Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/15/q/bon-sent-IV-d15-p2-a2-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article II. *On the manner of making satisfaction in particular.*

Consequently, as to the second article, the question is asked concerning the manner of making satisfaction in particular. And concerning this four things are asked.

First it is asked, from what goods almsgiving ought to be done.

Second, whether one may make satisfaction by fasting.

Third, whether one may make satisfaction by prayer.

Fourth and last, the question is asked concerning restitution.

### Question I. *From what goods almsgiving ought to be done.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus. It is commonly said that almsgiving ought to be done from one's own goods, justly acquired and necessary. And that it must be only from one's own goods, seems [the case]:

1. Because the law says that a possession cannot be alienated except by its proper owner; but when alms are given, the possession is alienated, since it becomes the property of the poor man receiving it: therefore no one can give alms except the one who has property and has ownership over the temporal thing.

2. Likewise, this is proved from the text of the Bible, Proverbs the third chapter: *Honor the Lord with thy substance, and give to the poor of the firstfruits of thy crops.*

That it must be only from goods justly acquired is shown.

3. Ecclesiasticus the thirty-fourth chapter: *The offering of one who sacrifices from what is unjust is defiled;* and below: *The Most High does not approve the gifts of the unjust.*

4. Likewise, Gregory in the *Morals*: «That alms pleases the eyes of the Redeemer which is gathered not from unlawful things, or

from iniquity, but which is from things granted and justly acquired». And again he says: «It is not to be reckoned as alms, if what is acquired from unlawful things is dispensed to the poor».

Likewise, that it must be from necessary goods, seems [the case].

5. For that is not satisfactory to which one is otherwise bound; but everyone is bound to give his superfluous goods to the poor, however much this is without sin, Luke the eleventh chapter: *That which remaineth, give alms:* therefore etc.

6. Likewise, Gregory in the homily upon that text: *Bring forth fruits worthy of penance:* «He who knows that he has committed certain unlawful things ought to abstain from things lawful»: therefore if the satisfactory abstinence is not that which is from unlawful things, but that which is from lawful things; it seems likewise that the satisfactory almsgiving is that, not which is from superfluous goods, but which is from necessary goods.

**On the contrary**, that it ought not to be from necessary goods — that we may begin by resolving or destroying — it seems:

1. Because each one is bound to love himself more than another: therefore he is bound to keep necessary goods for himself.

2. Likewise, to give the necessities of human life is a matter of supererogation; but no priest can impose works of supererogation: therefore neither such almsgiving. If, then, that almsgiving which is imposed by a priest is satisfactory, it is not required that it be from necessary goods.

Likewise, it seems that it can be from goods unjustly acquired.

3. Because in Luke the sixteenth chapter it is said: *Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity;* the Gloss: «Iniquity well dispensed is turned into justice».

4. Likewise Augustine, in Cause fourteen, question five: «You who have something from evil, make from it good».

Likewise, here it is asked, whether a harlot, or a usurer, or a gambler can make alms from his gain, since all these acquire by an evil manner.

Likewise, it seems that it need not be done from one's own goods.

5. Because the children of Israel took away the vessels of the Egyptians, Exodus the twelfth chapter, and afterward offered them for the use of the tabernacle, Exodus the thirty-fifth chapter.

6. Likewise, if this were true, since a wife and a son and a monk have no ownership; it seems that they can make no alms; which is false, since they are the more bound to be hospitable, and wives frequently give more than husbands.

> **Conclusion.** Almsgiving, in order that it be properly satisfactory, ought to be done from one's own goods, justly acquired and necessary according to the common manner of living.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is necessary for almsgiving to be satisfactory, namely that the one who bestows it should hold it by a just title and be able to keep and possess it; for if he has it otherwise, he is bound rather to restore it than to give it.

