Dist. 18, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/18/q/bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-dubia
----------------------------------------
### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first about this, that the Master says: *They are left to themselves, so that they have free choice to rush into sin.* For it seems to be said badly, because free choice does not admit of *more* and *less*: therefore it is not now freer toward sin after excommunication than before. — Likewise, in connection with this it is asked what are the evils that one incurs through excommunication.

**I respond:** It must be said that the freedom of sinning is not freedom, but a defect of freedom. Therefore free choice, insofar as it is called free *from fault*, because this is not *essential* freedom but *accidental*, is called more and less free; and then it is *more* free when it can better defend itself, and *less* free when it can less defend itself from the dominion of sin. Since therefore by the merits of the prayers of the Church many are sustained and defended from faults; then they are said to become *freer* toward sinning, when the suffrages of the Church are withdrawn. Whence it is plain how that word is understood.

And note that there are many harms which the excommunicate incur, which are noted in these verses:

> *Grace is withdrawn, more and more as the barrier is broken.*
> *From vice he rushes into vice, he loses the suffrages*
> *Of the Church; he is handed over to Satan to be vexed,*
> *He whom the anathematization binds for his own faults.*

And they are understood as to *exposure* or *abandonment*; just as a king would be said to hand a soldier over to the enemy, whom he would not defend from his vexation.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *But it is to be understood of those whose merits loose or bind.* — It is asked therefore here, if someone is unjustly excommunicated, whether he ought to regard himself as excommunicated. And that he should, it seems: because it is said in the law: «The sentence of the pastor, whether just or unjust, is to be held and feared». — But on the contrary: the Master says that the heavenly court approves only that sentence which is given from merits. — Likewise, to favor and hold an unjust sentence is to lend patronage to injustice: therefore such a sentence, as it seems, is in no way to be held, neither by him who is excommunicated, nor by others.

Likewise, it is asked how a sentence of excommunication is unjustly passed.

**I respond:** It must be said that an unjust sentence is so called from the *intention*, from the *cause*, from the *order*: from the *intention*, as when it is imposed not from zeal for justice, but for vengeance; from the *cause*, as when there is no sufficient or certain merit for which he ought to be excommunicated upon whom it is inflicted; from the *order*, as when the order of law is omitted.

If therefore such an excommunication is passed against someone, a distinction must be made: because either it is passed by one having canonical jurisdiction, or by one not having [it]. If by one having [it]; it must be said that it is to be held and feared, because it is not for subjects to discuss the sentences of their superiors; and if one despises [it], he sins gravely. — But two cases are excepted, namely if that sentence was passed after a legitimate appeal, or when it contains an intolerable error, as if it were said: I excommunicate you, because you believe in God. In these two cases those not seeking absolution are admitted to their proof; but otherwise they are not admitted, unless they humbly ask absolution. — Now the lord Pope absolves in all cases *for caution*, not because he reckons that they were excommunicated, or to-be-excommunicated, but to show that the sentence of the Church, however unjust it be, is to be dreaded. Whence it is feared and held not from consideration of [its] injustice, but out of reverence for ecclesiastical power. This is to be understood according to the laws, if one is excommunicated by one having canonical jurisdiction.

But if one is excommunicated by another, who does not have canonical jurisdiction, and this is established; then it is not to be held, namely if they are heretics, or schismatics, apostates, intruders, [or persons] suspended from jurisdiction. But if the crime of such persons is hidden, the sentence of such persons is to be tolerated, just as they too are tolerated by the Church.

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says, that *sin is called darkness, because the intellect is blunted and the whole interior man is darkened.* For it seems to be said falsely, because we see many sinners existing in sins, who understand and learn very well, and so experience is against this. Likewise, the Lord's teaching, Luke sixteen: *The children of this world are more prudent than the children of light.* — Likewise, since sin is much more disordering of the *affection* than of the *intellect*, and corruptive of *love* than of *light*, and of *charity* than of *faith*; it seems rather to be said that sin is *cold* rather than *darkness*.

**I respond:** It must be said that grace is called *light* rather than *heat*, because light has in itself both the power of illuminating, and, by illuminating, more and more the power of heating; and therefore light comprehends more than heat. And grace insofar as light regards not only the intellect, but even the affection, indeed light, as it is said of grace, names it as it regards the whole soul; because, just as light is the form of the whole first orb, and through whose influence generations come about in the lower parts, and there is one ground of actuality and of diffusion, according as Dionysius intimates and says openly in the book *On the Divine Names*: and because this belongs to grace, which is the root of all gratuitous habits and the principle of every good work: hence it is that it is called *light*, and sin is called *darkness*; because darkness not only deprives of the act of light, according to which it is in the sense of sight, but also [of] the other acts according to which [the soul] is operative: and so this darkness regards not the intellect only, but the intellect as extended to the heat of affection, or to the operation of effect.

From these things the objections are plain. For as to what is said, that the intellect flourishes in sinners; it must be said that it is true as to the act which is of pure speculation, but not as it is extended to affection or work. Whence Balaam had prophecy in one way, David in another. For the former only saw, the latter saw and rejoiced and according to this regulated himself in work and directed himself. There is an example in the musician and the good cithara-player; for the musician knows the consonance of the cithara in one way, the good cithara-player in another. And as to this [latter] the intellect is manifestly blunted, although not as openly as to the first; yet I firmly believe that [it is blunted] as to both.

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Therefore that very unlikeness, which is in the soul from sin, is the soul's stain.* For it seems to be said badly. For every stain is called a deformity, either because something is removed, or because something which ought not [to be] is placed about the thing; as is plain: one cut off as to the nose is deformed, but one having *morphew* or some such thing is stained; but sin does not corrupt natural goods, because nothing is corrupted «in that which is essence or nature»; or if it corrupts, yet it places nothing: therefore in no way ought it to be called a stain. If you say that it places an evil aptitude and proneness to evil, and that is the stain; on the contrary: that proneness can be removed by an opposite proneness: therefore the stain of sin would delete the stain; which it is unfitting to say. Likewise, one is freed from proneness by habituation; but God alone frees from the stain, as is said in the text.

**I respond:** It must be said that sin is nothing else than the *privation of due order*, and I call due order [that] insofar as it comprehends mode, species, and order, insofar as about it consists chiefly the ground of the good. This disorder therefore remaining in the soul is the fault itself and sin, because it is from one's own act, where there ought to be the order of justice. But this has to be considered according to the ground of *aversion* and according to the ground of *conversion* and of both.

According to the first ground there belongs to it the ground of *privation*; according to the second mode the ground of *infection*, and this joins to itself a base thing; according to the third mode the ground of *obligation*. — As to the first mode sin is called *darkness* and *deformity*; because the good can be considered in two ways, namely *in itself*, and thus it is called *light*, and by opposition sin is called *darkness*; and in comparison to the cognitive power, and thus it is called the *beauty* of the soul, and by opposition sin [is called] *deformity*. — But as to *conversion* thus it is called *stain* and *foulness*; and this likewise according to the twofold comparison of that conjunction with the earthly delightful thing: *in itself*, and thus *stain*; to the *cognitive power*, and thus *foulness*; as to both, thus there belongs [to it] to be the *bond of eternal death*.