Dist. 20, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/20/q/bon-sent-IV-d20-p2-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first about this, that he says: *But if the interior sorrow together with the enjoined penalty is not sufficient, God will add a penalty.* For it seems false, because he who has done the enjoined penance has done all to which he was bound: therefore, that being complete, he is absolved: therefore he ought not to render any further penalty. — Likewise, the priest is an arbiter between the sinner and God; but if the priest enjoins on the sinner a greater penance, the sinner is bound to stand by his judgment, although it exceeds [what is due]: therefore if God does not revoke the compromise; if he [the priest] errs by enjoining a penalty less than what is owed, God ought to be content; or if otherwise, He seems to break the pact. — Likewise, ignorance excuses, especially when it is invincible; but no one knows with certitude how much penalty God exacts for a fault, but only by conjecture: therefore in this one must stand by the judgment and discretion of the priest: therefore if [the penitent] proceeds no further, he is absolved.

**I respond:** It must be said that the priest by virtue of the keys has the power of relaxing something of the penalty, and this God never exacts, but reckons only as paid that from which the priest absolves; and as to this [the penitent] simply commits himself to the priest's discretion, if there be no impediment on the part of the one who is being absolved. But as to the taxation [of the penalty] he does not commit himself except to the discretion of a discerning [priest], who also taxes discreetly, because it is not fitting for God to do otherwise; and therefore, if the priest imposes a penance lesser than the worthy [one], the Lord supplies what was lacking.

As to what is objected, that such a one has done all to which he was bound, it is true of the holding [of debt] that comes from the obligation of the precept; but of the holding that comes from the obligation or from the guilt of sin, it is not true, until he has paid the worthy penalty.

As to what is objected concerning the discretion, it is now plain: because [the penitent] commits himself to the discretion of the discerning [priest] alone as to the taxation of the penalty.

As to what is objected concerning ignorance, it must be said that that ignorance excuses, so that he does not sin; but yet it does not excuse, so that he makes perfect satisfaction; and therefore it must still be perfected in the forum of God.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says concerning the thief: *As soon as he was converted, he merited to enter paradise.* For it seems false, because in Micah two it is said: *He shall ascend, opening the way before them*; this is understood of Christ: therefore before the ascension of Christ no one entered: therefore neither [did] the thief at once.

**I respond:** Some wished to say to this, that the thief was in the *earthly* paradise with the Lord until the ascension, but after the ascension was in the *heavenly* paradise. — But yet that is doubtful; and therefore another way is to be chosen according to Augustine, that paradise in one way means a state of fruition, in another way means a place apt and suitable for this. And that place is twofold, according as fruition is twofold: a certain [fruition] *through a mirror* and *imperfect*, and for such [fruition] the earthly paradise was suited, since the place is earthly, yet quiet and elevated; another is *full fruition*, and this is in the fatherland, and to it belongs the supercelestial place. When therefore it is said that the thief was at once in paradise, it is understood as to the state, because he was at once in the vision of God, not as to the place.

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that Jerome says, that *the canons do not sufficiently fix the measure* etc.; because Gregory says, and it is had above in the sixteenth distinction: «We call those penances *false* which are not imposed according to the authority of the holy Fathers»: therefore it seems that all true penances are comprehended in the canons of the Saints.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as it is in the practical sciences, which are concerned with works, that speech in particular [matters] is uncertain and doubtful; but speech

in universal [matters] has certitude, yet when it is applied to particulars, it begins in a certain way to have uncertainty, so that he who does not consider the particular circumstances rather goes astray than rectifies himself, as is plain in medicine and moral science: So it is to be understood in the matter at hand, that the canons instruct in general, in what manner penance is to be imposed, but they leave the descent to particulars to discerning priests, who should consider the circumstances of persons, attending to the canons as to directive rules; because, if they impose contrary to the canons, they do not impose rightly. But in the canon penance is determined chiefly as to *time*, more than as to *manner*; because that manner is more certain and more common. Whence *generally* for mortal sin they prescribe a seven-year penance: whence a layman who fornicates should do penance for seven years, a presbyter ten, but a bishop fifteen, as is had in diverse places in the decrees of the Fathers. Likewise concerning those who vomit up the Eucharist on account of gluttony and drunkenness, if he be a layman, let him do penance forty days; if a cleric or religious, seventy days; if a bishop, ninety days; this is had in [the treatise] On Consecration, distinction two. Looking to these rules, each priest ought to consider what penances he imposes, both according to the gravity of the crime and according to the diverse conditions of persons.

