Dist. 17, Part 3, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/17/q/bon-sent-IV-d17-p3-a2-q3
----------------------------------------
### Question III. *Whether we are bound to confess every circumstance of sin.*

Thirdly it is asked whether we are bound to confess every circumstance of sin. And that we are, seems to be the case.

1. Because Augustine speaks thus in his book *On Penance*, setting forth the manifold kinds of circumstances: "All this variety," he says, "is to be confessed and bewailed."

2. Likewise, it seems so by reason: for confession is made chiefly to know the magnitude of sin, because the penance is to be imposed according to the measure and estimation of sin, as is said in Leviticus 5; but the magnitude of sin lies in the circumstances: therefore it is necessary to confess them. The first is manifest; the second is proved by what Bernard says, that "trifles in the mouth of a priest are blasphemies." But he says this only on account of the aggravation of sin: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in confession it is necessary that the kind of sin be disclosed; but the kind of sin is varied by circumstances, as is plain; for to know a woman not one's own, who is unmarried, is fornication; to know one not one's own, who has a husband, is adultery: therefore it is necessary to confess the circumstances.

4. Likewise, confession is made especially for shame; but there is greater shame in confessing the adjacent circumstances than even in the narration of the act: therefore it seems that in confession one ought to dwell especially upon the circumstances.

5. Likewise, confession is made principally for the accusation of the one sinning; but the accusation of the action is from the circumstances. Whence Tully in the first book of the *Rhetoric*: "Circumstances are those from which the arguments of accusation or of defense are drawn." And Boethius in the fourth: "Circumstances are those which make the rhetorical question concerning the praise and blame of a person."

6. Likewise, the divine judgment is stricter than the human; but in human judgment inquiry and response concerning circumstances is now made, whence it is not sufficient to ask about the act: therefore much more so in the divine judgment. But this is the judgment of penance: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, the spiritual sickness is to be tended more diligently than the bodily, just as great diligence is to be had concerning the spirit and greater than concerning the body; but bodily sickness is not sufficiently detected unless the circumstances also be detected: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. The principal being transferred, it is necessary that what is annexed be transferred, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews in the seventh chapter: *The priesthood being transferred, it is necessary that a transfer of the Law also be made*; but sin is the principal: therefore if through confession the Lord transfers sin, by equal reasoning the circumstance also.

2. Likewise, the circumstances are infinite to us; and no one is bound to that which is impossible to him: therefore he is not bound to gather up and report the circumstances of sin.

3. Likewise, it is not necessary that the priest impose on the sinner so grave a penalty as the fault demands, but rather much lesser ones are imposed every day: therefore by equal reasoning it is not necessary that the sinner confess that he has sinned as gravely as he did sin.

4. Likewise, if he is bound to confess the circumstances in order to know the magnitude of sin; but the magnitude of sin is not known unless the *alleviating* circumstances be known as well as the aggravating, and the *defending* circumstances as well as the accusing: therefore a man is bound in confession to excuse himself, but this is false: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, it seems that the circumstance does not increase the magnitude, because in good deeds the magnitude of merit is not caused by the circumstances, but by the magnitude of the love by which a man is turned toward God: therefore by equal reasoning, since sin is an aversion, the magnitude of sin lies in the lust or contempt of the heart: not, therefore, in the exterior circumstance.

6. Likewise, it seems that it does not give species to the sin, because all that gives species and form ought to be essential and intrinsic and single; but circumstances are extrinsic and accidental and variable: therefore no circumstance draws sin into a new kind: it does not, therefore, seem that one must confess the circumstances.

There is, then, the question, which ones it is necessary to confess, and which not.

> **Conclusion.** The confession of circumstances changing the species is necessary, that of aggravating ones is fitting, but that of alleviating ones is rather unfitting.

**I respond:** It must be said that the circumstances which touch upon sin are some alleviating, some drawing it into another kind, and some in some way aggravating. To confess the circumstances drawing it into another kind is necessary, since the kind of sin must be confessed. — But to confess the alleviating circumstances is not good, except for this: that satisfaction be made to another's inquiry, or that provision be made against his scandal and disturbance, as for example if he should fear that the confessor might from this take occasion for evil; or also if it so diminishes the sin that it falls within the kind of the venial, as to eat meat in Lent on account of infirmity, yet in such a way that there be no gluttony on the side. And the reason for this is that in confession the sinner ought not to *excuse* himself, but to *accuse* himself. — But concerning the circumstances which *aggravate*, if the kind of sin is not changed, there is a diverse opinion among the doctors.

For some say that penitents are bound to confess them; but it is an affirmative precept and obliges not *always*, but *for the place and the time*, namely when he knows them, whether of himself or through another's inquiry. Whence one wise and intelligent is bound to confess them without inquiry; the simple is bound if he be questioned about it.

Others say that *we are not bound* to the confession of these circumstances by the bond of *necessity*, but *out of what is good and fitting*; and the more wise and perfect one is, the more distinctly ought he to explain them; but they are not bound to this, unless perhaps they be obliged out of their own conscience. — This position I believe to be the more probable.

Whence it must be said that the confession of circumstances drawing into *another kind* pertains to confession as regards *necessity*; but the confession of *aggravating* ones as regards *fittingness*; whereas the confession of *alleviating* ones rather produces unfittingness; and let this be understood with the aforesaid cases excepted.

All the reasons, therefore, proving that the circumstances are to be confessed, are reasons of *fittingness* as regards the *aggravating* ones; otherwise, if they wish to prove necessity, they proceed from an insufficient ground, that one excepted which concerns the circumstance drawing into another kind.

**Replies to the arguments:**

*To 1, 2, 4, 5, 7.* Whence the word of Augustine is a counsel. — And as to what is objected concerning the magnitude and the shame and the accusation and the diligence to be had, they do not conclude anything except that it be done more becomingly if the circumstance of each sin be expressed.

What is objected on the contrary, that it is not necessary to confess them, is to be conceded.

4. Yet as to that which objects that the alleviating circumstances are to be confessed etc.; it must be said that it is not the same: because the aggravating ones must be confessed not only on account of the magnitude of sin, but also on account of shame and accusation.

5. To that which is objected, that they do not increase the magnitude; it must be said that they do not increase it *principally*, but because they increase the contempt or the lust. Nor is it the same with the good; for because we are good, we do good; whence the magnitude of *goodness* comes from the *intrinsic habit*, but the magnitude of *malice* from the *act*; for because we do evil, we are evil.

6. To that which is objected, that it does not change the species; it must be said that there is the *being of nature* and the *being of morals*. And something is *accidental* to a thing according to the *being of nature*, which nevertheless is *essential* according to the *being of morals*; and although the circumstances are *accidental* to the act according to the *being of nature*, yet they are essential according to praise and blame, which praise comes from the side of morals, or its contrary. And *if you object* that they ought not to be called circumstances; it must be said that *some* thing is a circumstance with respect to *natural being*, which is not a circumstance with respect to sin, but a *form*, as in theft to take a thing not one's own, against the will of the owner. Sometimes a circumstance is accidental with respect to the act as regards the being of nature and inasmuch as it is sin, because without it there is nonetheless sin, as to take a thing belonging to another and sacred from a sacred place, and thus it is both a circumstance and a form; but it is a circumstance with respect to the sin of theft, because without it there could be theft, but a form with respect to sacrilege.

---