Dist. 16, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/16/q/bon-sent-IV-d16-p2-a3-q1
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### Article III. *On penance after baptism concerning venial sins.*
### Question I. *Whether a venial sin can become mortal.*

First, then, it is asked whether a venial sin can become mortal. And that it can, is shown thus:

1. By *complacency* specially, it seems so: Augustine: «Nothing is so venial that it does not become mortal, while it pleases». — Likewise, that it does so by *multitude*: Augustine, *On Penance*: «Although individually they are not felt to strike with a deadly wound; nevertheless all gathered together at once, like the itch, by the fact that they are many, kill».

2. Likewise, by *reason* it seems so: because complacency is full consent; but a pleasure that is venial, when consent comes, becomes mortal: therefore a venial sin becomes mortal through complacency. The *minor* is clear, because morose pleasure, which is venial before consent, afterward becomes mortal.

3. Likewise, *taking-pleasure* is a will at rest; but one resting in a creature enjoys it, and so sins mortally: therefore a venial sin becomes mortal through complacency.

4. Likewise, that it does so by *multitude*, it seems: because mortal love does not exceed venial love infinitely; but a finite thing taken several times yields a *finite* being: therefore etc. *If you say* that it does exceed infinitely, because this is above God and that is below; *on the contrary*: from the same power there does not issue a motion infinitely greater and lesser; but mortal love and venial love are from the same potency: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, a venial sin is of some quantity, since it is greater and lesser; but every quantum is proportional to a quantum: therefore a mortal sin, since it is a quantum, does not exceed a venial sin disproportionately, and so etc.

6. Likewise, one venial sin disposes in some way, and another more; but by a greater disposition there arises *necessity*: therefore necessarily, as it seems, a venial sin introduces mortal sin.

**On the contrary:** 1. Venial and mortal differ in species; but complacency, in that it is complacency, does not change the species but preserves it: therefore one does not become the other through complacency: therefore a venial sin does not become mortal.

2. Likewise, a mortal sin exceeds a venial one infinitely, because its punishment exceeds the other's punishment infinitely: therefore a venial sin multiplied infinitely does not become mortal.

> ### Conclusion
> Venial sins do not become mortal by essence; yet they do become so sometimes by reason of either full consent, or a will at rest, or disposition and proneness.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are three kinds of venial sin. For one is from *surprise*; and it is therefore venial, because it cannot then be avoided. Another is from *thought* without will or consent, and it is therefore venial, because the man does not fully consent, as in a thought about a woman and a pleasure short of consent into the pleasure. Another is venial with *reason and consent*; but it is venial nonetheless, because there is no disorder against a precept, as drunkenness and a jesting lie.

When, therefore, it is asked whether a venial sin becomes mortal; if one means that this fault by its essence becomes that one, there is no question, because this is impossible. — If one means that what was otherwise venial can be mortal, as a jesting lie and drunkenness; I say that one kind does not become mortal, another kind becomes mortal through complacency. The first venial sin, then, which is committed apart from reason, is always venial; but the venial sin of the second mode, through pleasure short of consent, becomes mortal through consent, and thus through complacency, insofar as taking-pleasure is called full consent. The third venial sin, which is through pleasure short of God, can become mortal through great lust, like a jesting lie; and this becomes mortal according to taking-pleasure, insofar as taking-pleasure is called a will at rest. And because the repetition of the act disposes toward lust and complacency; hence it is that Augustine

says in many places that many venial sins overwhelm, not *of themselves*, but because they *dispose* toward lust, not by a disposition of *necessity*, but of *proneness*.

**To the foundations:** To that, then, which proves that venial sins do not become mortal by *essence*; it must be said that it is true.

*To 1.* But as to what is objected on the contrary from Augustine, it has been solved how it is to be understood. For that is understood either by a fittingness in the genus of the act, or by disposition, because many venial sins dispose toward lust and contempt; therefore Augustine compares them to little beasts, compares them to drops, compares them to sand, compares them to the itch, not because they of themselves cause shipwreck, but because they lead to this accidentally.

*To 2 and 3.* To that which is objected about consent and the will at rest, it must be said that when consent comes, a new sin is made, and the venial sin does not become mortal, but what was otherwise venial becomes mortal.

*To 4.* To that which is objected about multitude; it must be said that the proportion is infinite, not because the motion is infinite in intensity, but in reckoning, as is clear in one who loves out of charity: he loves God more than a single penny and more than it multiplied to infinity; whence a love below God is never comparable to the love that is above God, according to this manner.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that a venial sin is a quantum; it must be said that just as a line is in itself something quantified, but in comparison with a surface it has no quantity; so a venial sin, though of itself it be a quantum, in comparison with a mortal sin lacks quantity.

*To 6.* To that which is objected about disposition, it must be said that the will is always moved freely, and therefore is not disposed by a disposition that is a necessity, but only by a disposition that is a proneness; not so nature, which is determined to one part. — And there is another reason in one who has charity, because he is sustained by an infinite power; and such a one is by no weight compelled to fall, his sustaining being preserved; for the will is always free and, as long as it is on the way, changeable; and therefore never, while it is on the way, is it inevitably disposed toward the evil of fault. And so that is clear.