As to what is asked, then, whether it is necessary to give alms from one's own: it must be said that a thing is called one's own either because one has the principal ownership of alienating it, or because from another one has entrusted to oneself the office of administering it. In the first way the one who has property can simply do it; in the second way he cannot do it when his superior forbids, as a monk, who administers the goods and property of the monastery by the abbot's mandate, can indeed give alms; but if the abbot forbids it, he cannot and ought not. Hence Cause twelve, question one: «It is certain that a monk ought to have nothing, or give, or receive without the superior's leave», unless perhaps the one who is in need is in extreme necessity; for then he ought not to obey the abbot, since he would manifestly act against God. Similarly it must be judged concerning a wife — if she has no dowry, or anything in lieu of a dowry — that against her husband's mandate she cannot make alms, if her conscience dictates to her that he in no way wills it; but she ought not to form for herself the conscience that her husband forbids what is moderate, but [only] what is superfluous, unless she manifestly sees the husband's will to the contrary.

5. If, then, the objection is made concerning the children of Israel, who stole; it must be said that the Lord transferred the ownership, and in truth there was no theft there.

6. To the objection that monks are of an evil condition; it must be said that they are not, because by the single renunciation of temporal things, if they have truly renounced temporal goods, they have merited as much as in many things; and besides, good will supplies what is lacking from the hand.

To what is asked concerning ill-gotten goods, it must be said that some things are ill-gotten in which ownership is transferred and there is no right of recovery; and such things need not be restored and can lawfully be retained, like the wage of prostitution and the gain of a stage-player. And such things can be given in alms, but nevertheless ought not to be received as an offering, if it is public, on account of reverence for the altar and the shame of the sin, that they may come to their senses. And this is what is said in Deuteronomy the twenty-third chapter: *Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet.* — But some things are such in which ownership is not transferred, but there is a right of recovery, as in theft and robbery; and from such things neither an offering nor an alms can be made, but restitution must be made. — And to this kind are reduced all things that are possessed by an unjust title and in bad faith, since an unjust title is to be held as nothing. But a possessor in bad faith is said to be one who trades contrary to the prohibitions of the laws; such are the things had through simony and usury; and therefore from such things in no way can or ought alms be made.

But if the question is raised concerning a gambler, it must be said generally that he is a possessor in bad faith and possesses by an unjust title; and therefore in no way can or ought he keep for himself what he has won, since such play is base and reprobated and against God and against all laws. — Yet whether he is bound to make restitution, some distinguish; because either the person with whom he won is such a person as cannot manage his own affairs, such as a minor or ward, deaf, dumb, perpetually wasted by sickness; and thus he is bound to restore. But if it is such a person as could have lost; then either the companion was drawn in and induced by him, or not. If he was drawn in by him, he is not bound to restore to him, since there is no right of recovery for him in punishment of his sin, but he can make alms from it. But if he himself drew him in, he cannot make alms, but is bound to restore, at least in the court of conscience, since, although no one wishes to lose, yet he who does not wish to lose nor to play but is induced seems less culpable, and the other, who induces, more so; and therefore the latter ought not to be harmed, nor the author nor the inducer in any respect bettered. To no one, however, is it lawful from this to convert any of the gain acquired to his own uses.

Similarly it must be judged concerning tournaments, and it must be said that in those agreements which they make among themselves, goods are not transferred to one another but are converted to the uses of the poor, on account of the dishonor of the play and the interdiction of the law.

From these things the objections are clear. For what is said, that alms cannot be made from what is unjust, is understood of that which is possessed unjustly and by an unjust title.

What is objected to the contrary proceeds by another way.

To what is asked concerning necessary and superfluous goods, it must be said that the necessary is spoken of in two ways: either according to the strictness of nature, or according to the common manner of living. If according to strictness; one is not bound, nor ought it to be imposed on the one who has sinned; because this belongs to the perfection of those who await their whole sustenance from Christ, such as are men who are in the state of perfection; and therefore, if alms be made, it ought to be made from what is over and above this necessary, and it is indeed satisfactory. — In another way the necessary is spoken of, namely what is expedient for a man according to the common manner of living. Of which Augustine says, that «we shall be shown to have much superfluous, if we keep only the necessary»; and from such goods properly satisfactory alms is made; but from the superfluous it is not made, so far as concerns the rigor of justice. — Yet I believe that the kindness of the divine mercy is so great that it accepts the whole and saves us as if for nothing. — And thus the reply to both parts is clear.