Dist. 18, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/18/q/bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q3
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### Question III. *By whom excommunication can be done.*

Thirdly it is asked, by whom excommunication can be done. And that it can be done only by one having a key is shown thus.

1. To loose and to bind are acts of the keys; but "to excommunicate is to bind," as the Master says in the text; but "whose is the act, his too is the power": therefore etc.

2. Likewise, to excommunicate is to separate from the communion of the Sacraments; but it belongs to him to separate from communion or from participation whose it is to administer; but only the priest, who has the keys, can administer the Sacrament of the body and blood: therefore only he can excommunicate.

3. Likewise, to Peter was given the power of binding and loosing in the judicial and the penitential forum; I ask, therefore, when were the keys given to him? Only when? therefore he who does not have the keys does not have this power.

4. Likewise, it is of greater virtue and power to bind with the bond of excommunication than [with the bond] of satisfaction; but only the priest can impose penance and hear confessions, who has the keys: therefore only such a one can excommunicate, because he who cannot do the lesser cannot do the greater.

**On the contrary:**
1. Delegated judges have the power of excommunicating; yet many of them do not have the keys, because they are not priests: therefore someone can excommunicate who does not have the keys. If you say that he does not excommunicate by his own authority, then the objection is made about the archdeacon, who by his office hears and decides cases: therefore he can excommunicate, and yet, if he is not a priest, he does not have the keys. If you say that he likewise has [this] by delegation or by custom; why does he not likewise have the act of binding in the penitential forum by commission or by custom? For there does not seem to be a greater reason in the one than in the other.

2. Likewise, one canonically elected and approved is certainly such that, before he is ordained a priest, he does not have the keys, yet he can hear cases and excommunicate by his own authority: therefore it seems etc.

3. Likewise, the parish priest does not according to the laws have the power of excommunicating except for thefts and robberies and the like; and it is established that he has the keys and the use of the keys: therefore excommunication is not from the power of the keys.

4. Likewise, a whole multitude, as a chapter, excommunicates, so that no one [individually does]; but that a multitude should have the keys, so that no one [individually does], is impossible, since it states an absolute property: therefore the act of excommunicating is not from a key.

Alongside this it is asked: since a multitude cannot be excommunicated, so that no one [individually is excommunicated], how can it excommunicate, so that no one [individually does]?

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** The power of excommunicating does not follow precisely upon the keys, but is in all who have ordinary jurisdiction in the judicial forum.

**I respond:** It must be said that among the jurists themselves there is a controversy about this question. — For some said that the power of excommunicating is only in bishops. Others said that it is not only in bishops, but also in archpriests, archdeacons and abbots and other prelates. A third group said that this belongs to these and also to parish priests.

But although in this question it belongs to the canons to say the "that," nevertheless it belongs to theology to say the "why", as to the higher science. For that anyone in the Church has power, this is from Christ himself, who conferred the power on the Apostles and especially on Peter himself. But the Lord conferred on Peter himself both powers, both of binding and loosing in the penitential forum, and of binding and loosing in the judicial forum. The first power regards order, the second prelacy.

Hence according to the first an equal can absolve an equal, according to the second an equal cannot bind an equal nor a superior; and this is because the former belongs to order, the latter to prelacy, namely the power of excommunicating.

The first power, of binding and loosing in the penitential forum, opens the entrance of heaven; and therefore it is rightly called a key. The second by the censure of judgment coerces subjects; and therefore it is called a sword. — The first power is the power of arbitrating between God and man, the second between man and man; and therefore the first regards order, the second prelacy. — The first power, since it was conferred on Peter as a priest, descends to all priests, although not all have its execution. The second, because it was conferred on Peter as he is a prelate, descends to all ecclesiastical persons who have prelacy or jurisdiction. Hence those who have ordinary jurisdiction in judging some have the power of coercing them by ecclesiastical censure, so that their judgment may be inviolably observed. And since not only those having the keys have jurisdiction, but also those not having them — they have it, I say, either by law or by custom, as archdeacons and certain chapters; therefore they can excommunicate. Again, because some have the keys who do not have jurisdiction in the judicial forum, as simple priests; therefore they cannot excommunicate except by commission, or except in determined cases, as in theft and robberies. — I grant therefore the reasons proving that this power does not follow precisely upon the power of the keys.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first, that to loose and to bind are acts of the keys; it must be said that this is true in the penitential forum, but in the judicial forum they are not [acts] of the keys, unless the power of the keys be taken according to its fullness, in which way it is said to be in bishops, who, when they are promoted from the priesthood to the episcopate, do not receive a new key, but the key of power is enlarged in them.

2. To that which is objected, that it belongs to him to excommunicate whose it is to give communion; it must be said that it belongs not only to him, but also to him who presides over the community, or also to him administering the Sacraments; and since such are those who have jurisdiction, although they do not have the keys; therefore etc.

3. To that which is asked: when was this power given to Peter? it can be said that both were given at once, because the power of the key was given in its fullness. — Or it can be said that not at once, but the power of the keys was promised in Matthew the sixteenth and given in John the twentieth: Receive the Holy Spirit etc.; but the power of excommunicating is intimated to have been given in Matthew the eighteenth, where, after it was said: If he will not hear the Church etc., it was added: Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind etc.

4. To that which is objected, that this is of greater virtue, namely to excommunicate; it must be said that they stand as exceeding and exceeded and are of one ordination and another; and therefore it does not follow that he who has the one power has the other; yet both concur toward the fullness of power, and one can exist without the other. Yet the key is granted to more than the sword, because more have the priestly order than [have] prelacy and ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

And if the reason for this be asked, it is twofold. One is the diffusion of the good, because the power of the keys is for reconciling, the power of the sword for compelling. — The other reason is the avoidance of danger, because few are those who know how to strike with this sword; therefore on account of the danger it ought to be handed over to the hands of few. For this reason too the solemn excommunication, which is done with candles first lit and then extinguished, and the bells rung, ought to be done only by bishops, although the others can be done by others.

To that which is asked lastly: why can a congregation or multitude excommunicate, so that no one [individually does], and not be excommunicated? it must be said that the sins of a multitude are nothing, but the jurisdiction of a multitude is something. And if you ask: whence is this? it must be said that a multitude does indeed contribute to the increase of power in excellence — whence a multitude can draw a ship, so that no one draws the ship by himself — but a multitude, as such, does not produce defect nor impotence of strength; whence a multitude is not drawn, unless each one of the multitude is drawn. Thus the whole multitude excommunicates, so that no one [individually does]; it is not so excommunicated, at least according to the new laws, as the jurists say.