Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/15/q/bon-sent-IV-d15-p2-a1-q3
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### Question III. *By what kind of works satisfaction ought to be made.*

Thirdly it is asked by what kind of works satisfaction ought to be made. And it seems [that it ought to be made] only by *penal* [works].

1. Gregory, in a certain homily: "It is just that a sinner should bring upon himself the greater laments by penance, the greater the harms he inflicted by his fault."

2. Likewise, it seems [so] by *reason*: because the sinner, by the very fact that he sinned, is a debtor of punishment; but in satisfaction he pays what he owes: therefore he pays punishment, therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the universe would remain disordered if sin remained unpunished; but after satisfaction the sinner is not punished: therefore it is necessary that he be punished beforehand.

4. Likewise, Gregory says, and it is true, that just as in bodily things, so also in spiritual things there is curing by the contrary; but a lustful sin is committed through pleasure and cured through satisfaction: therefore satisfaction ought to be by punishment.

5. Likewise, in penance and its parts the sinner takes upon himself justice and vindication, as was shown above; but vindication is taken upon sin only through punishment: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Anselm, in the book *Cur Deus homo*: "It does not suffice only to render what was taken away, but for the affront inflicted one must expend more besides"; and of this there are many manifest examples in the Law. *Properly*, therefore, satisfaction is not made from good works according as they are good, speaking precisely, but one must further understand something in them by which [they] become satisfactory for the offense; but nothing other than punishment seems [to be that] which could be understood in them. And this also seems most fitting, because, since punishment essentially follows upon fault, it is manifest that the sinner, by reason of his fault, has been made a debtor of punishment. To this end, therefore, that he may satisfy, there are required not only good works, but also penal good [works], because otherwise penal [works] would not be meritorious, because otherwise satisfaction would not be made through these.

2. Likewise, God does not take delight in our punishments, therefore penal works please God no more than others; but by that which pleases more, He to whom satisfaction is owed is better satisfied: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, certain sins are perpetrated with sadness; but satisfaction ought to be by the contrary: therefore satisfaction for these sins ought to be made without punishment, as, for instance, are envy and sloth.

4. Likewise, if a satisfactory [work] is penal, speaking per se, then the more penal is the more satisfactory; but for a miser it is more penal to give a penny than for a generous man to give a mark: therefore he satisfies more by a penny than the other by a mark. Likewise it can be objected in the case of *fasting* and *prayer*; and this is unfitting, because the wicked would carry off an advantage from their wickedness.

> **Conclusion.** *Satisfaction is made through penal works.*

**I respond:** It must be said that satisfaction is through penal works. — And the reason for this is fourfold. The *first* is that there [is found] the *rendering of honor taken away*; whence a man ought to render that honor more amply than if he had not taken it away; and therefore it is required that he not only serve God by a good operation, but also cast himself down by an assumed punishment. — The *second* reason is that there is first a *disordering*; and because what is disordered by fault is best ordered in punishment, therefore etc. — The *third* reason is that there [is] the *curing* of one made infirm; because one made infirm through the heat of pleasure is cured through the cold of penalty, etc. — The *fourth* reason is that there [is] the *discharge of a debt*; and because the sinner is a debtor of punishment, therefore he ought to satisfy through punishment.

1. From this the first objection is made clear: because it is a *debt of honor* coming *from a good conferred*, and this we owe through *the giving of thanks*; and coming from the *command of obedience* enjoined, and this we owe through *the subjection of obedience*; and coming from the *imperative of [His] Majesty*, and this we owe through *the adoration of latria*; and coming from *the sin committed*, and this honor is rendered to God through *the punishment of oneself*; and this is in satisfaction.

2. To the objection that God does not take delight in punishments: it must be said that it is true; not by that account by which [they are] *punishments curing* [as a remedy], but by that account by which, *curing* and *honoring the divine justice*, He takes delight in them.

3. It is to be resolved that, although in certain sins sadness accompanies, the root nevertheless is from lustful pleasure.

4. To the last it must be said that something is penal by nature, as, for instance, the abstinence of fasting and the giving away of goods, in which human infirmity is supported; something [is penal] by reason of *fault* and the disordering of the will. The first penality is regarded per se in satisfaction, but not the second; and concerning this second [the objection] argues.