Dist. 19, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/19/q/bon-sent-IV-d19-a3-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article III. *On whom the priestly keys take effect.*

Next, with respect to the third article, it is asked on whom the priestly keys have their use or effect. And concerning this two things are asked.

First it is asked whether a priest who can absolve one subject can absolve any other.

Second, whether a subject priest can absolve his own prelate.

### Question I. *Whether a priest who can absolve one subject can absolve any other.*

Concerning the first the matter proceeds thus, and it is shown that a priest who can act upon one can, by the same reasoning, act upon every other.

1. In *Leviticus* thirteen it is said: *The man in whose skin the plague of leprosy shall appear shall be brought to Aaron the priest, or to any one of his sons*; from this it is clear that any priest in the old law could judge concerning all the faithful of the people of Israel, of whatever tribe they were; but what went before in figure ought to follow in truth: therefore it seems that here any priest can judge concerning the leprosy of anyone. And this seems much more strongly to be so here, because there is greater unity in the Church, both as regards those ministering the Sacraments and as regards the charity of the faithful, than there was at that time; but then what one could do all could do, and toward whomever one could act, so could all: therefore now too it ought to be similar.

2. Likewise, the Lord gave this power or authority to the first priests, and according to their conformity it descended to those who came after; but the Lord said in general, *John* twenty: *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them*; and this very thing is said to the priest: therefore it seems that power is given over all: therefore he can absolve all.

3. Likewise, it seems so by reason: for we see thus in bodily things, that fire which burns in one matter burns also in any like matter of the same species; and light which drives darkness from one place likewise drives it from another without resistance: therefore by parity of reason it seems so in the case at hand, that if some priest can absolve one penitent sinner, by parity of reason he can also absolve any like one.

4. Likewise, we see thus in things of craft, that a key which opens one lock opens also all locks made in the same manner, and conversely, many keys alike in quantity and quality open one lock: if therefore the debt of sin is conformable in all penitent sinners, and the power of opening is conformable in all priestly keys; therefore he who can act upon one can act upon any other.

5. Likewise, we see thus in supercelestial things, that an Angel of a lower order can be purified, illumined, and perfected by any Angel of a higher order: therefore if this hierarchy imitates that one, since the priestly order is above the laity, it seems that any layman can be absolved by any priest.

6. Likewise, if he cannot absolve all, since he can absolve one; I ask whence this is. For either it is

from a slackening and corruption of the power, or from a binding, because a higher power does not permit it. That it is not in the first way is clear. In the second way it ought not to be, because the good is to be diffused and multiplied and cultivated: therefore the power is not to be restricted; and so it seems that he who can act upon one can act upon every one.

**On the contrary:**
1. Cause sixteen, question one: «Let it be lawful for no priest to absolve or to bind another's parishioner».

2. Likewise, Cause nine, question two: «Let no one presume to judge, ordain, or excommunicate another's parishioner, because such judgment or ordination or excommunication will be neither valid nor have any force».

3. Likewise, in the General Council, *extra, On Penance and Remissions*: «If anyone at some time should for cause wish to confess to another, let him ask and obtain license from his own priest, because otherwise that one cannot absolve or bind him»; but not every priest is the proper one, because that is called proper which belongs to one alone: therefore not every priest can absolve everyone.

4. Likewise, it seems so by *reason*: for we see in the ordering of the predicaments in *rational matters* and in the order of causes in *natural things*, that reduction is made up to the supreme through one immediate thing, such that there are not several immediate things with respect to one. And this is clear, because there is one most special species of one individual, and likewise it is in causes: therefore if there is order in the Church according to degrees, descending and ascending from the Supreme Pontiff down to the parishioner; it seems then that through one priest, through one archdeacon, through one bishop, through one hierarch it is reduced to the Supreme Pontiff: therefore there cannot, according to right order, be several priests over one: therefore not anyone can absolve or bind anyone.

5. Likewise, we see thus in *armies*, that there are distinct orders, as the tribune over the centurions, and the centurion over the captains of fifty, and the captain of fifty over the captains of ten, and the captain of ten over the ten; and those who are under one are not under another captain of ten, nor can the captain of ten restrain any but his own ten, and so on ascending; according to this, by parity of reason it seems that neither can a priest restrain another's parishioner, nor a bishop another's subject.

