Dist. 20, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/20/q/bon-sent-IV-d20-p2-a1-q1
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### Article (Sole). *On the commutation of satisfaction.*
### Question I. *Whether one person can make satisfaction for another.*

It is asked, therefore, first, whether a commutation of satisfaction can take place, and this is the foundation of the question, namely, whether one person makes satisfaction for another. And that it can, seems [to be the case].

1. To the Galatians, chapter six: *Bear one another's burdens;* but the burdens which most need to be borne are the spiritual burdens: therefore, if a grave penance has been imposed on someone, it seems that another person can bear part or the whole of it for him.

2. Likewise, in the text it is said: «By the prayers of friends and by the bestowal of alms the weight of penance is to be lightened»; this is said of one who is gravely ill.

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] *by reason,* first *by a likeness drawn from natural things.* For we see in the body of an animal that one member exposes itself in order to sustain the injury and burden of another, as is clear in that the arm exposes itself for the head: if, therefore, in the mystical body there is a connection by assimilation to the natural body, it seems likewise that one member can and ought to bear the burden of another.

4. Likewise, this seems [to follow] *by a likeness drawn from human acts*. For we see that it is so in [human] acts, that if someone is a debtor to another, it does not matter to the creditor whether he himself or another pays, but rather he accepts either for the same [debt]: if, therefore, God is much more kindly and more eager to receive payment than an earthly man appears to be, it seems that He is content, and that it suffices for Him, if another makes satisfaction for him.

5. Likewise, this seems [to follow] *by an argument from the lesser*: for it is more to obtain the remission of guilt than the remission of penalty; but a holy man obtains for someone who is outside grace, by his prayers, the remission of guilt: therefore [he obtains] also the remission of penalty by his afflictions.

6. Likewise, Christ was punished and by His penalty made satisfaction; not for His own sin, this is established: therefore for another's: therefore Christ made satisfaction for us. If, then, we all are one in Christ and are His members and ought to be His imitators; it seems that one person can and ought to make satisfaction for another.

**On the contrary:** 1. Second to the Corinthians, chapter five: *We shall all stand before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he has done, whether good or evil:* therefore to each one it will be rendered according to his works: therefore it does not seem that one makes satisfaction for another, since then God would render to someone according to another's works.

2. Likewise, in the Psalm: *Thou wilt render to each one according to his works:* therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, it seems [so] by reason: for God does not exact satisfaction from anyone because He delights in penalty, but because satisfaction is a remedy against guilt, that the soul may be set in order again; but an antidote or remedy must be applied to the member that is ailing: therefore it seems that it cannot be commuted to another man.

4. Likewise, one cannot be contrite nor confess for another, but rather it is necessary that the very one who sins be contrite and confess: therefore it seems likewise that it is necessary that he himself make satisfaction and undergo the penalty.

5. Likewise, if the healthy can take upon themselves the satisfaction of the sick, let it be supposed, then, that someone owes a seven-year penance, and his kinsmen take it upon themselves; and the sick man dies: I ask you therefore: either *he flies up [to heaven],* or *he does not fly up.* If *he does not fly up,* but is punished in purgatory, and they punish themselves for him: therefore God punishes *twice for the same thing*. But if *he does fly up,* let it be supposed that they do nothing about the satisfaction undertaken: then, therefore, someone will be saved, and the guilt will remain unpunished; which is against divine justice.

6. Likewise, no one can merit for another without meriting for himself, according to what that authority says: «He who prays for another labors for himself»: therefore by parity of reasoning no one can make satisfaction for another without making satisfaction for himself: therefore if one can make satisfaction for another, one person can by a single penalty make satisfaction at once both for himself and for another, and so by parity of reasoning for a third and a fourth and so on, therefore for all: therefore it seems, if this is true, that when one makes satisfaction, all also make satisfaction.

### Conclusion.

> The penalty of satisfaction, not insofar as it is medicinal, but insofar as it pays the penalty, can be commuted to another person.

