Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/17/q/bon-sent-IV-d17-p1-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether for justification contrition is necessary.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether for justification contrition is necessary. And that it is so, it seems.

1. Upon that text of the Psalm: *A sacrifice to God is a troubled spirit*; the Gloss: «A troubled and contrite spirit is the sacrifice in which sins are loosed».

2. Likewise, upon that text of the Psalm: *Justice shall walk before him*; the Gloss of Augustine: «The first justice of a man is that he should punish himself as evil and make himself good; this is the way to God, that He may come to him».

3. Likewise, it seems by *reason*: for it is impossible that a sinner be justified without a satisfactory penalty following; but it is possible for him to die at once, and there will be no satisfactory penalty unless voluntarily begun in this life, as Augustine says: therefore it is necessary that in the very act of justification there be a penal motion. But this is nothing other than contrition; therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as fault was introduced by the will, so too it is preserved by it: therefore if free choice, from the moment it once consented, is always held as consenting, unless it dissents; it is necessary to dissent; but its dissent before the coming of grace avails nothing: therefore it behooves that it dissent together with grace.

5. Likewise, something more is required in the justification of one who has sinned after [receiving] faith, beyond the motion of faith; but this is nothing other than contrition: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Ecclesiasticus the first: *The fear of the Lord driveth out sin*: therefore according to this, justification or the expulsion of sin can come about by a motion of fear: it is not therefore necessary that [it come about by a motion] of contrition.

2. Likewise, upon that text of Luke the seventh: *Many sins are forgiven her* etc.; the Gloss: «The ardor of charity consumed in her the rust of sins»: therefore it is not necessary that there be sorrow.

3. Likewise, it seems by *reason*: for there are two parts of justice, namely to do good and to turn away from evil; but the first is the greater: therefore much more does a man dispose himself to grace by doing good than by avoiding evil: therefore more by the appetite for good than by the detestation of evil.

4. Likewise, when one has been justified, he can be moved by a motion of every virtue: since therefore the motion of every virtue is akin to grace, the motion of any unformed virtue disposes to grace: it is not therefore necessary [that there be] contrition.

5. Likewise, it is possible for someone to be turned away from God while thinking nothing of Him: therefore likewise it is possible for someone to withdraw from sin while thinking nothing of the sin: therefore without contrition.

> **Conclusion.** *For the justification of the impious, contrition is necessary, that the will may accord with grace both as coming and as expelling sin.*

**I respond:** To this some say that justification is spoken of in three ways. In one way justification is called the preparation for justice; and for this attrition or sorrow is necessary. In another way [it is] the infusion of justice; and for this the infusion of grace and the expulsion of fault are necessary. In a third way justification is the exercise in justice; and for this two things from grace and two from the soul are necessary, namely the motion of free choice and contrition. And they say that the saying of Augustine is to be understood of this [last] justification: *He who created thee* etc.

But certainly, if for this — that grace be infused — it is necessary that a man prepare himself by consenting to grace and detesting sin; it is necessary that in the very infusion of grace these four be present, namely the infusion of grace and the motion of free choice, and contrition and the expulsion of sin. For God expels fault by infusing grace; but He does not infuse it except in the one who accords [with it], and it is necessary to accord with grace as coming and as expelling sin. With grace as coming one accords by the motion of free choice; with grace as expelling sin, by the motion of contrition. Hence there are two things there from God, namely the infusion of grace and the expulsion of sin; and two from us consonant with these two modes. — And these four are touched upon in that little verse of the Psalm: *Thou hast moved the earth and hast troubled it; heal thou the breaches thereof, for it has been moved.* For grace, coming into the soul, moves reason, according as it is a part of free choice, and troubles the will through contrition, and afterward heals through the expulsion of sin. And the reason for this is given, because a twofold disturbance preceded, through which the soul itself conformed itself to the justifying grace; and therefore it adds: *for it has been moved.* — Therefore the reasons brought forward for this side are to be granted.

**But to that which is objected on the contrary**, that it happens that one is justified by a motion of fear and of love; it must be said that in sin there are three things, namely the evil action and the interior stain itself and the consequence.

The evil action is expelled by fear, the stain by sorrow, the consequence by the ardor of charity. Hence fear is in justification, as it is called the preparation for justice, sorrow as the infusion of justice, the ardor of charity in the consummation.

*To that* which is objected, that it is better to do good etc.; it must be said that in truth it is better, but nevertheless it is not so consonant with grace as it blots out fault as the detestation of sin [is]; and because contrition is necessary on account of [this] consonance: therefore etc.

*To that* which is objected, that any motion of virtue is akin to grace; it must be said that this is true; yet there is an order in the acts of the virtues. For one never loves unless he be moved by a motion of faith; thus I say that the motion of the virtue of penitence in justification, after the motion of faith, is necessarily the first motion, and therefore it is simultaneous with the very infusion of grace.

*To that* which is objected, that one can be turned away from God while thinking nothing; it must be said that it does not hold, both because the departure from God is disordered, but the return is ordered — the example is of one who falls from a ladder — and because more is required for good than for evil.

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