Dist. 16, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/16/q/bon-sent-IV-d16-p2-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether it is necessary to be contrite over sins knowingly committed and afterwards forgotten.*

Secondly it is asked whether a man is bound to be contrite over sins knowingly committed and afterwards forgotten, or whether he can be saved with respect to such sins without penitence.

And that he is bound to be *contrite* seems so:

1. Because, if someone sins and afterwards falls into madness before penitence, he cannot afterwards be justified; and the reason for this is that he cannot repent of his sins: therefore if the madman is not excused, neither is the forgetful man.

2. Likewise, in the fourth chapter of First Corinthians: *I am conscious to myself of nothing* etc.; the Gloss: « Because what I do not know can lie hidden »: therefore the latency of a sin impedes justification; but this would not be so unless one were bound to repent of it: therefore etc. If you say that one is bound in a general way, this does not resolve it, because in a general way it does not lie hidden — indeed everyone ought to reckon that he has been a sinner.

3. Likewise, that one is bound in particular seems so: because if he had not forgotten, he would be bound to repent in particular: therefore granted that he should have fallen into forgetfulness through fault and through negligence, if he does not derive an advantage from his malice, he is still bound.

Likewise, I ask what it is to be contrite or to repent in a general way. If under a condition, as: I grieve, if I did it; then likewise a man can repent of those things which he has not done, just as of those which he has done.

**On the contrary:**

1. Someone has so forgotten that he cannot remember, because memory is not in our power: therefore if he is not bound to the impossible, he is not bound to remember; but he cannot repent except of the evils which he remembers: therefore neither of these.

2. Likewise, if a man does what is in him, God does what is in Him: but it is possible for this man to do what is in him without remembering: therefore it is possible to do what is in him without penitence: therefore it is possible to be justified without penitence: therefore he is not bound to repent.

3. Likewise, someone is prepared to grieve over all things, and he does not grieve or repent of these except because he does not remember: therefore the forgetfulness that has come in is an impediment: if therefore he grieves over the forgetfulness, the impediment is removed: therefore he is justified.

4. Likewise, granted that he has wholly forgotten both in a general and in a particular way, because he never remembers that he has offended; such a one cannot repent either in a general or in a particular way, and yet he can be justified, because he is a wayfarer and can earn demerit: therefore it is not required that he repent of those things.

> **Conclusion.** Concerning sins committed and forgotten it is necessary to be contrite in a general way, but not in particular.

**I respond:** It must be said that the forgetful man is either wholly forgetful, so that he remembers neither in a general nor in a particular way, or he is forgetful in particular, but nevertheless remembers in a general way. When he is forgetful in particular, yet remembers in a general way; I say that he is bound to repent and to be contrite in a general way over his negligence, on account of which he came into that forgetfulness; and he is bound to do what is in him, that he may remember in particular, whether by recollection or by prayer. — But if he is wholly forgetful, he is still bound to be contrite in a general way. — And I call being contrite in a general way not under a condition, but under a probable estimation. For a man ought probably to believe that he has offended in many things of which he does not remember; and if from this estimation he grieves, just as if he were certain, he is contrite and penitent. — Therefore the arguments showing that it is not necessary to be contrite in particular, or to repent, are to be conceded. — Nor does that hold which is objected last, that he is not bound even in a general way because he has wholly forgotten. For I say that the whole which he has forgotten with certainty he can know probably.

1. To that which is objected to the opposite, that it is required specially, by the likeness of the madman; the response is that the madman can repent neither generally nor specially; and no one is justified without penitence, either in a general or in a particular way.

2. To that which is objected, that a hidden sin impedes justification; it must be said that it is false — rather it impedes the certitude of justification, because he is not certain of his righteousness, in that he is not certain of his guilt.

3. To that which is objected, that he derives an advantage; it must be said that it is false, because he ought to grieve in a general way over those things and besides over the forgetfulness; and again, he is punished more gravely by God than if he had not forgotten, yet the way of salvation is not cut off.

The last point about generality is clear: because to repent in a general way is not by a condition, but by certainty concerning sins committed, because he knows that he has at some time sinned, yet does not recall by what sin; or by a probable presumption, which sometimes generates as much grief in a man as the certainty of sin, and is worth just as much.

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