Dist. 19, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/19/q/bon-sent-IV-d19-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the power of the keys inseparably accompanies the priestly order.*

Secondly, it is asked concerning this whether this power inseparably accompanies the priestly order. And that it does, seems to be the case:

1. Because, just as the consecration of an order is never repeated, so neither is the word repeated in which the power of the keys is given: therefore, just as that order is inseparably possessed on account of the character, it seems likewise that this power is too.

2. Likewise, this power is in something; it is established that it is in nothing but the priest, not according to the flesh, but according to the soul; but the things that are had according to the soul, since the soul is incorruptible, cannot be taken away, as is clear in the case of knowledge and virtue: therefore such a power cannot be taken away.

3. Likewise, if they are lost, then it is either on account of ignorance, or on account of malice, or on account of the absence of a subject. Not on account of ignorance, this is established; not on account of malice, this is established, because the wicked have it, as was seen before; not on account of the absence of subjects, because, if such a one were to be made to lack the key, then a change of subjects would change the keys; which is manifestly false: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, if something necessarily posits another thing, the other cannot be taken away without that which it posits being taken away; but once someone has been made a priest according to the form of the Church, he immediately has the key: therefore, the key being removed, the order is removed. But the character of the order cannot be removed: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

**On the contrary,** it is objected: 1. First, concerning heretics and schismatics, who, according to what is said in the text and is found at the beginning of the preceding distinction, cannot loose and bind, and yet have orders, as will be clear below: therefore the key does not follow orders inseparably, because, if they cannot, they do not have the power.

2. Likewise, it is objected concerning the degraded: it is established that orders cannot be taken away, because the character cannot be taken away: if therefore they are degraded, this will be only as to authority or power: therefore it seems that this is taken away, especially since the degraded themselves seem to be farther removed from this act than heretics.

3. Likewise, it is objected concerning the separated soul, which has the character of the order and does not have the power of the keys; for in the fatherland all prelacy ceases: therefore it does not seem that it inseparably accompanies the character.

If you say to me, against all these things, that all the aforesaid have the power but not the execution, this is disproved by a threefold reason.

4. The first is, because that power is a spiritual active power — for power is called active, not passive — and again it is in a free potency, namely free choice, which goes forth into act when it wills: therefore it is impossible that anyone should have the power and not have the execution when he wills.

5. Likewise, a potency that is not followed by act is in vain: therefore if in such persons there is potency without act, it is in vain; but in the divine works nothing ought to be in vain: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, if such a potency is not in act, I ask whence this comes. If because the Pope or a superior forbids it; but on the contrary: however much a superior may forbid it, if someone consecrates, it is consecrated in fact; if he baptizes, it is baptized: therefore by parity of reasoning, if he absolves or binds, it is absolved and bound; which is manifestly false: therefore the first returns, that such persons do not have the power; and they have the character: therefore this power does not follow the character inseparably.

> **Conclusion.** The key inseparably follows the priestly order as to its essence, but as to its execution it follows the state of the wayfarer and the possession of jurisdiction.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that, just as the power of sight may be spoken of in two ways — either as to essence, or as to use; and as to essence this power is rooted radically in the soul and never deserts the soul; but as to use it requires a well-disposed organ and an illuminated medium — so in the matter at hand it is to be understood that, if we speak of the power of loosing as to essence, then it is radically in the soul itself, like the character, and does not seem to differ from it except according to a certain relation; and in this way it holds inseparably with the priestly order.

In another way we can speak of it as to use, and in this way the state of the wayfarer and the authority of jurisdiction are necessarily required. — That the state of the wayfarer is required is clear, because, just as the ground of meriting does not belong to charity outside the state of the way, so neither does the power of reconciling and of presenting or administering the Sacraments belong except in the state of the Church militant; and thus through death the power is said to lose its use in the separated soul. — That jurisdiction too is required is shown thus. For the priest is a mediator, and insofar as mediator he is inferior to God and superior to the penitent, and is appointed as arbiter and judge over man in the place of God, for sparing or loosing and for punishing; but such a judgment is not without some jurisdiction over him who is judged, because no one can judge anyone except him who is appointed his judge by him who holds the power. And therefore jurisdiction is, as it were, the moving force of the key itself, or of the hand; but this failing — that which should move the key — even if the key be present, it will never open; and if this jurisdiction is lost, the execution of the key ceases. — Now this is lost in two ways: either through the removal of subjects as to the thing, and so it is in schismatics, heretics, the cut-off, notorious fornicators, the excommunicate, and the like; or as to removal both according to the thing and according to hope, and this is in the degraded, from whom it is taken away without hope of recovery. Hence both heretics and the excommunicate are said to have a bound hand, but the degraded an amputated one. — Therefore I say that although the key follows as to being an order, yet as to execution it follows the state and jurisdiction.

**Replies to the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1, 2, 3.* And thus the response to the first three objections is clear — concerning heretics, the degraded, and some separated souls; who are said not to be able, because the things necessary for use are not present there; and yet they have the potency, just as in the soul of a blind man there is the power of sight, and yet he cannot see.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that it is an active and free power; it must be said that although it is active and is in a freely-acting substance, nevertheless it is directed to another and needs a fitting recipient; hence, just as matrimony is from free consent, yet, because a mother is not fit to contract with her son, however much they consent, there is no matrimony. So it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that a potency which is not followed by act is in vain; it must be said that if it is understood of the due act for place and time and opportunity, it can hold; but if it is understood of other cases, it has many instances. And because such persons lack opportunity for the act, even if they never go forth into it, they do not on this account have the potency in vain. Moreover, that saying is understood of act in general, not of this or that one, because it is not necessary that the potency go forth into all, yet it suffices that it do something, so that it not be idle in nature. And so it is in the matter at hand, because, even though nothing be done externally through that potency, nevertheless it can be for the adornment of the soul as regards the good, or for the confusion as regards the wicked.

*To 6.* To that which is objected: who takes away the execution from that potency? it must be said that a contrary or superior power can take it away from it. And if you object that it cannot take away the act of consecrating; it must be said that the cases are not alike, for two reasons. The first is that it cannot take away the matter from such a one, and if it could take away bread made of wheat, then it would take away the potency; but this takes away the matter, namely the subjects — for a superior power can withdraw subjects from the power of an inferior — and by taking this away it takes away jurisdiction. — Moreover, in the power of consecrating all are equal, because this is given immediately through the impression of the character; but in jurisdiction or prelacy there is no equality: and therefore in matters of this kind they can be restrained, but not so in others. — And this is the reason why good and holy enclosed religious, even if they be priests, do not have the execution of the key in absolving and binding, because they do not have jurisdiction over any persons; and therefore they are forbidden this act. Hence Pope Eugenius: «It has been resolved that it be permitted to no monks by rash daring to give penance» etc.

— But the reason for this prohibition is assigned at Cause sixteen, question one, and in many decrees of the holy Fathers. They have nevertheless, as is shown in the same place, a fitness from the order and from the merit of life, to which jurisdiction being joined — that which is so called — the priestly order goes forth into act. Hence at Cause sixteen, question one, Pope Leo: «Monks, although in the dedication of their priesthood, like other priests, may duly receive the power of preaching, baptizing, giving penance, remitting sins, and enjoying ecclesiastical benefices, yet they do not have the execution of their power unless they have been elected by the people and ordained by the bishop with the consent of the abbot».

From these things it is clear that, when this power is given, it is never taken away as to substance, but only as to use.