Dist. 19, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/19/q/bon-sent-IV-d19-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first about this, that it is said: *Being the high priest of that year.* For it seems false, because, as is plain from the text, he said [it] with the intention of killing Christ: therefore he sinned in saying [it], he did not prophesy. — Likewise, both he and the Jews understood [it] of bodily welfare; but it is established that that was false.

**I respond:** It must be said that in that prophesying there are two things to consider, namely the word of the interior thought and the word of the exterior man. But in the interior word itself there are two things to consider, namely the sending-in or inspiration of it, and after the sending-in the judging of the word sent in, which was from the intellect of Caiaphas. And since the word had a twofold sense, namely a carnal and a spiritual; the Holy Spirit sent [it] in according to the spiritual sense, and he himself understood [it] according to the carnal. — And according to this twofold sense the exterior word produces a twofold understanding in the hearers: a carnal one in the Jews, and another spiritual one in the Christians. And according to the first sense the word was not [a word] of prophesying, but of conspiring; and so the conspiring Jews understood it; but according to the second sense the word was true and a prophecy

was made for the Christians. Whence he prophesied not knowing what he said, as to the true sense, according to which the word had been inspired. And according to this twofold sense that word is said to have been the fruit of the Holy Spirit, or of the evil will of the high priest himself.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *No one ought to use the office of priest, unless he be immune from those things* etc; because according to this, since there is no one who lacks venial [sins], no one would be able to absolve from them. If you say that he understands [it] of mortal [sins]; on the contrary: it happens that a priest who has the cure of souls sins mortally, and yet is bound to hear penitents; and no one sins in doing that to which he is bound: therefore he does not sin mortally. — Likewise, a fruitful and useful absolution can be made without grace-making-grateful: therefore it is not necessary that he be in grace, nor is he bound [to be], since it has its effect.

**I respond:** It must be said that to absolve from mortal [sin] is to judge a man in the sight of God; but according to every forum no one is worthily a judge who is guilty and under the same condemnation: therefore I say that the priest, when he absolves a penitent, is bound to do penance for his own fault, otherwise he administers the Sacrament unworthily; therefore he sins gravely, because in that wherein he judges another, he condemns himself.

What is objected concerning the venial [sin] has no force, because there is no judgment there. — What is objected, that he does what he ought; it must be said that this is true, but not in every manner in which he ought. — What is objected, that it is fruitful; it must be said that this is true for the one receiving, but it is harmful to the one absolving or administering, on account of contempt of the Sacrament.

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *For judging another, who is to be judged* etc. Let it then be supposed here that a priest knows [carnally] his parishioner-woman, or, to put it more decently, steals along with his parishioners certain things, whether he can absolve them. And that he can, it seems: because in whatever sin he exists, he absolves in fact: therefore it seems that he can absolve them of such [a sin]. — But against this is, that the same [person] cannot be judge and defendant in the same case; and this is plain: therefore if such a priest is a defendant, he cannot be a judge.

**I respond:** It must be said that I do not see why he cannot absolve. For let it be that someone gives evil counsel, for instance about committing a homicide; I do not see why that same [person] cannot give good [counsel] to a penitent. — Nevertheless it is to be believed that for neither is it safe: not for the one *absolving*, because there seems [to be] a manifest presumption in it; not for the *penitent*, because there seems [to be] in it a less true contrition and detestation of sin, while he is unwilling to disclose [it] except to one who knows [it already]. Whence if the priest is unwilling to give license, he ought to approach a superior; or if that [priest] has no superior, or cannot go to him, he can receive absolution from him, because in truth he absolves, if contrition is present; and if further, for greater certainty, he wishes to disclose the sin to another priest, it is good, and this I say for the sake of having greater security.

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *He therefore freed the woman-sinner, because there was no one who could justly cast the stone.* For according to this it seems that that woman-sinner was not freed out of mercy, but because human justice was not present. — Likewise, let it be that the prelate is evil; I ask of you, whether he is bound to correct his subjects; it is established that he is not released from his charge: therefore if he does this, he does not sin from this.

**I respond:** It must be said that correction is twofold: by way of rebuke and reproof; and such a one reproves by way of a superior, and he who thus reproves another sins, because what he does, he does not as he ought; but if the malice be interior, he sins by being proud; if exterior, he sins by giving scandal: and therefore in order that he may lawfully correct, he is bound first to cast the beam out of his own eye, otherwise he perverts the order of correction. — Another is correction by way of a certain entreaty and admonition, and this can belong to the good and also to the evil; but he [the Master] speaks of the first and not of the second. — What is objected concerning the woman is plain, because that manner of reproving was by way of vengeance. — What

is objected, that he therefore freed [her] etc.: it must be said that he does not therefore state the *end*, because that was an abundance of His mercy, but rather he intimates the way and manner for freeing her.

