Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/16/q/bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On contrition as to its quantity.*

Next, as to the second article, the inquiry concerns contrition as regards its quantity. And about this two things are asked.

First, it is asked whether the sorrow of contrition must necessarily be the greatest.

Second, whether it is possible for an excess to occur in that sorrow.

### Question I. *Whether the sorrow of contrition must necessarily be the greatest.*

As to the first, then, it is asked whether the sorrow of contrition must necessarily be the greatest — that is, whether, in order for contrition to be sufficient, it is necessary to grieve more over sin than over any temporal thing. And that it is so, it seems.

1. Jeremiah 6: *Make for thyself the mourning of an only son*; the Gloss: « It teaches the penitent what he ought to do »; and another Gloss: « Nothing is more grievous than the death of an only son »: therefore one ought to grieve so much over sin that over nothing more.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the twenty-first book *On the City of God*: « It is necessary that the sorrow burn as much as the love had clung »: therefore if one grieves more over the loss of a temporal thing than over the loss of God through fault, then he loves the temporal thing more than God; but no such person truly repents: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason: because sorrow is founded on love and every affection, as Augustine says; but the love of God ought to be greater than every love of a creature: therefore the sorrow from the loss of God also [ought to be greater].

4. Likewise, the sorrow of contrition is from grace and free will, but the other is only from fault and free will; but grace strengthens more toward the good than fault inclines toward evil: therefore the motion of sorrow [is] stronger.

5. Likewise, the just soul is united more to God than to itself by love; but over that to which one is more united, one grieves more when it is separated: therefore he grieves more that he is separated from God through sin than over the death of a neighbor and of his body, if it were possible.

6. Likewise, everyone having an ordered soul grieves more over the loss of a greater good; but God is the highest good, and every contrite person has an ordered soul: therefore he grieves more over the loss of God than over the loss of another created good.

**On the contrary:**
1. It is shown that it need not be greater than [the sorrow] over some temporal thing: because « that is whiter which is more unmixed with black »: therefore that sorrow is greater which has less of joy; but the sorrow of contrition is mixed with joy, while some other [sorrow] is sometimes without any joy: therefore that one is greater.

2. Likewise, one ought to grieve more over that which cannot be recovered than over that which can be recovered and has been recovered; but the loss of a son cannot be recovered, [whereas] the loss of God in the penitent has been recovered: therefore he need not grieve as much over the loss of God as over the loss of a son.

3. Likewise, that one need not grieve so much seems [true], because, however small the grace may be, it blots out all fault: therefore likewise on the side of sorrow, however small it is, provided it be informed by grace, it will blot out all fault: therefore it need not be greater than every other.

4. Likewise, if this were required, then few would be contrite; for few are those who would rather be blind than have never sinned; we see also many penitent men who weep at the death of kinsmen, who cannot weep for their sins.

> **Conclusion.** The sorrow of contrition need not be the greatest as to sensuality, nor as to the displeasure of reason absolutely, but only greater in comparison with other sorrows.

**I respond:** It must be said that, when the question concerns the quantity of sorrow, sorrow can be called the displeasure of reason, or the passion resulting from it in sensuality. If it be taken in this second way, I say that it is not necessary to grieve more over sin than over a temporal thing, nor even is it necessary to grieve, because it is not in everyone's power. For such sorrow does not follow upon love, but follows upon the affection itself, and the affection [follows upon] experiential knowledge; and because not all have experience of divine love: therefore not all grieve so sensibly over sins. Nevertheless, that someone should grieve also more sensibly over sin than over some loss — this belongs to perfection and is fitting, [but is] not necessary.

But insofar as sorrow is called the displeasure of reason, thus I say that this displeasure is measured according to the quantity of charity. Now the quantity of charity can be taken in two ways: either in itself, or in comparison with other loves: in itself, thus I say that it is small and greater and greatest; in comparison with others, thus I say that it claims for itself dominion in the heart as long as it is present; nor is it ever there unless it be mistress; whence I say that, in order that

someone may have charity, it is necessary that he love God above all things; and this is to love above all things, that for no loss or advantage he be willing to offend God. Thus is it to be understood concerning the displeasure of contrition. — Whence I say that sin ought so to displease reason that by no pact, no advantage, would he be willing to consent or to have consented to it; since the will which from some cause consents to sin is not just. — Whence, just as it is not required that one having charity be willing to die for Christ — except in a case in which either he must lose charity or [his] life; then he is bound to be more willing to die for Christ than to lose charity — so in the case proposed it is to be understood that I am not bound now, for the satisfaction of sin, to undergo every penalty for reconciliation, because God does not exact it. And therefore, just as I can be saved without undergoing martyrdom, so I can be reconciled to God without many sorrows and losses of temporal things.

