Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/15/q/bon-sent-IV-d15-p2-a2-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether restitution is a part of satisfaction.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether restitution is a part of satisfaction. And that it is, it seems:

1. Because by some sin we sin against God alone, by another against God and neighbor, as in robbery; but it is established that satisfaction answers to the injury: therefore satisfaction must be made in this case to God and to the neighbor. But satisfaction is made to the neighbor through restitution: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, he who sins through gluttony in no way makes better satisfaction than through the sobriety of fasting: therefore he who sins by carrying off another's property makes no better satisfaction than by restoring it: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is shown by a sign: because, if there are two robbers, one of whom is engaged in restoring and the other not, the priest imposes a lesser penance on him who is able to restore, a greater on him who is not: therefore restitution contributes to satisfaction.

4. Likewise, « to satisfy is to cut away the causes of sins »; but the cause why the robber is in sin is that he has carried off and retains another's property: therefore satisfaction is through the restoration of the retained thing, because here the cause of the sin is cut away.

**On the contrary:**
1. Sin is sin by the very fact that it is against God, and because the image of God is deformed, not because it is against another like himself — for then a lion would sin when it ate another animal — whence also in the Psalm: *Against thee only have I sinned*: therefore satisfaction is to be made to God alone; but this is not through restitution, because restitution regards the neighbor directly: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, satisfaction is through a penalty, to which a man is not otherwise bound except through fault and according to the judgment of the priest; but to the restitution of another's property he is bound, by the very fact that it is another's, and by the judgment of God without a priest: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if it is a part of satisfaction, since no satisfaction is without charity, neither is restitution without charity; but this is false: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, since there are three parts of satisfaction, namely fasting, prayer, and almsgiving; it is asked: under which of them is it contained? and since it is under none, the point is plain, etc.

### CONCLUSION.

> Restitution can be called a part of satisfaction taken broadly, but not properly.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there is a twofold opinion.

Some say that restitution is not a *part* of satisfaction, but a *foundation*. For certain things are required for penance or satisfaction as foundations, and such are the dismissal of sin and the restitution of another's property; certain things as *expedient*, such as avoiding evil company; certain things as *satisfactory*, such as fasting, prayer, and almsgiving; certain things as *perfecting*, such as the works of supererogation, in Luke ten: *Whatsoever thou shalt spend over and above, I will repay thee.* — And their reason is that fault is properly against God, and that satisfaction is through a penalty arbitrarily set at the priest's discretion.

But there is another opinion, that restitution is a satisfactory work, if it is done in charity; otherwise not, just as neither are the other works.

It could nevertheless be said that satisfaction is spoken of both broadly and properly: broadly, every penal work voluntarily undertaken, whether one to which a man is bound by the judgment of God or by the judgment of the priest; and thus restitution is a satisfactory work and a part of it. But if satisfaction be taken properly, as a penalty voluntarily undertaken, to which one was not bound except from fault and the judgment of the priest; thus it is not a part, because he who has another's property is bound to restore it by every right, even if the priest never imposes it. — The reasons, therefore, for the first part proceed concerning satisfaction taken broadly; otherwise they all proceed from an insufficient ground.

**To the arguments for the negative part:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected on the opposite side, that sin is against God alone etc.; it must be said that this is true *in itself*; but nevertheless, because man is the image of God, and « the honor and dishonor of an image is referred to its prototype »; therefore, just as out of charity man is to be loved insofar as he is an image, so also one can sin against him. — Or it must be said otherwise, that either it is understood of him who has no superior to punish; or it is understood *first and principally*; or of the sin which is not against the *neighbor outwardly*, but through *pride inwardly*.

*To 2.* To the other the response is plain, because it objects concerning satisfaction taken *properly*.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it is not without charity; it must be said that satisfaction, because it is to God, cannot be except in charity; restitution, because it is to the neighbor, can be done outwardly; but for it to please God, it must be in charity.

*To 4.* To the last it must be said that it is reduced to none of those parts, because they are of satisfaction properly so called.

*To that, however, which is objected to the contrary*, that one sins against the neighbor; it must be said that one does not sin against the neighbor except *by accident*, namely because God is offended in the neighbor; and therefore satisfaction is to be made to God alone. Nor do those who say that restitution is satisfactory; they say so *not* because through it a man satisfies the neighbor, but because in some way, while he restores the thing which he loves and could in fact retain, out of love of God and at the command of the priest he restores it. Nevertheless restitution is not properly satisfaction, but a beginning of it. But when he gives something of his own, then he rightly gives honor to God and adds something further; therefore he satisfies.

*To 3.* To that which says that a greater penance is imposed, it can be said that this is because he has squandered the neighbor's property.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that he cannot be better cured; it must be said that this is false; rather, one is better cured if he gives of his own.

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