**I respond:** It must be said that satisfactory penalty has in itself a twofold account or power. For such a penalty exists chiefly for two things: both as a *medicine* against the consequences of sin and as a *price* for paying the debt of sin. If, therefore, we speak of this penalty insofar as it is *purgative* or medicinal; since the disease does not receive its medicine from another's penalty, but from its own — whence concupiscence is not extinguished in me if you fast for me — as regards this account satisfactory penalty neither can nor ought to be commuted to another person.

It could, however, be commuted into an *interior* penalty, since the groaning of the heart more frequently heals and restores the soul than the long duration of an exterior penalty. — But if we speak of the penalty insofar as it has the account of a *price;* in this way it must be granted that it can be commuted, since one person can pay the penalty for another. — But this commutation must be made *by the authority of the priest,* whose office it is to consider two things here, namely the due *disposition* in the subjects and the due *proportion* in the penalty. By due *disposition* I mean that in the one there be *sufficiency* and in the other *need*, and that in both there be *charity,* which makes goods common; but if either of these is lacking, the commutation is not rightly made. By due *proportion* I mean that a lesser penalty be commuted into a greater, since one's own penalty makes satisfaction to God more than another's, just as a man more effectively merits for himself than for another. Whence just as an *assumed* penalty is commuted into a greater *purgatorial* penalty, because that one is far less *acceptable,* in that this is voluntary *simply,* that one *least* voluntary; likewise one's *own* penalty ought to be commuted into a greater *foreign* one, that the commutation may be made rightly.

Thus, therefore, it must be granted, as the first reasons prove, that satisfactory penalty can be commuted by reason of the unity of charity, as regards that which it has in itself of the price to be paid, but not as regards that which it has in itself of the medicine.

*To 1 and 2.* To that, then, which is objected, that to each one it will be rendered according to his works; it must be said that charity makes another's works *its own,* especially when the charity of the other voluntarily gives what is its own to another.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the remedy, the reply is already clear: for however much someone may take another's penalty upon himself, nevertheless that other is not entirely freed from penalty until the dross of sin is consumed which he contracted from guilt; and this dross also cannot be blotted out except by an exterior penalty, or by interior contrition.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that one cannot be contrite nor confess; it must be said that it is not the same: because the *first things,* namely confession and contrition, are ordained that one may enter ecclesiastical unity, through which it comes about that the goods of one are another's; but satisfaction follows upon both; and because the foundation of this communication is in charity: therefore it is not the same. — Another reason is that it is in the power of anyone to confess, [but] it is in the power of no one to be contrite, except of Him who knows the hidden things of the heart, namely the spirit of man; but to undergo penalty is in the power of anyone, both for himself and for another. Nevertheless it is not useless nor foreign to satisfaction if a just man should bewail the sins of a less just man.

*To 5.* To that which is asked, whether he whose satisfaction is commuted flies up at once; it must be said that he does not: both because it is necessary that the dross of sin be purged, and also because no one enters paradise until he is free of every debt, so that neither he himself be a debtor, nor another for him. If, then, you object that God then punishes twice for the same thing; it must be said that this is false, because, in proportion as they do it more quickly, he is freed, and the Lord reckons into the lot [of his debt] the penalty which that one bears for himself, and which others bear for him; whence if he owed a penalty of two months, he can be helped in such a way that he will be freed within a month. Nevertheless he is never drawn out from there until the debt is fully paid; and when it is paid, then that which is paid thereafter belongs to him who makes satisfaction; *for the prayer is turned back into his own bosom*, or if he himself does not need it, it is turned into the bosom of the Church.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that he who merits for another [merits] also for himself; it must be said that it is not the same with the meritorious and the satisfactory work. For a work is *meritorious* by that account, by which it is from the root of charity — which always pleases God, and [pleases] him in whom it is, that root — which regards all in common and makes all things common; therefore no one can merit for another without himself being pleasing before God, since this very thing pleases God most. — But a *satisfactory* work [is satisfactory] by reason of the penalty, and so much penalty pays so much debt, and a greater [penalty] a greater debt; therefore by one and the same penalty one cannot pay two debts in full; and therefore, if he makes satisfaction for another, as regards the *whole* he does not make satisfaction for himself; and if for himself, not for another; for himself indeed he merits eternal glory, because that *work* is pleasing to God, and the one *doing* it is pleasing to God in the doing, and through this he is judged worthy of recompense from God.