Dist. 17, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/17/q/bon-sent-IV-d17-p2-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first about this, that the Master says: *To some it seemed to suffice if confession be made to God alone.* It is asked therefore whether such men were heretics. And that they were not, it seems: because the Master recounts this as a probable opinion. — But against this is that he who denies confession denies absolution, and through this denies the power of the keys, and thus is manifestly against Scripture, and thus against the faith.

**I respond:** It must be said that if anyone were now of this opinion, he would be reprobated as a heretic, since in a general Council this was determined under Innocent the Third. But before this determination this was not heresy, because they did not deny the power of the keys, but denied [its] necessity; they freely conceded that it was useful to confess, and that priests could absolve. Therefore the Master and Gratian in the Decrees report this as an opinion; yet each disapproves it and determines to the contrary, and if anyone were pertinaciously to assert the contrary, he would have to be judged a heretic.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *That which cannot be defended can be absolved or washed away.* For it seems to be said badly, because no sin can be reasonably defended; why therefore does he say that it cannot be defended?

**I respond:** It must be said that he here calls "defense" excuse; and there are some sins which it is possible to defend, because they can be excused, and by this very fact are worthy of pardon; but sins which cannot be excused of themselves can have washing-away and absolution by the merit of tears. He means therefore to say that there is no sin so grave that it does not become excusable through tears; nor any so shameful but that true sorrow of contrition makes [one] confess [it]. And weeping and lamentation «is advisable for pardon», while it obtains pardon; «and for shame», while it renders the sinner excusable, or makes him overcome the shame on account of which he did not dare to confess. And so Ambrose does not intend to exclude confession,

but to persuade [to] true contrition. And thus the sense of the authority and the continuation of the text is plain.

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *I do not say that you should confess to your fellow-servant, so that he may reproach you with them.* For according to this it seems that, since every man is a fellow-servant, a sin could be revealed to no one. — Moreover, the seal of confession is most strict: therefore one ought not to fear that they be reproached against him.

**I respond:** It must be said that one confesses his sin to another in two ways: either as to a man, and this by a certain conversation; or as to God, and this by the revelation of conscience, so as to speak to the man as to God. In the first way to confess a sin is to confess to a fellow-servant, because he confesses to the man as to a man; and therefore he can reproach him, because he is not bound to the seal of confession. In the other way, because he confesses to the man as to God, and then he does not confess as to a fellow-servant, but to God; and because the man does not know it as a man, he cannot tell it, but is bound to be silent; and then there is nothing to fear, that he should reproach. But if anyone were to reveal confessions, he would be unworthy of priestly honor; and reasonably confession could be made to another, and he himself avoided, and this by the authority of a superior.

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Without others knowing, they bear against themselves the sentence of a voluntary excommunication.* For it seems to be said badly, because no one can excommunicate himself. — Likewise, however much one punishes himself, he cannot be reconciled except through the judgment of a priest.

**I respond:** It must be said that he speaks of the knowledge by which one knows as a man. Yet someone knows as God, at whose judgment a man is said to bear against himself the sentence of excommunication, when he debars himself from someone by his own will, from whom the excommunicate is debarred unwilling, namely from holy places and the participation of the Eucharist. — And if you object that no one ought to deprive himself of that Sacrament, since it is a medicine; it must be said that the deferring of the medicine, that a better preparation may be made, is rather a promotion than a withdrawal from the good. Now for that Sacrament a man is most prepared through desire and through reverence; and when he withdraws himself for some time, then he takes [it] more desirously and approaches more reverently, especially he who rises from sin; and therefore he says this.

### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *That they cannot obtain the indulgence of God except by the supplications of priests.* For it seems from this that the absolution of the priest ought to be done by way of supplicating or of beseeching: therefore not by way of the indicative. But against this is that the form of all the Sacraments is by way of the indicative: therefore [the form] of this Sacrament also.

**I respond:** It must be said that that Sacrament is against actual sin, to whose cure a voluntary act concurs. Whence although the Sacrament has power of itself, it can nevertheless be impeded by an existing evil disposition, and that evil disposition God alone removes; and therefore it is fitting that the form of the words be expressed under both; and so it is. For the priest first gives absolution by way of beseeching, saying: *May He grant indulgence* etc., and afterward: *And I absolve you*.

### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Teaching that sins are to be confessed by bodily presence, not to be manifested by writing.* For it seems from this that he who does not know the language cannot confess through an interpreter; and also, that a mute cannot confess, since he cannot speak with the mouth. — Likewise it is asked whether the interpreter is bound to conceal [it]. And it seems that he is, because he shares in the act with the priest. On the contrary is that the sinner does not confess to him.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine speaks of those who have the language and the capacity of confessing; who are not excused, but rather are bound to speak with their own mouth on account of the merit of shame. — As to what is objected concerning the interpreter, it must be said that he is to be bound [to silence] by the priest; and if he does not bind [him], yet [the interpreter] is bound, because he is the ear of the priest. Whence he shares with both.

### Doubt VII

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *That becomes venial which he committed [as] mortal.* For it seems to say [something] false, because the species of things cannot be transmuted: therefore neither [can] sins.

**I respond:** It must be said that for a mortal [sin] to become venial is twofold: either as to the stain and deformity, or as to the guilt. If as to the stain, this is impossible; if as to the guilt, this can be understood in two ways: either that this [sin] becomes that [one], and this never happens; or that the one succeeds the other, and this is true, because someone is first obliged to eternal death and afterward, through the divine mercy, to a temporal penalty. — Or it is distinguished, that "venial" is said in three ways: by genus, as a jesting lie; by event, on account of the effect of the divine mercy; by circumstance, as that which has an excuse. In the first way a mortal [sin] does not become venial, but in the second way.

### Doubt VIII

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *The more [priests] he confesses to in hope of pardon the foulness of his crime* etc. For it seems to be said badly, because either the second priest remits something, or nothing. If something, likewise also the third, and thus they can remit the whole: therefore without satisfaction by confession alone one can be saved; which is unfitting. If he remits nothing: therefore he does not obtain pardon more easily. — Likewise, if the first confession is a perfect Sacrament, then if he adds more, the whole seems superfluous: therefore he does not obtain pardon. — Likewise, every priest ought to impose penance; and then it seems that either he is bound to [impose] all [penances], or to [impose] none. If to all, then he obtains pardon more difficultly; if to none, it seems that one confession nullifies the other.

**I respond:** It must be said that confession is ordered to many things, but to one principally, and as to the principal [end] it is equivalent to confess to many as to one; because one priest remits as much of the penalty as he can by the power of the keys. Nor ought confession to be repeated

on account of the principal end, unless perhaps it be feared that there was an error in the confession. — Moreover, there are other annexed utilities, and for these it is profitable to confess many times, namely for shame and the multiplication of intercessors and for humiliation and the increase of grace. For the principal effect it is profitable as to certification.

From these the objections are plain, because the second [priest] does not make a new remission nor ought he to bind anew, but to impose something easy, as the *Our Father* etc.; and the penitent can always be more certain, because, if the first [confession] did not have its effect, it can be that the second has [it], because it finds [him] better disposed. — And from this the last [objection] is plain.