Dist. 16, Part 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/16/q/bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first about this, that the Master says in the text: *Now in the perfection of penitence three things are to be observed.* For it is asked whether these three are *subjective* parts of penitence, or *integral* ones. And that they are not integral, it seems: because the whole is not predicated of an integral part; but to *be contrite* is to do penitence, likewise to *confess* is to do penitence, and to *make satisfaction*: therefore they are not integral parts. If you say that this fails in a homogeneous whole, because every part of bread is bread; it is objected, that a homogeneous whole has parts of one nature; but penitence does not have parts of one and conformable nature. For penitence contains contrition and confession and satisfaction, which are diverse according to form. — Likewise, integral parts constituting some whole, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, ought to be simultaneous; but these parts of penitence are not simultaneous: therefore etc.

And that they are not *subjective*, it seems: because the whole nature of a universal whole is preserved in each part — whence the whole notion of "animal" is in man — but contrition is not the whole and perfect penitence, nor [is] confession: therefore they are not subjective. — Likewise, when the subjective parts are numbered, the whole is numbered: therefore these are subjective parts of penitence, [and] since they are three, there are three penitences: therefore either three virtues of penitence, or three Sacraments; both of which are false.

**I respond:** It must be said that penitence is taken in two ways, namely for penitence-as-*virtue* and for penitence-as-*Sacrament*. If we speak of penitence-as-*virtue*; thus contrition and confession and satisfaction are not integral parts, but *potestative* ones. For just as from one essence several powers issue, so from one habit several acts follow. For the virtue of penitence orders man so that by punishing himself he makes amends according to every forum; and therefore each of these acts receives its denomination from the habit, so as to be called "doing penitence"; and thus it seems to have the character of subjective parts, but in truth they do not have it, because confession and satisfaction is not penitence, but an act issuing from penitence, likewise satisfaction and contrition. — But if we speak of penitence-as-*Sacrament*; thus they are integral parts as to perfect being — whence the Master speaks reasonably, when he says, that in the perfection of penitence etc. — and thus it is plain that none of these is a perfect Sacrament without the other.

And if you object that they do not have simultaneous being; it must be said that although they are not simultaneous *in act*, they are nevertheless simultaneous *in vow*, or *in effect*. Whence when one is contrite, he has confession and satisfaction in purpose; and when one makes satisfaction, he has the effect of the two preceding. And so that is plain.

### Doubt II

Likewise, it is asked about this, that he says: *That, just as we offend God in three ways, so in three ways we make satisfaction, in contrition* etc. For according to this it seems that satisfaction ought not to be distinguished against the other parts. — Likewise, if there is satisfaction in three ways according to the threefold mode of sinning: therefore he who has sinned in heart, it does not seem that a penalty in the flesh ought to be imposed on him, because by the things by which one sins, by these also will he be punished. Therefore then for no spiritual sin is satisfaction to be imposed; and that is manifestly false, since spiritual sins are graver than carnal ones: therefore they are punished more gravely by God and ought to be punished more gravely by the priest.

**I respond:** It must be said that satisfaction is spoken of in two ways. In one way satisfaction is called the reconciliation itself; and thus, because all the parts of penitence are ordered to reconciliation, each can be called satisfaction or satisfactory. In another way satisfaction is called the paying-out of the penalty owed; and thus it belongs properly to one part of penitence, which is the assuming or fulfilling of the enjoined penalty. Nevertheless it belongs to the other parts by accident, as to contrition by reason of the conjoined sorrow, which is in the sensible part; likewise to confession by reason of shame. — And so the first [objection] is plain.

To that which is objected, that we ought not to make satisfaction outwardly for a sin of the heart; it must be said that that word of Chrysostom and likewise of Augustine is understood by *appropriation*: since these three correspond to every mortal sin, because every [mortal sin]

merits eternal penalty of soul and body, and to each is owed an interior and exterior penalty, unless the interior is so great that the exterior is not opportune, and supplies its place. Whence just as it is certain that it does not suffice to confess the sin with the mouth, but rather for it one must be contrite and make satisfaction; so also in the matter at hand it must be understood.

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Compunction is there commended.* For it seems to take compunction for the same as contrition. But on the contrary: upon that [text] of the Psalm: *In your chambers be ye compunct*; the Gloss: «By certain goads rouse yourselves, not for sorrow of sins, but to see the light of Christ, and that you may be inflamed with the love of invisible things»; but contrition is of sins only: therefore they are not the same, and so he wrongly takes [one] for the other.

**I respond:** It must be said that sorrow is called *contrition*, and sorrow is called *compunction*: contrition, because it grinds the heart, or sins are ground in the heart by that sorrow; but compunction, because the heart is pricked. But the heart is pricked according to a twofold regard: either [by] the lack of glory, or [by] consideration of the offense; and according to this a twofold sorrow and a twofold *watering* is considered, namely an upper and a lower; and thus compunction is more common than contrition, as is plain from that Gloss. But the Master here appropriates compunction to sorrow over sins, from the consideration of which the heart is pricked as if by certain stings.