But concerning fraternal correction this is to be noted, that a man is then bound to correct, when he sees a brother gravely sinning, and probably believes that he ought to profit and not harm [him]; yet this is to be guarded against, lest one form for himself a foolish conscience from a slight conjecture.

### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Let the diligent investigator therefore wisely inquire.* For from this it seems that it pertains to the confessor to search out another's conscience. But the contrary is had in the Psalm: *They have searched out*, he says, *iniquities; they have failed in searching with [their] search.* — Likewise, Deuteronomy twenty-four: *When thou demandest of thy neighbor any thing which he oweth thee; thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge, but thou shalt stand outside, and he shall bring out to thee what he has*: therefore it does not seem that a man ought to enter inwardly into the secrets of the heart. — Likewise, from the ruminating of these sins there frequently arises a stench of concupiscence in the one *inquiring*, and a knowledge of evil is generated in the one *hearing*; on account of which it also frequently happens that he is tickled to know by the knowledge of experience: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt it behooves the confessor himself to be diligent in investigating. And the reason for this is that he himself is a judge, and a judge ought diligently to inquire into the truth of the case, especially when it appears doubtful; according as it is said [in] Job twenty-nine: *The cause which I knew not I searched out most diligently.* But in such inquiries superfluous curiosity and negligence are to be guarded against. — For there are certain things which the confessor ought not to inquire about in particular, such as unusual and enormous sins and [sins] against nature, and of such is understood that [text] of Proverbs eleven: *The investigator of evils shall be oppressed by them.* And the reason for this is that the penitent frequently learns what he did not know, and it happens that the confessor himself is shaken in such things; and therefore he ought not to ask such things except in general and as it were from afar by certain circumlocutions, so that, if he did [it], the one confessing may understand, [and] if he did not do [it], he may not learn [it]. In signification of this thing it is said [in] Judith eight: *But I will not [have you] search out my act*; Judith is interpreted "confession," and she said this to the priests, as it were repressing curious inquiry; and therefore, because it ought to be from afar, it is said [in] Job twenty-six: *With his hand bringing forth, the winding serpent was led out.*

But other things are to be inquired about, namely the transgression of the ten precepts, the commission of the seven capital [sins], the abuse of the five senses; and about these he can ask, when he sees the penitent himself to be negligent or ignorant. But this is always to be attended to, that the inquiry contribute to the penitent's state. Therefore it is said [in] Proverbs eighteen: *The just man in the beginning is the accuser of himself. His friend comes and shall investigate him.* And it behooves [him] to do this with great prudence; and therefore it is necessary that confessors be discreet. Whence Proverbs twenty-eight: *The rich man seemeth to himself wise, but the poor [man] that is prudent shall search him out.*

### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Since there are so many who fall, that [their] former dignity* etc. For it seems to be said badly, because deference is to be given to the multitude; and «where the multitude is in question, the rigor must be relaxed»: therefore they are rather to be restored to their former grade than if they were few. — On the contrary: the law says that they are to be removed: therefore he who restores [them] acts against the law, therefore he acts unjustly.

**I respond:** It must be said that in such cases, when the crime is grave or enormous, the deposition or removal of priests from office is of the equity and rigor of the law, but the restitution is of the relaxation of the law. But in the relaxation, in order that it be done, there must be considered, in the one who does [it], the power, that he be such a one as can [act] above the law and not be subject to that law; and in the one for whom it is done, that there be a fit cause, namely necessity or utility; otherwise it ought to be called not a dispensation, but a dissipation. And since the lord Pope is not subject to the constitutions of the Fathers, but is above all; therefore he can dispense in them, and then he does well, when necessity or utility requires it. But in the precepts of the decalogue he can in no way [dispense], because he himself is subject to them; therefore a dispensation has been wont to be thus defined:

«*A dispensation is a relaxation of the law, made with cognizance of the cause, by him who has the right of dispensing.*» Whence "to dispense" is so called as it were "to weigh diversely"; and therefore in those things which discolor the state of the Church, dispensation is not to be made, and in those things which seem to infringe the law, and this when to many is granted what ought to be granted to few, and when it is so received, not as if it were done for him out of grace, but as if it were of the common law. And in such [cases] the authority set down earlier speaks.