6. Likewise, if two had *power* over one, who might disagree, they could command contrary things; but no one can reasonably obey two masters commanding contrary things: therefore perplexity could be generated in that subject: therefore according to right order equal power ought not be given to two priests over the same subject: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** Not every priest can absolve everyone except in a case of necessity.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Dionysius says, «it is the law of the Godhead to lead through the first to the middle, and through the middle to the last, unto purification, illumination, and perfection». Therefore, as we see in all things, whether in rational, or natural, or celestial things, that for there to be concord and beauty it is required that there be *order*; so it must be understood also in the *spiritual* powers within the Church itself; whence in *Canticles* six it is read that *she is terrible as an army set in array*.

Since therefore *order* is regarded according to prelacy and subjection; and *prelacy* is regarded according to *ascent* and *descent*, not according to equality; and in *ascending* to what is higher there is *a coming-to-rest and a reduction to one*, while on the contrary in *descending* there is *multiplication*: therefore according to the right order of the Church it was required that there be one prelate, first and supreme, in whom should be *the coming-to-rest* of all ecclesiastical prelacy. And because in him the coming-to-rest is as in the first and most simple thing in that genus; therefore *power* is united in him, and he alone among prelates is the one who has the *fullness of power*. — Likewise, since by withdrawal from the one there comes *multiplication*, and through this a diminution of power; therefore, the more the other prelates are inferior, the more *numerous* they are and the *less* power they have, so that the coming-to-rest is in the par-

ish priests, who immediately bear the care of the people; and the jurisdiction of these is restricted to a determined portion, and to each is committed his portion according to right ordering, and that is judged to be *his harvest*. And since it is not lawful for another priest to put his hand or sickle into another's harvest; therefore another does not have the power to absolve his subject, unless a superior, or one who holds the place of a superior, as the penitentiaries of the lord Pope and the penitentiaries of the bishop, legates and the privileged, who do this by the authority of a superior, as a messenger proceeding from a prince can act upon all subjects below others. But these things are to be understood according to the *common law*, because in a case of *necessity* the rectitude of the law grants to any priest to absolve anyone, if he be in the unity of the Church.

As a rule, therefore, it is to be held that only the proper priest has the exercise of power over his own, except in five cases. The first is, if a stray sheep has offended in his parish. — The second, if it has changed its domicile there, as is the case with students who study at Paris. — The third is, if it be a vagabond. — The fourth is, if the proper priest be ignorant or malicious, and, license having been sought, [the penitent] wishes to go to a more skilled one. — The last is in a case of necessity, and in this case the priest need not be licensed. In the others, however, it is required — not from the priest of the penitent alone, because he can only license a *subject* — but it is required to be licensed by the ordinary, namely the bishop himself. — The reasons proving that not anyone can act upon anyone are therefore to be granted.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that which is objected concerning the sons of Aaron, it must be said that it is not similar: because the people of Israel was one people and had one temple, nor were the kingdoms of the lands committed there to the care of the priests, as they now are; and therefore it is now required that there be several bishops and several churches, each of which has its own power.

2. To that which is objected concerning what the Lord says: *Whose sins you shall forgive* etc.; it must be said that the priestly key, although of itself it is indifferent to all, nevertheless the moving force of this key, which is jurisdiction, as was seen before, does not bear upon all but only upon one alone; and therefore one alone can absolve all. When therefore the Lord gave the key and this power, he himself presupposed its exercise according to the rule of the power conferred on Peter and his successors.

3. To that which is objected, that fire acts upon any combustible thing; it must be said that it is not similar: because the first is a *natural* action, which is according to necessity, but this action is *spiritual* and *rational*, which indeed is regarded according to order.

4. To that which is objected concerning the key and the lock, it must be said that that is true when there is present the moving force which moves the key; but in some it is restricted, as in inferior priests; in some *bound*, as in heretics and the excommunicate; in some it is *cut off*, as in the degraded. Whence just as those whose hand is bound absolutely cannot absolve anyone, so in others the key cannot close where the hand of jurisdiction is unable to extend itself.

5. To that which is objected concerning the Angels of a higher order, it must be said that it is not similar: because in the angelic hierarchy zeal or controversy cannot fall, since concord is made among the sublime ones; it is not so in the Church, but rather everyone wishes to claim for himself the right of another: therefore it was required to distinguish and limit the powers.

6. To that which is last objected, that power is not to be restricted; it must be said that the restriction of power can come in two ways: either on account of a *defect* of love, or on account of the *conservation of order*. The first is of envy and is repugnant to goodness, but the second is of wisdom and accords with peace and the common good; and such restriction was made in the lesser priests, the divine law regulating it, indeed the Holy Spirit himself, through the Fathers and Apostles, who founded and ordered the Church. And thus the whole is clear.