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Confession is there commended: The just man in the beginning is the accuser of himself.* For it seems to be said badly, because either the just man accuses himself insofar as he is just, or insofar as he is a sinner. If insofar as just; but everyone who accuses a just man insofar as such accuses justice; and everyone who accuses justice is unjust: therefore if he accuses himself insofar as just, he is unjust. If he accuses himself insofar as a *sinner*; but everyone who accuses a sinner insofar as a sinner accuses sin; and every such one justly accuses and is just: therefore if he accuses insofar as a *sinner*, the accuser is just, and so insofar as a sinner he is just.

**I respond:** It must be said that in accusation there is the one accusing and the one accused; and when a just man accuses himself, the one accusing and the one accused are present, but yet having as it were the character of a double person; and insofar as he holds the character of a double person, so also [the character] of a double property, because that same man insofar as just accuses himself insofar as he is a sinner. And so it is plain that there is a sophism concerning that reduplication, which can be referred to the act of accusing by reason of the *subject*, or by reason of the *object*.

### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Satisfaction is enjoined by John.* For it seems to be said badly, because John could not institute the Sacraments of the new law: therefore neither [could he] enjoin satisfaction.

**I respond:** It must be said that John enjoined [it] by intimating or preaching; but Christ commanded [it] as the principal author, because John ran ahead and said [it], Matthew three, but the Savior confirmed and instituted [it], as is had in the fourth [chapter] of the same.

### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Bring forth worthy fruits of penitence.* For it seems not to be a fitting precept: because worthy fruits of penitence are acceptable to God; but it is not in our power nor in our cognition to do those things which are in the divine acceptation: therefore etc. — Likewise, if satisfaction is under precept, since no one knows whether he has made satisfaction, because no one knows that he is in charity; it seems that satisfaction must always be repeated.

**I respond:** It must be said that the worthiness of fruit can be taken in two ways: either by comparison to the merit of *fault*, or in comparison to the divine

acceptation. And note that he here calls them *worthy fruits of penitence* not in comparison to the divine acceptation, because this is not enjoined; but as to the merit of fault. — Likewise it is to be understood that to make satisfaction to God is twofold: either according to His forum and according to truth, and thus it is not under precept; or according to the probability of conscience, and thus it is under precept.

But then it seems that that sinner who is unwilling to undertake the worthy satisfaction imposed by the priest sins mortally; and it must be said that that is an affirmative precept, which does not bind for always, and moreover [its] committing is in the power of the priest; and so, if the penitent here undertakes a worthy penalty from the priest, he makes full penitence; if not — because the priest does not impose [it], attending to the frailty of the sinner — the Lord waits, and will exact [it] in purgatory.

### Doubt VII

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *That [it be] according to the quality and quantity of the fault*; what is the difference between the *quality* of fault and the *quantity*. For since fault does not have a quantity of *mass*, but of *virtue* [i.e. power], and this is a quality; it seems that they do not differ. — Likewise, if according to the quantity of fault there is a quantity of penalty; but the fault is as great as the offense; and the offense is as great as is he who is offended; but he is infinite: therefore an infinite penalty ought to be imposed. — Likewise, how can the penalty be according to quality, since fault and penalty are of diverse genera?

**I respond:** It must be said that it is possible for the quantity and quality of fault to be caused from the same principle, but yet according to a different ground, just as to know a married woman increases the fault and further places [it] in a [distinct] species of sin. Whence the quality of fault is considered according to that which distinguishes the sin, according as it is said that it is the *defilement of flesh and spirit*; the quantity, according as it aggravates within the same genus. And in these two ways also the quality of penalty corresponds, so that to a spiritual sin [corresponds] a spiritual penalty, namely prayer, to a carnal sin a penalty in the flesh, namely fasting, and quantity [corresponds] to quantity within the same genus. — And note that the quantity of sin is not taken here in respect of him against whom [it is], but in respect of the lust of the sinner. — And so the objections are plain, because this quantity is finite; and the assimilation of the qualities of penalty and fault is considered within the same genus.

### Doubt VIII

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Purging by tears every quality of vice*; because either this is a precept, or a counsel. If it is a precept; there seems [to be] danger, because few or none thus run through, lamenting each single thing; and it is established that a man is justified by a single contrition, which cannot consider all the qualities. If a counsel; on the contrary: as the Philosopher says, «the species of the delight moves the appetite»: therefore if anyone thus singly recalls the vice, it seems that he gives himself occasion of temptation and lapse: therefore it is better to forget than thus to bring [it] back before the eyes.

