Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/16/q/bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-a1-q2
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### Question II. *What contrition is in the moral genus.*

Secondly it is asked what contrition is in the moral genus. And that it is the act of a virtue seems to be the case:

1. Because every act that is difficult and meritorious is the act either of a virtue, or of a gift, or of beatitude; but contrition is of this kind and is not of a gift nor of beatitude: therefore it is of a virtue.

2. Likewise, every special meritorious act, which issues from a determinate power, is the act of a special virtue; but contrition is of this kind: therefore contrition is the act of a special virtue.

3. Likewise, penitence is grief and bitterness of mind; but it is agreed that this is said by way of cause,

quia penitence, as Ambrose says, causes one to grieve: therefore, if contrition is grief, contrition is the act of the virtue of penitence: therefore, and so on.

**On the contrary:**
1. Contrition is grief; but grief is a passion, and a passion is not the act of a virtue nor of grace: therefore neither is contrition. That grief is a passion is plain, because grief is opposed to delight.

2. Likewise, contrition is expulsive of sin; but to expel sin belongs to grace itself: therefore contrition is an act of grace. And if you say that this belongs to a virtue; on the contrary: either this belongs to a virtue through grace, or the reverse. It is agreed that it belongs to a virtue by reason of grace, which is life, and therefore expels death: since, then, contrition is of itself expulsive of sin, it is plain that contrition is an act of grace.

3. Likewise, by contrition all sins are expelled; but everything of this kind is common to every power and habit of the soul: therefore contrition is not the act of a virtue, or if it is, it is not the act of a special virtue.

> **Conclusion.** Contrition is the motion of a special virtue, namely of penitence.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there were three opinions: one, that contrition is a motion of free choice informed by grace, not by virtue, on account of which it is expulsive of sin; another, that it is a motion of all the virtues, because it is against all sins; the third, that it is a motion of a special virtue, namely of penitence. And these three opinions take their origin from the opinions about penitence: for some said that penitence was grace; some, that it was a general virtue; some, that it was a special one. But since it was shown above that it is a special virtue, whose motion is to detest the sin committed in order to amend it — and this is to be contrite — it must be said that contrition is the motion of a special virtue, namely of penitence.

1. To that which is objected, that it is a passion; it must be said that grief is spoken of in two ways: in one way, as the dissent of the rational will, in another way, as a passion overflowing into the sentient being. In the first way it is a motion of the will, and thus contrition is grief by essence; in the other way it is a passion, and thus contrition is grief by concomitance.

2. To that which is objected, that to blot out fault belongs to grace; it must be said that although to blot out fault belongs to grace, nevertheless in an adult, who prepares himself through the use of free choice, grace is infused, as it is in such a use; the blotting out of fault in him comes about through grace, inasmuch as it puts on the character of a virtue, and therefore through penitence, which has to do with grace and the habit of virtue.

3. To that which is objected, that it expels all things; it must be said that it expels by way of detesting; and it belongs to one virtue to detest every evil under that account by which it is offensive to God, and because it was committed against God; and thus contrition detests and expels and is the virtue of penitence. Hence, just as obedience regards the works of all the virtues under the account of a command, and is not for that reason a general virtue — because, although they differ by essence, nevertheless the formal account is one according to species — so also in the case proposed. — And it is similar with sight, which sees a man and a plant, which differ not only in species but even in genus; yet it sees them, because they are colored; it sees also white and black, which are objects in themselves and differ in species; and yet it does not itself differ, because it sees by the nature of light: thus contrition detests pride and lust insofar as they are an evil perpetrated against God by the one who is contrite. And if you object that contrition is a power of the concupiscible part, and penitence is in the irascible; it was resolved above. For grief and hatred with an uprising consist in the irascible; nevertheless together with that there is a certain grief in the concupiscible, and this is commanded by penitence and joined with that grief; and thus it is not contrary to the things said before, because both concur in contrition, but the first grief is the chief and principal one.

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