Dist. 18, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/18/q/bon-sent-IV-d18-p1-a3-q2
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### Question II. *Whether knowledge is a key other than the power of loosing.*

Secondly, it is asked concerning this matter, whether knowledge is a key other than the power of loosing. And that it is so, it seems:

1. *First*, by the authority of the Lord, Matthew the sixteenth: *I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven:* if therefore the Lord spoke truly and properly, then he gave not only a key, but indeed keys: therefore there are several keys. But [these are] nothing other than power and knowledge: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, "habits and potencies are known through their acts," therefore by parity of reasoning instruments [are known] also; but knowledge is for discerning, whether it names an authority or a habit, while the power of binding and loosing is for the other act: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, things that have diverse opposites are themselves diverse; but knowledge is opposed to error, as Jerome says, and it is found in the preceding problem; while the power of loosing is opposed to difficulty: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, things that regard diverse powers of the soul are diverse, speaking of those things which are superadded to the powers, on account of the fact that accidents and properties are distinguished through their proper subjects; but knowledge is referred to the intellect, and power to the affect: therefore it seems that there are two.

**On the contrary:**

1. A key is either the priestly order, or a property inseparably annexed [to it], as will be seen below; but that order is one: therefore also the key pertaining to that order is one.

2. Likewise, the keys are directed to opening the kingdom of heaven and to removing the obstacle; but that kingdom is nothing but one, and the door, which the priest opens, is nothing but one, namely the debt of eternal punishment: therefore it seems that there ought to be only one key, [namely] knowledge and power.

3. Likewise, either the power of binding and loosing opens by itself alone, or joined to the authority of discerning; it is established that [it does] not [open] by itself alone, as was seen before, and this is plain, because it belongs to no one to determine concerning anything about which it does not belong [to him] to discern: if therefore the act of opening does not belong to it except with knowledge, and a key is named from the act of opening; therefore both are one key.

4. Likewise, if these keys are distinguished, [it is] either with respect to that from which they are, or [that] in which, or [that] to which. If with respect to that from which, as knowledge from the Son, and power from the Father; against this are number and order: number, because since there are three persons, there ought to be three keys; order, because, since the Father is pre-understood according to origin, the power of loosing would precede knowledge; which is unfitting. — If with respect to that in which they are; then since there is a threefold power in us, according to which the image consists, there ought to be a threefold key: one in the memory, another in the intelligence, a third in the will; or if it is not in these, but in the [appetitive] forces, since there are three forces, in which there are three virtues, then accordingly there ought to be three keys, one in the rational, another in the concupiscible and a third in the irascible. — But if they are distinguished with respect to that to which [they are directed]; but that is one, namely to open the kingdom: therefore, etc. If you say that they are for loosing and binding, and thus for two; on the contrary: for virtue there is required to know and to will and to act perseveringly; but to know and to will do not multiply virtue, but rather are in one virtue: therefore by parity of reasoning [neither do] to discern and to loose.

### Conclusion.

> In the authority committed to priests there are two keys, namely the power of discerning a case and of pronouncing sentence, concurring in one full authority and given in one order.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the distinction of the aforesaid keys is taken in diverse ways by diverse [authors].

— For some take the distinction of these keys with respect to that from which they are and to which they finally reduce [them]. For they say that, just as among the Angels there is a hierarchy descending from the supercelestial hierarchy and ascending to it and returning; so it is in the Church Militant. But among the Angels the hierarchy, as Dionysius says, is order, knowledge and action, that is, power ordered with knowledge and action, such that power corresponds to the Father, and this appears in the Thrones; knowledge to the Son, and this appears in the Cherubim; and action or work to the Holy Spirit, and this appears in the Seraphim. In this manner it is to be understood in the ecclesiastical hierarchy; which consists chiefly in the Sacrament of order, in which is conferred the power ordered with knowledge and action; and this they call the power of the keys, which embraces the act of discerning and of loosing: such that power corresponds to the Father, and knowledge to the Son, and work to the Holy Spirit. And according to these there are in the priest three powers: one principal and first, which is the order itself as the power of consecrating; the second is the power of discerning, and the third of absolving; so that thus there may appear a most perfect beauty in the ecclesiastical order according to the representation of that higher most perfect Trinity. — But if you ask of these: why is the power of consecrating not a key? they answer you, because it is not toward another, like those two, as will be seen below. — And this position indeed seems to be sufficiently probable.

Others take the ground of distinguishing with respect to that in which they are and against which they are. For they say that these two keys regard the *intellect* and the *affect* by removing the twofold evil inflicted on us, namely error through knowledge and difficulty through power. — But this manner is less probable than the first, both because it does not inquire into the distinction of the keys according to the right way, and because, although knowledge is in the intellect, nevertheless the authority of discerning is in the same power, as seems plain, [together] with the authority of loosing or of pronouncing sentence. But it does not rightly take the ground of the distinction: for the keys are not given to the priest that they may be a remedy to himself, but that they may be directed as a remedy to others. In this, however, it agrees with the first, that there are two keys according to a complete distinction.

The third manner of distinguishing the keys is with respect to that to which they are immediately [directed]. Now in the penitential forum there are two [things], just as in the judicial forum. For in the latter there are these two acts, namely to discern the case, and afterward to pronounce sentence; and these are diverse acts, and for this, that authority may be fully committed to someone, it is necessary that both be committed, otherwise he does not have full authority; nevertheless it is a twofold authority concurring into one full [authority], which is plain, because it happens to be divided. For sometimes the Lord Pope commits to certain persons, that they discuss a case and, [once] prepared, refer it back to him before the pronouncing of sentence; and these have the authority of discerning, not of pronouncing sentence. In this manner it is to be understood concerning the authority committed to priests, that since the power of arbitrating between the sinner and God conferred upon them is sufficient, they have both authority; and since each of these is ordered to opening heaven, each is called a key, and there are two keys; nevertheless, because from these there results one full authority, therefore they are given in one order and regard one [thing]. — And thus it is plain that there are several keys.

1. And the reply to the first objection to the contrary, concerning the unity of the order, is plain. — Yet it could be said that the first and only *essential* power of the priestly order is the power of consecrating.

2. To that which is objected, that they are toward one [thing], it must be said that toward that one [thing] a twofold act is necessarily required, namely the discernment of guilt and the loosing of punishment, and in these two the twofold key consists; therefore they have their distinction not with respect to the ultimate end, but with respect to the immediate [end].

3. To that which is objected concerning the opening, it must be said according to the ancients, that for opening the same lock in bodily [things] we see a twofold key: one, which opens the way and is called the fore-key (*anticlavis*), and another, which directly opens, and this is called the principal key. So in spiritual [things] knowledge is like the fore-key, which directs the judgment, and the power of loosing [is] the principal key.

4. To that which is asked: with respect to what are they distinguished? it must be said that [they are distinguished] with respect to that to which they are immediately [directed], namely to discern concerning guilt and to loose from punishment, not with respect to these acts, to loose and to bind. And if you object that knowledge and operation do not make two virtues; it must be said that knowledge is twofold: one by way of practice and experience, and this is in every virtue and is essential to them; the other, however, is by way of a certain direction — like prudence, which, as Bernard says, "is the charioteer of the virtues," and faith also is directive of the theological [virtues] — and thus it is distinguished from those things which concern the work. So it is to be understood in the present case. — And if you ask of me: why are there not as many powers as there are vices, from which they loose? it must be said that they loose from all those according to one ground and one act and a like manner; and therefore there is no need to multiply thus.