**I respond:** It must be said that as to some quality of vice it is under precept, namely as to that which draws into another genus of sin; as to some [qualities] it is under counsel, namely as to those which do not change the genus of the sin. But whether it be counsel or precept; it does not bind for always, but when there is place and time, and when the penitent has so mortified himself and tamed his sensuality, so that at the recalling of the circumstances the fire of concupiscence does not grow hot, but rather the indignation of the will; then he ought to recall such things, especially when he is in the act of prayer and lamentation; otherwise he ought rather to drive [them] away than to ruminate on such things, especially in sins of the flesh, in which man has an incitement within, on account of which it is pointedly said in the first to the Corinthians six: *Flee fornication*, as if [to say], not only in the deed, or in the will, but even in the recalling.

### Doubt IX

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Let him bewail the virtue which meanwhile he lacked.* For the contrite man ought

not to grieve except over fault: therefore if he ought to grieve over the lack of virtue, it seems that this is a fault; but he lacked [it] in infinite instants: therefore he sinned in infinite [instants]. — Likewise, since there are many other circumstances, as Tully determines, namely *who, what, why, when, where, how, with what aids*; and the one which is *who*, he divides into eleven circumstances, namely name, nature, manner of life, fortune, etc., which are plain there: it seems that Augustine touches [them] here insufficiently.

**I respond:** It must be said that not only are sins bewailed by contrition, but also the penalties of sins, the penalties, I say, which are sequels and which disable and render man unfit for good. Among these the chief is the lack of virtues; and by this Augustine understands the other sequels of vices, which are to be considered and bewailed, not because they are fault, but penalty, not inflicted, but contracted.

To that which is objected, that Tully posits more; it must be said that Augustine does not here posit all the circumstances, but only the aggravating ones; but Tully posits all the circumstances which touch the deed or the person. Now all the circumstances can be reduced to fourteen, which are noted in these verses:

> *Order, place, person, knowledge, time aggravate,*
> *Age, condition, number, delay, abundance, cause,*
> *The manner in the fault, high status, scant struggle.*

Now of these five regard the *person*, namely knowledge, order, age, condition, and status. Three regard the *act* of the crime, namely number, delay, and manner of acting. Three regard the *cause*, namely abundance, cause, scant struggle. And two are *adjacent*, namely place and time.

### Doubt X

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *For with joy ought he to do [it] who is to be immortal* etc. For it seems to speak ill, because penitence consists chiefly in sorrow and tears: therefore he ought not to do [it] with joy, but rather with sorrow. If you say that both concur there; it is asked: why does he rather say that it is to be done with joy?

**I respond:** It must be said that he exhorts to joy for this reason, that it is conservative of all the virtues, and especially of those virtues which consist about penalty. Whence the Philosopher says: «He who is continent and rejoices in this very thing is truly chaste; and he truly has perfect fortitude who not only does not succumb, but even rejoices in painful or penal things». And this is the principal reason why he exhorts to joy, because otherwise the assuming of the penalty is not virtuous.

But the ground why one ought to rejoice in penitence is twofold. The first is the consideration of *equity*, the second is the consideration of *utility*. Equity is greatest there, namely that the flesh, which drew the spirit and subjugated [it] through delight and is an enemy to the Spirit of truth, should on the contrary be subjected through affliction and through this be reconciled, and that vengeance be taken on the enemy. Whence just as a carnal man rejoices much in the casting-down of an enemy, so the spiritual man ought to rejoice over the affliction of the flesh. And just as a just judge rejoices much in the exercise of justice, so the penitent ought to rejoice; and therefore Proverbs twenty-one: *It is joy to the just to do justice*; therefore also Proverbs fourteen: *The heart that knoweth the bitterness of its own soul* etc.

The other is the consideration of *manifold utility*, because [penitence]

is a *plank of deliverance from shipwreck*. Whence just as one rejoices when he escapes from shipwreck, so the penitent ought to rejoice. — Another reason can be on the part of the *good*, because it renews man, according to that [text] of the Psalm: *Thy youth shall be renewed like the eagle's.* — Spiritual losses too are there restored. And so the manifold reason for joy is plain.

And as to what he objects, that he ought to do [it] with sorrow; it must be said that this is no impediment, because, when one grieves vehemently, in sorrow alone he finds delight. Whence there is the example of Augustine, who relates in the fourth [book] of the Confessions, that when his companion had died, he delighted in nothing except in groaning, and every other delight was a penalty to him, and in this alone he rested. How much more therefore ought one to rejoice amid sorrow over his own death? And therefore he rightly says that he ought to do [it] with joy.

### Doubt XI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Let him beware lest, led by shame, he divide his confession within himself* etc. For it seems to be said badly, because the more he reveals to, the greater will be the shame, and the more he has whereof to blush. Whence it does not seem that this is from shame, but against shame.