And note here, that for mortal sin a seven-year penance is prescribed not only on account of the length of time, but rather on account of the *figure* and the *signification*. For in the Law Mary was separated outside the camp for seven days, Numbers twelve; Mary signifies the penitent, whence "Mary" is interpreted *bitter sea*, and in Lamentations it is said of the penitent man: *Great as the sea is thy contrition.* This [woman] did penance for seven days, but now [the penitent] does penance for seven years, which was signified in Ezekiel four: *A day for a year have I given thee.* — But if you ask the reason for this, why penance is aggravated, since the new law is a law of mercy; it must be said that the ingratitude here is greater on account of the greater grace; because also the contempt is greater on account of the greater dignity of the new law, in which the blood of Christ was poured out, that the testament might be firm; because also the sin is graver on account of the state of the sinner, who ought to be more perfect; because further satisfaction in the new law ought to be perfect, so as to lead back into the pristine state. — And since the sun in one day does not return to the same point, but [does so] in a year, therefore the day was turned into a year. Again, because the remedy in the new law is perfect, therefore the year had to be multiplied by seven on account of the seven *pronenesses* to be subdued, on account of the seven *gifts* of the Holy Spirit to be reacquired, on account of the seven *dowries*, namely three of the soul and four of the body, to be obtained. — And so the reason is plain, why the canons instituted [it] thus. But this [penance] is not to be imposed on all, but yet to be intimated, so that they may recognize how grave the fault is.

### Doubt IV

Likewise, it is asked about this, that he says, that *penance is not to be imposed in the article of death, but [is] to be made known.* For it seems to be said badly, because it is of no avail to know what and how much one ought to do, unless one also does it: therefore if it is not to be imposed, so that he may do it, it is not to be made known. If you say that it avails to know the gravity of the sin; *on the contrary*: the gravity of sin, considered at the end, especially induces into despair; but this is especially to be guarded against in the sick: therefore it ought not to be said then.

**I respond:** It must be said that penance is not to be imposed on such a one, of whom it is presumed that he will die, because it would be foolish to impose something on someone which he cannot do; but it *is to be made known* in order to make known the gravity of the sin, so that he may grieve and groan. But nevertheless the abundance of divine mercy is to be manifested, so that he may hope in the Lord and trust; and thus manifesting the penance does not induce into despair, but rather into true contrition.

### Doubt V

Likewise, it is asked about this, that he says: *A presbyter ought not to reconcile a penitent, without consulting the bishop.* For it seems to be said badly, because where the supernal Judge dictates what is to be done, human counsel is sought in vain; but when the presbyter sees the sinner contrite, the supernal Judge says that that sinner is converted into a just man and is reconciled: therefore at once,

without counsel, whether he be in necessity or not, he ought to absolve him.

**I respond:** It must be said that counsel is sought from someone in two ways: either on account of *instruction*; and then counsel is sought from a wise man, because [he is] wise, and this especially when a case emerges where one can probably be in doubt. In another way counsel is sought and someone is consulted on account of the *commission of authority*; and thus an inferior consults a superior, namely that he may know his will and through his command and commission may have power. In this manner the priest ought in certain cases to consult the bishop, because he cannot of himself extend his hand to those [cases], since he has a limited power. — But in five cases the priest ought to refer to the bishop or to consult him. The first is concerning solemn penance, which ought to be imposed by the bishop, and the penitent [ought] to be reconciled by him. — The second case is concerning the excommunicated, whom sometimes he cannot absolve. — The third, wherever he finds an irregularity contracted; for on account of it he ought to refer to the bishop, that, if he can, he may dispense; if he cannot, that he may send with his letters to the Pope. — The fourth is concerning arsonists. — The fifth, if there be a custom in some bishopric, that certain crimes be referred to the bishop, such as homicide, sacrilege, and the like; and this case is particular, not universal.

### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *The consecration of maidens, the bishop having been consulted, can be done by a presbyter.* It seems to be said badly, because they are betrothed to Christ: therefore the ring is to be imposed on them by the bishop alone.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as far as concerns the common law, this is lawful only to bishops, because they are the spouses, who ought to consecrate souls to Christ, according as the Apostle says in the second to the Corinthians eleven: *I have espoused you to one husband, [to present you] a chaste virgin*, and they ought to beget perfect sons; and therefore they have the power of the keys in *excellence*, and to them alone those things which are of excellence are committed. Whence this which the Master says was only local and now has no place except concerning the veiling of widows, to whom the priest can give the veil by counsel of the bishop. And to this extent that [statement] is to be understood.