Dist. 15, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/15/q/bon-sent-IV-d15-p1-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether it is possible to satisfy God for one sin while another is retained.*

Secondly it is asked whether it is possible to satisfy God for one sin while another is retained. And that it is, seems to be the case:

1. To the Fourth [chapter] of First Timothy: *Godliness is profitable unto all things;* the Gloss: «The sum of Christian discipline is in piety and mercy; and whoever follows it, even if he should suffer the slipperiness of the flesh, will without doubt be scourged, yet not perish»; and it is clear that it understands [this] of mortal slipperiness, because, if [it were understood] of venial [sin], even without that one would not perish: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems so *by reason:* because satisfaction corresponds to transgression by opposition: therefore, since it is possible to transgress successively, first in one way, then in another; it likewise seems that one may also satisfy first for one sin, then for another.

3. Likewise, to one sin one penalty is due and one

satisfaction, whence too another [penalty] is imposed; suppose then that for some sin the due penalty be imposed; if one carries it out, nothing further can or ought to be exacted from him; but he can carry it out while committing another fault: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, God desires more that satisfaction be made to him by a sinner than any creditor [desires] payment from a debtor; but a creditor who greatly desires payment receives payment of one [debt] without another: therefore God too [receives] satisfaction for one sin without another.

5. Likewise, a man can satisfy for one venial [sin] while committing also another: therefore by equal reasoning [also] for a mortal one; or else why not?

**On the contrary:** 1. Isaiah fifty-eight: *Behold, you fast for strifes and contentions;* and afterward: *Is such a fast as this what I have chosen?* as if to say: No. Therefore a fast for sin does not please God when in fasting sins are committed.

2. Likewise, Gregory in a homily: «Whoever so weeps for some things that he commits others either does not know how to do penance, or dissembles it».

3. Likewise, it seems so *by reason:* because in this the sinner is worthy of penalty, because he deforms the image of God: therefore he never satisfies except by a reformation of the image; but in him who satisfies and again sins, the image is never reformed: therefore such a one never satisfies.

4. Likewise, in sin there is conversion and aversion, and a penalty is due to the sinner by reason of the aversion; but all sins agree in aversion: therefore satisfaction regards sins according to that in which they agree: therefore it is impossible to satisfy for one without another.

> **Conclusion.** It is an error to hold that a sinner satisfies for one sin while persisting in another.

**I respond:** It must be said that some have held that satisfaction could be made for one sin while the sinner persisted in another. And their reason was the divine kindness, which accepts satisfaction however small. — But nevertheless these men did not sufficiently consider what it is *to satisfy.* For to satisfy does not mean only the *bearing of penalty,* because God does not delight in our evils, but delights in the *justice of our will* and in *reconciliation,* which cannot be had of one fault without another: both on account of the *connection of the virtues* in one grace, which blots out every mortal fault, since it has every virtue connected; and on account of the divine generosity, which does not show favor in part, but rather pardons every offense; and on account of mortal sins, which all share in aversion and contempt of God, and are all against God and against the one: and therefore, if God were to remit the fault of one without another, he to whom it is remitted would be at once friend and enemy, converted and averted.

And therefore, as the Master says, it is an error to hold this — that a man should satisfy God while offending God — because the aversion and the deformation of the image and the enmity always remain. And therefore it is said in Ecclesiastes nine: *He who sins in one thing shall lose many good things;* and blessed James, in the second chapter: *Whoever offends in one thing is made guilty of all:* because he who sins in one does not satisfy for anything, in that in every sin the one [God] is offended, and it is impossible that God be friend and enemy of the same person.

1. To the objection therefore from that Gloss, *Solely* that he will not perish; it must be said that it is understood [thus], that by works of piety he is prepared for the grace by which he may satisfy for all.

2. To the objection from transgression, it must be said that it is not similar. For because we do evil things, therefore we are evil; and therefore, since the acts are not connected, neither are the transgressions; but not because we do good things are we good, but the contrary; and therefore it is necessary that one be a friend before he satisfies for any sin; and if he is a friend, then he has no mortal sin.

3. To the other [objection] it must be said that to this sin so great a penalty is due of itself — unless it be remitted by grace — that it is impossible for him to pay it, because it is infinite; and therefore the due penalty can never be assessed so long as he remains in fault.

4. To the other [objection], that God desires satisfaction more than a creditor [desires] payment; it must be said that God likewise receives satisfaction little by little; but as long as one is in any fault, he is not paying anything, but rather binding himself the more; and therefore God does not receive [it].

5. To the objection from the venial [sin], it must be said that it is not similar, because the *venial* stands together with the grace through which it happens that one satisfies; not so the *mortal,* but rather any mortal [sin] takes away the foundation of satisfaction, as will better appear in the following problem.