Dist. 19, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/19/q/bon-sent-IV-d19-a3-q2
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### Question II. *Whether an inferior can absolve a superior, with the superior himself willing it.*

Secondly it is asked whether an inferior can absolve a superior, with the superior himself willing it. And that he can, is shown:

1. Because in Hebrews chapter five it is said that the high priest ought to pray not only for himself but also for the people, since *he is compassed with infirmity:* therefore if he sins mortally, he needs to confess, just as one of the people; but he has no ordinary superior: therefore he can confess and be absolved by an inferior.

2. Likewise, in order that reconciliation be made for a mortal sin, it is necessary that the mediation of a priest intervene; but it is possible that the supreme prelate should sin: therefore he needs a priest to reconcile him; but not a superior: therefore an inferior.

3. Likewise, although the Supreme Pontiff is appointed *to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins*, yet he can have the victim offered through another priest, and another can offer for him: therefore although he has the keys for loosing, nevertheless another can absolve him; but only an inferior: therefore by the same reasoning in all other cases.

4. Likewise, the power of absolving is given for the benefit of the one who is absolved; but he to whom this power is given is not of worse condition than others: therefore he too can be absolved; but not by himself, nor by a superior, since often he does not have access to him, or has no superior, as the Pope: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Of a relation there is no relation, « nor is there a motion of a motion », nor a mediation of a mediation, nor a mediator of a mediator; but the supreme priest and every prelate is a mediator between inferiors and God: therefore there cannot be, nor ought there be, the converse.

2. Likewise, in order that someone absolve another, it is necessary that he have jurisdiction over him, as was seen in the preceding; but an inferior has no jurisdiction over a superior: therefore etc. If you say to me that the superior gives him jurisdiction to absolve; on the contrary: « no one gives what he does not have »; but a prelate does not have jurisdiction to absolve himself, since he has no power over himself: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, an inferior prelate cannot excommunicate another, nor can he give to another jurisdiction to excommunicate himself: therefore it seems likewise that neither [can he give jurisdiction] of absolving.

4. Likewise, in the angelic hierarchy the superior Angels do not receive illumination from inferiors: therefore it seems likewise that in the Church a superior is not absolved by an inferior.

5. Likewise, it has been proved by canons and reasons that a priest cannot absolve another's parishioner: therefore neither his own prelate, *by argument from the greater;* for it seems rather that he could [act] over a lesser than over a greater. *If you say* that the prelate gives him power over himself; it is asked how this can be.

### Conclusion

> A subject priest can absolve a prelate who in the forum of penance subjects himself to him.

**I respond:** It must be said that an inferior can absolve a superior, if the superior is willing to subject himself to him. — And this is clear thus. The power of the keys, so far as concerns itself, extends to all, unless by the ordinance of superiors its hand were restricted for the sake of preserving ecclesiastical order. For a priest by his ordination is appointed a mediator between God the judge and sinful man, and so far as concerns the part of *God,* there is no difference — for everyone regards his own priest as mediator, and on everyone he has stamped the character of a mediator — but the difference is on the part of *men:* because, if everyone were the mediator of everyone, there would be confusion in the Church; and therefore some are subject to others, and those who are subjected to one cannot give to another authority over themselves; but if there were a free person who could subject himself, then without doubt one could absolve him. Since therefore the supreme prelate, who is of pure freedom and subject to none, can subject himself to whom he wills, and others exempt even from their own subjects: I concede that they can absolve them.

That the supreme prelate can subject himself to him, divine law agrees, because, since he is *compassed with infirmity,* he ought to be subject to the Sacraments; and just as a sick physician seeks a physician and medicine, not insofar as he is a *physician,* but insofar as he is *sick;* so the prelate and mediator of the Church seeks a priest, insofar as he has been made an enemy of God through fault and insofar as he is a sinner. — The law of the canons too agrees, that each one can communicate his authority for himself and for his own benefit without prejudice done to his own authority and power; and so the Supreme Pontiff can subject himself to any priest and seek absolution; and other prelates also can do so by the permission of the Pope, as is said in that decretal *On Penances and Remissions,* which is Gregory's: « Lest through the delay of penance peril threaten souls, we permit bishops and other superiors as well as the lesser exempt prelates that, apart from the license of their own prelate, they may be able to choose for themselves a provident and discreet confessor ». — And so it is clear that a subject can absolve a superior, with the superior himself willing and choosing it and thereby subjecting himself to him in the penitential forum.

**Replies to the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected first, that of a relation there is no relation etc.; it must be said that it is true, according as it is of this kind; nor is the physician of a physician, according as he is of this kind, nor the priest of a priest insofar as such, but insofar as a sinner.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning jurisdiction, it must be said that the prelate gives him jurisdiction over himself, by subjecting himself. And if he then objects that he cannot give what he does not have in himself; it must be said that jurisdiction and subjection are toward another; and therefore, although one cannot be subject to himself, nothing prevents that he can be subject to another, especially if he is of free power.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that he cannot give the authority to excommunicate himself; it must be said that this argument fails in two ways. First indeed, because excommunication is against a man, but absolution for a man; and a man cannot use his authority against himself, although he can for himself. — Further it fails, because another mode of jurisdiction is required for excommunication than for absolution. For excommunication, which regards a man, bespeaks a common jurisdiction over a man, but absolution a mediation between God and man, in respect of which a man is always inferior. And since it is necessary that a man, however great, be judged together with God and be inferior in the judgment; as to this judgment anyone can, however great he be, give to another jurisdiction over himself. But because such a prelate is above all, such jurisdiction, which is regarded with respect to prelacy over men, cannot be had over him, nor can he give it to another, saving the right of his dignity, by reason of which he can say to God: *Against thee only have I sinned.* And therefore he cannot give to another the power of excommunicating himself.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning the Angels, that they do not descend to inferiors: it must be said that it is not similar: because the Angels always persist in their dignity, nor does the darkening of sin fall upon them; and therefore it is not needful that they descend to inferiors. But in the ecclesiastical hierarchy it is otherwise, because prelates and subjects sin; and therefore it is needful that they too be subjected to inferiors, since they too through fault have in a certain way been made inferiors.

*To 5.* To that which is objected last concerning another's subject, the response is clear: because he does not have jurisdiction over such a one, nor can such a one give it to him, since he is subject to another. Hence just as it does not hold: this man who is the servant of Peter cannot make himself the servant of Martin, therefore neither can this man who is free; so neither does it hold in the matter proposed.

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