Dist. 17, Part 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/17/q/bon-sent-IV-d17-p1-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first about this, that Cassiodorus says: *A vow is judged for the deed.* For it seems to be said badly, because according to this it avails just as much if one has the will of confessing as if he confesses: therefore he confesses in vain. — Likewise, the Sacrament either confers *something* on one having a good will, or *nothing.* If *something*: therefore to will [it] and to receive the Sacrament are not the same and equivalent. If it confers *nothing* on one having a good will, and confers [it] on no other: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that a *vow* is here called a firm resolve, and this is reckoned for the deed, not because it avails just as much altogether, but because God also accepts this, and if the vow is present and the opportunity is lacking, God holds [the man] excused. I grant, therefore, well, that he who receives the Sacrament in deed always receives something and has some benefit; nevertheless, where the opportunity is lacking, God reckons the vow itself sufficient for obtaining [it]; and where it is present, before [one] arrives at the deed, He reckons [it] fit for obtaining grace. Nor yet does he confess in vain; for if he were not to confess according to place and time, the vow would not be a true [vow], or would cease to be, if it were [one] before.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says, that *no one can confess unless raised up [from death].* For it seems not to be true what he says, because according to this, since no dead man is bound to his own raising-up, because this is impossible, no sinner is bound to confession; which is unfitting.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to be able to confess* is twofold: either by uncovering the sin, so that it be a *manifest* confession, and thus it can be done even by a sinner; or so that it be a truly *reconciliative* confession, and thus it cannot be done except by one who is just and raised up. For if it be done otherwise, [the man] is absolved outwardly, but not inwardly. For it avails nothing for salvation to assess a temporal penalty for anyone, until the Lord absolves [him] from the eternal [one].

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *That, as [the soul is] the life of the body, so its life is God.* For it seems to be false, because the soul by giving life informs the body, but God is not the form of the soul. — Likewise, a body deprived of the life of the soul is not raised up except by a miracle: therefore it seems that justification is miraculous; which does not seem [so], since no one wonders at this, nor is it unusual.

**I respond:** It must be said that God is the life of the soul as the soul [is] of the body, in a certain way, and in a certain way not so. For in this there is a *likeness*, that just as the body needs the soul and is given life by it, as long as it is joined to it, and by its separation grows worthless; so, as long as the soul is united to God by charity, it is given life, and when it is separated from Him, it dies and grows worthless. But in this there is an *unlikeness*, because the soul is joined naturally and by the corruption of nature is naturally separated, so that appetite and need are in both, because they constitute a third [thing]; but from God and the soul one [thing] is not made. And *moreover*, that conjunction is of the will on both sides; and hence it is, that because our will is by nature changeable, and the divine mercy is prompt to have mercy, the raising-up of the soul is not *miraculous*, but, to speak more properly, is *wondrous*.

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says, that *he does not merit to be justified who in his life is unwilling to confess [his] sin.* For it seems to speak improperly, because justification precedes all merit: therefore no one merits to be justified. — Likewise it is asked: since all the virtues are given to man, namely faith, charity, etc., why is justification rather called the deletion of fault than [anything] else? — Likewise, since the soul is said to be *justified*, *given life*, *healed*, and *renewed*; it is asked what is the difference between these.

**I respond:** It must be said that justification does not fall under the merit of *condignity*, yet it falls under the merit of *congruity*; and the repairing of the soul is called *justification.* For actual sin is a disorder or twisting about some act of the soul; and through this the soul is separated from God, and from this it incurs a double evil, namely *difficulty toward the good*, and this is called oldness, by which the soul is now grown old; and *proneness toward evil*, and this is called infirmity; whence every sin is called injustice, is called death, is called oldness, is called infirmity. By the opposite, therefore, the soul at the coming of grace is *given life*, and from the reception of the virtues ordering all the powers is *justified* — and this indeed is done in an instant — whence justification is named from *general justice*; but it is further *healed* through the grace of the Sacraments, and is *renewed* through good exercise and becomes ever fitter for the good. Whence the Apostle says in the second to the Corinthians four: *That [the inward man] is renewed day by day, just as the outward [man] day by day is corrupted.*

Whence it is to be noted that sin is in one way called infirmity and oldness, in another way the sequel of sin. And in the first way, indeed, healing and renewal are done at once; in the second way, successively, nor is perfect health and newness attained except in glory, because proneness and difficulty always remain in the way.

As to what then is asked: why is it called justification? it must be said that it is named from general justice, not from cardinal justice. — As to what is asked, how these differ, it is now plain. — That too is plain which has been wont to be asked, to whom [the office] of healing belongs. For I say that it belongs to contrition, insofar as it is an act of the virtues, to justify; but to it, insofar as it is sacra-

mental, [it belongs] to cure — for the Sacraments properly heal, and the virtues rectify — but insofar as [it is] of grace, [it belongs] to *give life*; insofar as [it is] of all of these, to renew.

### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about this, that Chrysostom says: *Unless he be purged from every sin by penitence and confession, or baptism.* It is asked how these three are distinguished; for it seems that confession does not differ from these.

**I respond:** It must be said that the curing of a disease is twofold: either by virtue, or by Sacrament. If by virtue, he means by penitence; if by Sacrament, this is twofold, just as there is a double *plank*; and thus there is confession and baptism. — Otherwise it can be said, and better, that Chrysostom speaks of adults, and these are purged by a double Sacrament, namely confession and baptism; and the preparation for both is contrition, and this he gives to be understood by the name of penitence.

### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Let no one say: I do penitence secretly* etc. For from this it seems that all penitence is to be done in public, and that seems [to follow] from the following text concerning Job: *If I have blushed at my sins* etc.; according to this it seems that everyone is bound to confess his sins in the sight of the people: therefore he who confesses in private is not truly penitent.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine understands [it] of the concealment which is done with respect to the priest, to whom the Lord commands [him] to make [them] manifest, not with respect to other persons.

### Doubt VII

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *It is a venial fault, which the confession of offenses follows.* For it seems to be said badly, because a fault is not lightened by a following effect, although it is aggravated [by one]: therefore it seems that a mortal [sin] never becomes venial through confession. — Likewise, a venial [sin] does not become mortal, therefore neither [does it become so] conversely. — Likewise, if it becomes venial because God remits [it], by parity of reason, indeed by a much stronger [reason], he ought to say [the same] of contrition.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the absolution which is in contrition, the fault receives pardon as to the eternal penalty, but in confession it partly receives pardon, partly not, because it is bound to one part of the penalty [and] from another is absolved. And therefore Ambrose says, that *it becomes venial*, not as to the stain, but as to the obligation to some penalty. And so that is plain.

### Doubt VIII

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Let him sleep in sackcloth.* For it does not seem fitting, since even many [who are] in silks, not in rough [garments], do penitence.

**I respond:** It must be said that *sackcloth* is taken for any humiliation whatever, by that trope by which the species is taken for the genus. — Or it must be said that it is [a matter] of perfection and a counsel; nor is it understood of sackcloth *outwardly*, but that *inwardly* a rough garment be worn. — Or it must be said, and better, that it is to be understood that *he enter the Church* just as [that he] *sleep in sackcloth*; for it is not understood of a material temple, but of spiritual unity; thus inwardly he ought to be clothed with sackcloth, because true penitence ought to be humble and austere, both of which are noted in sackcloth and were [found] in the Ninevites. — But this authority does not seem to the point concerning confession; and therefore it must be said that it is adduced not for the sake of confession, but for the sake of satisfaction; yet it bears on confession as it were *a posteriori.* And so that is plain.