Dist. 16, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/16/q/bon-sent-IV-d16-p2-a2-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article II. *On the penance after baptism, which concerns mortal sins.*

Next, with regard to the second article, the inquiry concerns the second penance after baptism, namely that which concerns mortal sins. And concerning this two things are asked:

*First*, it is asked whether it is necessary to repent of mortal sins committed through ignorance.

*Second*, it is asked whether it is necessary to be contrite over sins knowingly committed and afterward forgotten.

### Question I. *Whether it is necessary to repent of sins committed through ignorance.*

Concerning the first it is shown that it is necessary to repent of sins committed through ignorance:

1. Because Ambrose says: «You sin most gravely if you are ignorant»; but, as it is explained, this is for no other reason than that such a person does not readily seek a physician: therefore medicine is necessary for such a one; and this is penance, and so on.

2. Likewise, it seems by reason: because Augustine in *On Correction and Grace* says that a man is not excused on account of ignorance from being bound to believe: therefore by parity of reasoning a man is not excused on account of ignorance from being bound to be contrite.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason: because a sin from ignorance is an actual sin committed by our own act: therefore it is not blotted out without an act of ours; but the act by which guilt is blotted out is penance: therefore, and so on.

4. Likewise, ignorance in the one who has sinned did not excuse from the sin: therefore it does not excuse from needing a remedy.

**On the contrary:**

1. Penance concerns only what is willed; but what is done through ignorance is involuntary: therefore over such a thing penance ought not to be done.

2. Likewise, we cannot love goods that are unknown: therefore neither can we hate nor detest evils that are unknown: therefore over these there is no penance.

3. Likewise, by no right are we certain whether we offend God through ignorance; but no one is bound to do anything from precept, except that for which he has certitude from some right: therefore no one is bound to repent of things committed through ignorance.

4. Likewise, we are bound to repent only of those things of which we are bound to confess; but we are bound to confess only those things which we can truthfully relate, and we can truthfully relate only those things which we know; because, if we assert doubtful or unknown things, it is a lie: therefore, since we do not know things committed through ignorance to be sins, we cannot truthfully confess them: therefore neither are we bound to repent of these in any way.

> **Conclusion.** Concerning sins committed through ignorance it is necessary to apply diligence, that they may be known, and to repent in general, but not in particular.

**I respond:** It must be said that to repent of something is twofold, namely in *general* and in *particular*: in *general*, when a man grieves generally over every offense against God which he has committed; in *particular*, when he grieves over this or that one. — I say therefore that over sins committed through ignorance he ought to repent in *general* and to say with the Prophet: *The sins of my youth and my ignorances* etc.; but in *particular* he is not bound to repent, but is bound to do what is in him, that he may know and may recognize the sins. For sins are committed through ignorance of *right* (law); and then, the right being known, he knows that he has sinned, as for instance one who has committed fornication being ignorant that it was a sin. Sins are also committed through ignorance of *fact*, due diligence not having been applied; and then they become known when the Lord reveals it; whence he is bound to pray that the Lord spare him, or reveal it.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that a sin committed through ignorance is involuntary; it must be said that it is not wholly involuntary, because, even if the knowledge was not perfect, there was nevertheless knowledge of the act, although the *deforming circumstance* was not recognized; and this is better shown in the question concerning ignorance in the second [book].

2. To that which is objected, that we cannot repent of things unknown; it must be said that this is true of things *wholly unknown*, but of things *unknown in particular and known in universal* it is possible to be contrite in universal. And because certain things unknown in particular through negligence become known through diligence; therefore he is bound to do what is in him, that he may know; and if it does not come [to mind], then penance in general suffices, that he grieve and also endure some evils and believe that he has offended in many things which he does not know.

3. To that which is objected, that what is unknown is known by no right, etc.; it must be said that for penance a *probable* knowledge suffices; and it is probable to anyone, who was ignorant even as an adult, that he has offended in many things. And this the divine law intimates, which teaches to repent of these things and to seek pardon; whence in the Psalm: *Who understands his sins? from my hidden ones cleanse me.*

4. To that which is objected, that things unknown cannot be confessed: therefore, and so on; it must be said that we are bound to confess those things for which it is necessary to make penance in particular; but such things, unless they become known to us either through our diligence or through divine revelation, do not oblige to performing penance in particular; nevertheless, in the confession itself a man ought to show himself wholly and willingly to bear the penalty, even concerning those things which were ignorantly perpetrated.