefore if it always grows, there is never a state as to the act.

**I respond:** It must be said that this can be understood according to the *act,* so that he be so evil that none [be] worse: it is not understood according to the *potency.* — Or let it be said that this is understood according to the *genus* of sin, that if anyone sins with a most enormous sin, still God is ready to spare, while [the man] is on the way; and this he calls *the summit of evils:* because it is *an evil against* divine *grace,* like fornication; and there is *an evil against grace and reason,* like perjury; and there is *an evil against grace, reason, and nature,* like sodomy, and that is the worst; or if any other genus of sin be worse, like blasphemy against God or the spirit of blasphemy.

### Doubt XIII

Likewise it is asked about this, that Augustine says, that *David sinned in the numbering of the people.* That word of Augustine seems false, because Moses numbered the people, Numbers twenty-six, and likewise Saul, first [book] of Kings eleven; and yet neither sinned: therefore by parity of reasoning neither [did] David. — Likewise, David sinned: therefore the people ought not to have been punished, but rather he himself who had sinned.

**I respond:** To the first it must be said that Moses numbered by mandate of the Lord, and Saul on account of the expedition to battle; but David on account of pride; for he wished to glory in the numerous multitude of the people.

As to what is asked: why was the people punished? it is answered, on account of the connection of the people to the prince, on account of which also the children of Israel were punished in

peccato Achor [the sin of Achan], Joshua seven. — Or it can be said, and better, that the Lord punished the prince in the people, that he might be punished in the very [thing] in which he gloried, just as someone is punished in his own possession. — Some, however, judge that by the just judgment of God it was permitted that those should be punished who had adhered to Absalom. — Yet there was a great figure and instruction in this, that by the sense of the figure it might be shown how much an evil prelate and his sin harms his subjects, and how much his prayer profits in [the prelate's] own penitence and sanctity.