Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/17/q/bon-sent-IV-d17-p1-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the expulsion of fault necessarily precedes contrition.*

Secondly, it is asked whether the expulsion of fault necessarily precedes contrition. And that it does, it seems:

1. Because the motion of contrition is an informed motion; but grace naturally informs the subject prior to the act: therefore a man is naturally graced before he is contrite. But to be made graced follows upon the expulsion of sin: therefore so also does contrition, which proceeds from a graced soul.

2. Likewise, contrition is a meritorious motion; but every meritorious motion proceeds from a purified root: therefore since the root is purified through the expulsion of sin, it is clear that the expulsion of sin precedes contrition.

3. Likewise, contrition is a good work; but a good habit precedes a good work: therefore the soul is naturally enabled before it is made contrite. But it is impossible to understand the soul as enabled for good unless fault has been expelled: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the motion of free will precedes; but it is impossible for the soul to be moved at the same time by diverse motions according to the superior part; but in the same instant there is the remission of fault and the motion of free will: therefore contrition is not [the same instant].

**On the contrary:**
1. If contrition followed upon the remission of fault, since, the fault being remitted, a man is necessarily just, then even if contrition did not follow, he would be just; but this is false: therefore it does not necessarily precede.

2. Likewise, if the remission of fault were entirely from free will, then it is settled that the act of detestation would precede it; but as that which is the whole cause precedes the thing, so also does that which is auxiliary: therefore if contrition is a motion from free will, aiding grace and making the way for fault to be destroyed; it is clear that it is prior.

3. Likewise, if light could not be introduced into the air unless the air worked toward this; not only would the introduction of light precede the expulsion of darkness, but so also would the act of the air; but so it is in the case at hand: therefore since justification is not introduced except with free will aiding, it is clear that not only the infusion of grace, but also the act of free will, precedes it naturally.

4. Likewise, since the soul cannot be healed except by operating; if it could not operate unless healed, the way would be closed off to it: therefore it is necessary that the operation by which it is healed precede the healing, therefore the remission of sin.

### Conclusion
> Contrition precedes the remission of fault according to the order of nature.

**I respond:** It must be said that it was the opinion of some that the remission of fault antecedes contrition, insofar as the remission of fault is taken with respect to the removal of the stain; but with respect to the penalty, or the consequence, it follows. — But as was said above, contrition is necessary in the very infusion of grace; whence it also precedes the expulsion of sin in nature.

And this is clear thus: because the soul, through the detestation of sin, disposes itself toward grace with as great a disposition as it can; but grace, coming into the soul, since that detestation was as it were a middle disposition for introducing grace, by nature first regards that detestation and through it the fault to be destroyed; but from the comparison or in respect of grace to that detestation there is contrition, while in respect of the fault there is remission: therefore contrition precedes remission by nature. — And the reasons for this are to be conceded.

An example of this can be seen thus. Let us understand the air darkened by the presence of clouds and mists, and that those clouds cannot be expelled insofar as they darken, except by the motion of the air and the irradiation of light. Then, in order

that the air might receive the first illumination, it would be necessary that, together with the irradiation of the sun, a wind concur, and afterward, for the perfect restoration of the light, it would still be necessary that a wind follow which would expel the clouds. In this manner is contrition and the infusion of grace to be understood, though the active causality be attributed to the irradiation, according to that of the Psalm: *At the brightness in his sight the clouds passed away,* etc.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1, 2, 3.* To that which is objected to the contrary, that it is an informed and meritorious and good act; it must be said that an act can be informed by grace in two ways: in one way, by grace eliciting and commanding the motion itself according to its substance, as when grace moves free will to a good work; and then it is true that the soul's gratification and purification and enabling for good precedes such an act. In another way, an act is informed by grace not commanding nor eliciting, but coming, as when free will is in an act consonant with grace; then also, coming and finding free will in act, it forms both at the same time in time, namely the potency and the act, yet the act prior in nature to the potency, as an intermediate disposition. And concerning such an act it is not true that it follows purification or information, rather it precedes and is ordered to the remission of fault; which indeed some act elicited by grace does not do, insofar as it is called grace-making [*gratum faciens*]. For even that act by which the soul disposes itself is from grace, insofar as grace signifies something freely given; because, as was held in the second [book], free will does not dispose itself toward grace-making grace without something freely given. And so the three objections are clear. But the contrition which is after justification is by that mode which it states.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the soul is not moved by diverse motions at the same time; it must be said that this is true according to the same potency; but according to one potency and another it can be, and is necessary. For there are simultaneously the cognition of reason and the appetite of the will and delight, when someone delights in seeing or understanding something. So in the case at hand: because the motion of free will is of faith according to the act of reason, but contrition is of the potency of the will according to the irascible power, and they are simultaneous in time.

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