Dist. 20, Part 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/20/q/bon-sent-IV-d20-p1-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is doubted about this, that Augustine says: *If you act thus, I tell you that you are secure* etc. For it seems to be said badly, because *no one knows whether he is worthy of love or of hatred*: therefore no one is secure.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold certitude, namely of *knowledge* and of *conjecture*; the certitude of *knowledge* no one has except through revelation, but the certitude of *conjecture* he has who does penitence while in health, when prosperous things smile upon him; then it is a sign that his sorrow is from God's grace, not from an earthly affection. Both of these certitudes he lacks who at the end does penitence by a late penitence, because he has more ground for the opposite than for the proposal.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *That, on whatever day God is invoked, He be present.* For this seems to be against that [text] of Micah three: *Then shall they cry, and I will not hear*; and the Gloss upon that [text]: they shall cry, namely [by] «a late penitence»: therefore it seems that the Lord is not always present.

**I respond:** It must be said that invocation can come from a twofold principle, namely from *fear* of penalty, or from *love* of the divine mercy. The first is of servitude, and this invocation the Lord will not hear; the second is of sonship and of truth, and this invocation He hears, according to that [text] of the Psalm: *The Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon Him, to all that call upon Him in truth.*

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *God seeks the freedom of choice, that He may be able to blot out the things committed.* For it seems not to be well said, because God can justify a man even while sleeping, just as He enlightened Solomon even in sleep, when there was no use of free choice. — Likewise, the freedom of choice lasts as long as a man lives, according to the possibility for merit and demerit, [but] according to the impossibility of coercion: therefore always, in whatever way he understands concerning the freedom of choice, what he says does not seem true.

**I respond:** It must be said that here Augustine calls the freedom of choice not the faculty of the power itself, but the *readiness*, according to which one is said to act freely when he has no hindrance; and this is required as to the well-being of the conversion. But this is frequently not had at death, for the reason that the soul is so intent upon the sorrow of death and of sickness that it can less return to itself and consider those things which would pertain to this, that someone might have a sufficient remedy of true penitence. Nevertheless the text seems to speak of the time after death, in which it is not only difficult, but even impossible, for one departing in sin to be saved; not because the divine power could not [do] this, but [because] the divine justice justly and reasonably decreed the opposite; and if it ever gave grace to anyone after death, it must be understood that that one was not damned by sentence, as is read concerning Trajan. — Some also have wished to say that this was a special privilege, that the Lord might show how much He loved His Saints.

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says, that *this purgatorial fire is not eternal.* For it seems false, because the fire of the conflagration, which shall burn off the face of the world, will not perish altogether, but will envelop the reprobate: therefore much more strongly it seems that this fire lasts for eternity.

**I respond:** It must be said that he does not speak of the duration or eternity of this fire as to [its] *substance*, but as to [its] *office* or as to the act of punishing or purging the good. For if it remains for some act according to that which it has of burning, it will be for the burning-up of the reprobate, not for purgation.

### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about the word of the Apostle, which is in the text: *It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God.* For the contrary seems to be said in the last [chapter] of the second of Kings: *It is better for me to fall into the hands of God than into the hands of men.* — Likewise, God is most merciful; but it is better to fall into the hands of the more merciful: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold state: one, in which mercy holds the scepter, and this is the state of the present life, for which it was said: *It is better to fall into the hands of God.* The other is the state in which justice holds the scepter, and this is the state of the future life, and for this it is said: *It is a fearful thing to fall* etc.: because, since God is most merciful, and therefore bestows more than the human mind can estimate; since He is likewise also most just, although not so prone [to it]: yet He punishes so gravely that it is horrible to think of it.

### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says, that *certain mortal sins in penitence become venial.* For it seems to say what is false, because a mortal [sin] in penitence is altogether blotted out: therefore it altogether ceases to be: therefore it does not pass into another sin: therefore it does not become venial.

**I respond:** It must be said that in a mortal [sin] there are two things: both *stain* and *guilt* or obligation to penalty. When therefore the mortal [sin] is blotted out, the *stain* altogether ceases nor passes into another; but the *guilt* of penalty remains altered, because at first it was for eternal death, but now it is for temporal penalty.

But how shall we understand that this guilt becomes that [other one]? It must be noted here that some have wished to say that it was the *same* guilt, but lessened or diminished. For they said that when God remits the fault, He does not remit it as to *that which it is*, but only as to the *ground of [its] disposition*, which is eternity, whence the prior obligation to penalty remains; but because the Lord has remitted the *eternity*, it is now only for temporal penalty, so that the guilt is the same which was then, and now [is]; and to that extent it is rightly said that the mortal [sin] becomes venial. — But that is not very well intelligible, for the reason that *eternity* is not a disposition of penalty, but rather a *measure*; and the measure of duration inseparably adheres to that which it measures, so that, if some action is in A, it is impossible that that same [action] should come to be in B. — And therefore it must be understood that the guilt is *new*, and the first guilt is exchanged, and the fault is totally remitted; and therefore, if the mortal [sin] is said to become venial as to the *guilt*, it must not be understood by *identity*, but by *exchange*, which the divine sentence makes.