Dist. 18, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/18/q/bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q5
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### Question 5. *Whether one who communicates with an excommunicate is [himself] excommunicated.*

Fifthly there is inquiry concerning excommunication as regards communication, and it is asked whether one who communicates with an excommunicate is [himself] excommunicated. And that he is, is shown:

1. Because the laws say this.

2. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*: for to approach one of two opposites is to withdraw from the other; but the excommunicate is placed outside the communion: therefore one who communicates with him withdraws from the communion.

3. Likewise, excommunication is inflicted as a penalty of shame; but there is no shame where others communicate [with the person]: therefore, in order that that sentence be of any value, it is necessary by the law itself to keep others away: therefore, if the ecclesiastical censure consists in excommunication, it seems that such a one is justly and duly excommunicated.

4. Likewise, either it *is permitted* to communicate with an excommunicate, or it is *not*. If *yes*; then such persons are not to be avoided; and this is against that text of First Corinthians, chapter five: *If any brother* etc.; and afterwards: *With such a one not even to take food.* If it is *not permitted*; then by some sentence others are kept from communicating with this person, and only by a sentence of excommunication: therefore those who communicate with him incur the sentence of excommunication: therefore they are excommunicated.

**On the contrary:**

1. One who communicates with an unbeliever or with another sinner, whether in food or in drink, does not incur that fault unless he communicates in a like act or in the crime: therefore by like reasoning no one who participates with an excommunicate is excommunicated, unless he participates in the crime.

2. Likewise, excommunication either is a contagious disease, or it is not. If *yes*; then by the same reasoning by which this person, first excommunicated, infects the participant with a like fault, so also the one [infects] the other, and so on in succession: therefore if this is false and against the laws, it is not a contagious disease: therefore it does not seem that one who communicates with an excommunicate is excommunicated. If you say that *institution* does this, not contagion; *to the contrary*: that institution is from man, just as excommunication is; but no one ought to inflict a penalty except for fault: therefore if he does not communicate in the merit or in the fault, neither [does he] in the penalty: therefore that institution, which causes one to share in the penalty without fault, is unjust.

3. Likewise, a son communicating with his father either is *excommunicated*, or *not*. If *yes*; then he ought to avoid his father. But if he cannot avoid his father without his own detriment, then *the son bears the iniquity of the father*, which is against divine law. But if he is *not* excommunicated, then it is permitted to someone out of *familiarity* to communicate with the excommunicate. But fellowship and friendship and charity are more praiseworthy: therefore it seems by like reasoning that out of *social love* or some such thing it is permitted to communicate with the excommunicate, and thus it does not seem that one who communicates with an excommunicate is excommunicated.

4. Likewise, every excommunication, whether greater or lesser, separates from the Sacraments; but no one is to be separated from the Sacraments except for mortal fault: therefore everyone who communicates with an excommunicate sins mortally. But if this is true; since this medicine is the occasion of many dangers, it then seems that it is not a medicine but a disease; and that whoever inflicts it, since he places many in grave danger, sins gravely.

> **Conclusion.** *Those who communicate rashly with an excommunicate — not for the sake of necessity, or ignorance, or the excommunicate's advantage — incur the lesser excommunication.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as has been touched on, excommunication is twofold, namely *lesser* and *greater*. The *lesser* separates only from the Sacraments; the *greater* however separates not only from the Sacraments but also from lawful acts with other persons. And therefore the lesser excommunication is a disease regarding the person *absolutely*; the greater excommunication is a disease regarding the person *as he is a part of the community*, and separating [him] from the community. But this separation, since it is a relation *of equiparance*, would have no place except where they are separated from him. Therefore, in order that this excommunication be effective, the law established that others avoid him. And because men for the most part fear penalty more than fault, for the firmness of the sentence it added a like penalty, but a lesser one; whence it does not separate from the *communion of the faithful*, but [from the communion] *of the Sacraments*. And right reason dictates that this whole thing was suitably done and established.

But since it is dangerous to forbid all from communicating, inasmuch as some communicate by *necessity*, or by *ignorance*; therefore such persons had to be excepted. Whence those who communicate by *necessity* — such as sons and daughters, so long as they are under the hand of their parents, such as a wife, such as menservants and serving-folk and maidservants, such as pilgrims and the poor, when they do not have wherewith to be sustained — in such cases the law relaxes the sentence. — Likewise, those who communicate out of *advantage*, that a sinner may be converted *from his evil way* and corrected; since they walk according to the law of charity, they are not kept away. — Likewise, those who communicate out of *ignorance* are not excommunicated, because such ignorance of fact excuses; and here one is said to be ignorant so long as a man does not know either by denunciation or by report. Whence no one ought lightly to make a [bad] conscience for himself, because of anyone the good is to be presumed, unless the contrary be proved. — And these circumstances are contained in this verse:

> *Useful, law, humble, a thing unknown, necessity.*

In which is touched this threefold cause, and *necessity* comprises three members. These persons being excepted and thus communicating, those communicating with excommunicates without any of these conditions intervening are, according to the rule of law, excommunicated with the lesser excommunication; and this indeed is reasonable, as has been seen.

*1. 2. 3.* From these things the objections are clear. For as to what is objected concerning other sins and concerning contagion and concerning the son, in all of them the response is clear: because *institution* does this; and the ground of the institution has been stated, and the fittingness of the exception, and why the *greater* passes [to a third person] and the *lesser* does not. And therefore the rule is that excommunication does not pass to a third person. It is clear also that one who communicates does not communicate in the fault; but because he does not show due reverence to the sentence, hence it is that it is just that he carry the penalty.

*4.* To that which is objected, that this is the penalty only of those sinning mortally; it must be said that according to some the conclusion is granted. For they say that, apart from the excepted cases, he sins mortally, because he acts against the command of the Church and seems knowingly to contemn the sentence of the Church. — But because it seems very hard to say that, and there would be the greatest danger were all who communicate to be excommunicated; in order that we may avoid both dangers, without prejudice a distinction seems here to be made. For to say that it is only a *venial* sin does not seem fitting, since commonly men make little of venial sins. To say again that for every word of humanity which a friend says to a friend he should sin *mortally*, seems hard.

And therefore it must be said that one who knowingly communicates either *communicates* in an exterior act *in contempt* of the sentence passed, and then he sins mortally; or he does *not* communicate *in contempt*, yet can reasonably see that the sentence comes into contempt, and still it is to be believed that he sins mortally;

or he probably believes that by this the sentence will never more be contemned, and he himself does this with fear and out of a certain affability or fellowship says some words beyond necessity, or in some other way communicates in non-excepted cases; then it is to be believed that regarding such persons the sentence is tempered.

Whence if someone should ask whether a man ought rather to allow himself to be killed than to say some word; I say that if by this the sentence would come *into contempt*, he certainly ought [to allow it]. But who would judge that this man does wrong, since he ought rather to eat of [what is] stolen than to perish of hunger? — If therefore some say that he sins *mortally*; it is to be understood [as holding] when contempt intervenes. And because [communication] can scarcely be *frequented* without contempt, therefore it is sound counsel for everyone to keep himself far from such things, for the sake of avoiding danger, as Augustine says must be done concerning an oath.

To that therefore which is objected, that they are not deprived of the Sacraments except those sinning mortally; it must be said that this was done for the sake of terror, lest perhaps through habituation and the danger of contempt one should fall [into it].

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