But if the question concerns comparison and preference; some answer and lay stress on this point, that it can be understood with respect to the past or the future. — But I see no force in this, because the just will and the truly penitent so detests the past sin, as [it detests] a future one, lest it occur; and so to will to have sinned is a sin, just as to will to sin. Therefore concerning the sorrow and detestation of the preceding sin it must be said that in a case in which one must either prefer or consent to sin, that is, to the complacency of sin, or [accept] the toleration of penalty, anyone is bound to prefer, or rather to choose, the penalty than to be willing to sin or to have sinned. — Apart from a case of necessity I say that to prefer every penalty belongs to perfect virtue; but to hesitate belongs to weakness, because natural fear makes one hesitate greatly, and this hesitation can coexist with charity; but to prefer fault to any penalty — this belongs to iniquity, if it be with deliberation and full will, because every such will is iniquitous, which wills sin either absolutely or conditionally. — Whence it is a danger and folly to demand this of someone weak, or even of oneself, because this is to set a man in temptation; whence no confessor ought to demand this of one who confesses to him. But if the penitent offer himself and say that he would rather be dead than to have sinned, or something similar; one should rejoice, because this is a sign of good will.

If therefore it be asked whether the sorrow of contrition must necessarily be the greatest; if it be spoken of the sorrow of sensuality, it is manifest that [it need] not; if of the displeasure of reason, either as to the intensity of the motion absolutely, then in this way too it need not be the greatest: if in comparison with other sorrows, I say, as concerning love, that it must have predominance. — And thus proceed the arguments proving that it obtains primacy among all other sorrows over created things. — But if it be understood of the sorrow of sensuality with respect to all by way of intensity, it is to be resolved, as has been touched on, because it follows experience and delight and also complexion, or something of the sort; therefore one grieves more sensibly over the death of an only son.

**To the arguments:**

To that, however, which is objected lastly, that the superior always moves the inferiors; it must be said that this is true in those things which are naturally fitted simply to obey, as in the motion of the hands or feet; but it is not so in the affections except through much habituation.

*To 1.* As to what is objected, that [the sorrow] is small because mixed with joy; it must be said that the sorrow of contrition, when it is in a well-disposed soul, is very great, and the joy mitigates the sorrow and intensifies it. For he grieves because he wills to grieve; and the more he desires to grieve, the more he grieves; and the more he sees himself grieving, the more he rejoices. Therefore it is clear that it is not lessened, because it does not have opposition, rather the one is the cause of the other; nevertheless I readily grant that it is mitigated and wounds less; whence it is intensified and mitigated: it is intensified with respect to the sin, and mitigated with respect to the penitent; it is intensified with respect to the object, mitigated with respect to the subject; or it is intensified under the aspect of displeasure, mitigated under the aspect of penalty.

*To 2.* As to what is objected, that it can be recovered; it must be said that this too mitigates the sorrow, so that the sorrow of the contrite is not with despair, but with hope. Nevertheless, because the contrite of himself does not hope; so far as concerns himself, he afflicts himself with sorrow as if he had lost everything; yet he takes breath in the mercy of God. — And as to its objecting that one ought to grieve more over an irre-

coverable thing; it must be said that this is true, other things being equal.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that the least grace blots out all fault; it must be said that sorrow, however small it be, suffices, if it be informed by grace; but nevertheless grace never informs without claiming for itself dominion in the heart as to the act or motion of the rational will, not of sensuality.

*To 4.* As to what is objected, that few, or none, would rather be blind than have sinned; the response is already plain according to the way set out above. For if they were placed in necessity — namely, either that they desist from the detestation of sin, or that they lose their eyes (and I speak of interior detestation) — they would necessarily have to prefer [to lose their eyes]; but now they are not.