Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 4, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/16/q/bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-a4-q2
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### Question II. *Whether one ought to be contrite more intensely for one sin than for another.*

Secondly it is asked whether through contrition one ought to be contrite more, or more intensely, for one sin than for another. And that one ought not, it seems:

1. Because the contrition which blots out guilt is in an instant, as is clear concerning the justification of the ungodly; but the same motion in an instant cannot be more and less intense: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, whatever acts upon many things at once, so that it does not act upon them singly, does not act upon one more and another less; but contrition acts upon many sins at once, so that it does not consider them singly, because then it would be necessary, with respect to them, that the action be divided: therefore contrition does not detest one sin more than another.

3. Likewise, contrition detests sin by that account by which it is something separating from God; but anything whateverseparates from God, and so God is lost through one mortal sin just as through another, and so through a small one just as through a great one: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, contrition regards sin in two respects, namely as to *offense* and as to *harm*; but as to *offense* every sin has the character of the infinite, since it is against the infinite God; as to *harm*, every sin takes away all the virtues, as is said in the second chapter of James, and is held in the text: *Whoever sins in one is made guilty of all*: since therefore harm and offense have the character of equality, it seems that contrition ought to be equal concerning all of them.

5. Likewise, however much contrition detests a slight sin, it is praiseworthy; and however small the contrition, even concerning the greatest sin, it is good and praiseworthy: therefore it seems that a degree of intensity according to the degree of vices and sins is not necessary.

**On the contrary:**
1. The grief over a mortal sin is greater, and ought to be, than over a venial one: therefore by parity of reasoning over one graver mortal sin than over another less grave one.

2. Likewise, according to Gregory: « he who has sinned more gravely ought to punish himself more by satisfaction »: therefore by parity of reasoning the same person, when he sins more gravely, ought to punish himself more gravely through contrition: if therefore over a graver sin in different persons the contrition must be greater, by parity of reasoning so in the same person.

3. Likewise, that order is in grief which is and ought to be in love, since it takes its origin from it; but the greater good, according to ordered love, is more to be loved: therefore by parity of reasoning the greater evil is more to be detested.

4. Likewise, contrition is a rational grief; but grief follows the estimation of reason, and the estimation of reason does not weigh all sins equally, but some as greater: therefore by parity of reasoning grief too.

5. Likewise, suppose by the impossible that someone were so perplexed that he would fall into one of two evils; it is settled that, if he had ordered love, he would shun the greater evil more: therefore if he shuns it more before the fall, by parity of reasoning so after the fall, and so etc.

> **Conclusion.** Contrition, insofar as it is destructive of guilt, has an order toward detesting the greater evil more according to habit, not according to act; but insofar as it is destructive of punishment, also according to act.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of speaking of contrition: either insofar as it is destructive of *guilt*, or insofar as it is destructive of *punishment*. If insofar as it is destructive of *guilt*; thus it operates in the justification of the ungodly in an instant, and thus *actually* it cannot have an order with respect to particular sins, because at once and in an instant it is against every sin committed; it has it, however, according to *habit*, because that grief habitually disposes one to detest one thing more, another less; and because it makes one apt to detest evil, as it is evil, therefore to detest the greater evil more. — But if we speak of it as destructive of *punishment*; then it must be said that it has greater and lesser intensity even according to *act*, as the reasons brought forward for the second part show.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1 and 2.* To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, the response is clear, namely to the first and second. For they proceed concerning contrition according to the first way, namely as it is in the justification of the ungodly.

*To 3 and 4.* To that which is objected concerning separation and harm and offense, it must be said that *separation* is regarded in the estrangement according to unlikeness, and *offense* according to contempt, and *harm* according to the loss of gratuitous goods and the wounding of natural ones, or the disabling of them; and in these there is a degree of punishment; whence that argument does not hold. For although God is offended by all, yet some despise him more, some less; and likewise in one sin nature is more wounded and is more estranged from virtue.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that over a small sin one can grieve no less; it must be said that, just as in charity it cannot be granted that love — however small and however great it be — is not always good, yet in its greatness and smallness it necessarily has an order; so it is to be understood in the matter proposed. And thus it is easy to respond to the rest.

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