**I respond:** It must be said that the greater shame can be [so] in two ways: either because one is reckoned an enormous and great sinner, or because he is known by many to be a sinner; and the first shame is the greater: and therefore for avoiding the greater one might well assume the lesser, and through this he would derogate from the truth of confession, which is not to be divided, as will appear below.

### Doubt XII

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Let him not approach the Lord's body before he is strengthened by a good conscience*; what is called here being *strengthened by a good conscience*? It seems that he who is in grace can approach without fault; and such is one contrite before confession. — But on the contrary is what Hugh says in the letter to Bernard: «I say boldly, if he be contrite, yet he ought not to communicate before he has confessed». — On account of this there is a question, whether someone contrite can in some case approach before confession.

**I respond:** It must be said that someone strengthens himself by a good conscience when he probably perceives that his fault has been forgiven him; and this he perceives when he does what is in him to obtain pardon. But this he does not fully do before confession, if he has access to a priest; for then, if he confesses outwardly, the interior conscience is strengthened, and he can well approach. But if he has access and does not confess, he does ill if he approaches. But if he does not have access; either he has necessity of consecrating, as a parish priest, and then he can approach with sorrow and the purpose of confessing; or he does not have necessity, and thus in no way ought he to approach before confession, because he who was excommunicated through a mortal [sin] from the Sacrament of the unity of the Church ought not to approach unless first reconciled to the Church, unless he is otherwise compelled; and then an evident excuse is had.

### Doubt XIII

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Let him restrain himself from games and from spectacles*; what are these two called? And why does he say that he ought to restrain himself? For either they are evil, or good and lawful. If evil; then therefore all ought to restrain themselves. If however good and lawful; then no one ought to restrain himself.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as is said in the first to the Corinthians ten in the Gloss, a game is a lustful gesticulation, of which kind is [that] in dances; spectacles are, as Augustine says, like the ci-

thara and hunting and the like. I say therefore that the game of dances is not evil in itself, as is plain concerning the sister of Moses [in] Exodus fifteen; but it is made evil from a fourfold cause, namely on account of the manner, when the manner is lascivious; on account of the end, when it is done to provoke lust; on account of the time, that it not be done in a time of sorrow; on account of the person, that it not be done by a religious person. These removed, it can be done. Since therefore the penitent both is a person to whom it does not belong, and, as long as he truly does penitence, is in a time of sorrow: therefore it does not belong to him. Likewise it is to be judged concerning spectacles; for from these four causes they can be done ill, and are; these excluded, they can be done well.

### Doubt XIV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says, that *not all worthy fruits are worthy fruits of penitence.* For it seems to be said badly: because the works which the penitent does from the virtue of penitence are fruits of the virtue; and not [of any] except *penitence*: therefore etc. — Moreover, just as the virtue of penitence is about the good and the difficult, so [are] the other virtues: therefore etc. — Likewise, since "fruit" is so called from *enjoying* [frui], how can the works of penitence be called fruits?

**I respond:** It must be said that the works of penitence are called fruits, not because we enjoy them, but because they lead to enjoyment; or fruits metaphorically: just as from a tree is born an apple, which is called the fruit of the tree, so from the will [is born] the good work of the penitent. — And note that it is a different thing to say a *good* fruit and a *worthy* fruit of penitence. A good fruit can be called every good work; a worthy fruit says more, namely a good work with fittingness to the state. For a work is good and thus perfect, if it befits the state. But a worthy fruit of penitence does not say only a good work, as it befits the state, but as it befits the merit of the sin; because he who has sinned more ought to suffer more, as Gregory determines in a homily.

### Doubt XV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *A soldier, or a merchant, or one given to some office* etc.; because, if this is true, then no merchant, no soldier is saved; and this is against sacred Scripture. For blessed John did not reprove soldiering, but said: *Be content with your wages*, Luke three. Likewise concerning merchants, Genesis forty-nine: *Zabulon shall dwell on the seashore*, where according to the letter the land of Zabulon is blessed for [its] trafficking. — Likewise, if this were true, soldiering would perish, which is necessary for defending the faith; trafficking would perish, without which many lands could not live.

**I respond:** It must be said that of soldiering and trafficking and the office of toll-gathering or the exaction of tolls, from which Matthew is called a *publican*, one can rightly make use, if he does [it] in the manner in which they were instituted: that the soldier injure no one, the merchant defraud no one, and the toll-gatherer not exact an immoderate toll, but that which was instituted from a certain and useful cause; and all this can be without sin, and in this manner the penitent can be saved in this state. But very near to these are abuses: in soldiers *violences*, in merchants *deceptions*, in the others *immoderate exactions*; and therefore such things are perilous. And as to such abuses Gregory says: «One does not do penitence until he relinquishes these», namely as to the abuse.