Dist. 21, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/21/q/bon-sent-IV-d21-p1-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the purgation which is made through purgatory.*
### Question I. *Whether in purgatory after this life there is any purgation from any fault, or only from pain.*

Consequently, as regards the second article, it is asked concerning the purgation which is made through purgatory. Concerning which two [things] are asked. First it is asked whether in purgatory after this life there is any purgation from any fault, or only from pain. Second, whether that purgation is made through material fire.

As regards the first, then, it is shown that there is made there a purgation from fault:

1. *First*, by that which is said in Matthew, chapter twelve: *He who shall speak a word against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come*: therefore the Lord implies that some sins are remitted in the world to come; but not except in purgatory: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory in the fourth [book] of the Dialogues says that «*certain light faults are remitted in the world to come*», and there he says many things which serve to show this. If you say that he understands this as regards the liability of penalty; this does not resolve [it], because in the world to come, namely in purgatory, there is made a purgation not only from the liability of venial faults, but also of mortal [faults] in those who do not complete penance in this life.

3. Likewise, every purgation, as such, regards some foulness; but the foulness of the soul is fault: therefore it seems that the purgatorial fire is against fault. If you say that it is against the proneness or the consequence [of sin] or something of the sort; then I ask: since free choice after this life is as immovable with respect to proneness as with respect to the will; why can such a consequence be purged, and not venial fault, since the consequence of a mortal [sin] harms the soul more than a venial fault?

4. Likewise, that which purges something in some way has an opposition to it; but pain is not opposed to pain: therefore if there is a purgation there, it is not from pain: therefore from some fault.

**On the contrary:** 1. Upon that [passage] of the First [Letter] of John, chapter five: *There is a sin unto death*; the Gloss: «*That which is not corrected in this life, in vain is pardon for it sought after death*»: therefore no fault is purged there after death.

2. Likewise, the Damascene: «*What death is to men, that the fall is to angels*», and conversely; but angels after the fall can be freed from no fault: therefore neither can men after death.

3. Likewise, Gregory in the Dialogues: «*Each one will be in the judgment such as he went out from the body*»: if, therefore, he went out with a venial [sin]: it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, free choice is a mean between advancement in good and liberation from the evil of fault; but after death it cannot advance in good: therefore neither can it rise again from any fault.

5. Likewise, it is easier to lapse into a venial [sin] than to be freed from a venial [sin]; but after death the soul cannot sin venially: therefore neither can it rise again from a venial [sin].

6. Likewise, the venial [sin] in us exists only by reason of the tinder [of sin]: therefore, the tinder being removed, the venial [sin] does not remain; but the tinder is taken away in death, not after death: therefore the venial [sin] too [is taken away in death].

> **Conclusion.** After this life the pain of purgatory can purge not only from pain, but also from the fault of venial sin.

**I respond:** It must be said that the opinion of some masters, men of good understanding, was that no sin is remitted after death, on the ground that the use of free choice, as regards merit or demerit, wholly ceases. Hence they say that venial [sins] are entirely remitted either through penance, or through final grace, if there be no place for penance, if perchance a just man dies forestalled by death.

But they assign the reason of this position and the understanding [of it] in this way. For they say that grace is threefold, namely baptismal, penitential, and final; and each of these graces, by its beginning, has dominion in the soul itself. On the ground that the grace which has dominion at the very entrance, like baptismal grace, or at the beginning of its state, like final [grace], blots out every fault, not only mortal, but even venial. But baptismal grace has dominion

by the power of the Sacrament, penitential grace by the subjection and conformity of free choice, final grace by the perfect conformity of all the powers of the soul to that grace. For when the soul itself is separated from the flesh, now the pronenesses and disturbances which were in the soul from the flesh recede, and the powers of the soul are tranquilized and made subject to grace; and through this the venial [sins] are blotted out, whether they be in the rational part of the soul or in the sensible part of the soul. And so no venial [sin] is remitted after this life, but at that point at which it can be said: this is final grace, which claims dominion for itself and expels every fault. — If, then, it be objected against them that in the world to come sins are purged and remitted; it is answered, according to them, that they are remitted as regards the liability or penalty, and purged as regards the dross or consequence. And master Hugh seems to have held this, who speaks thus, speaking of the remission of sin: «*Sometimes God remits according to mercy, sometimes according to severity, sometimes according to both. Through the fire of purgatory the dross of sin is decocted, through the laver of baptism the stain of sin is washed away, through the scourge of satisfaction the chaff of sin is shaken out*». — But although this opinion is much in accord with reason, nevertheless the authorities of the Saints seem expressly to be contrary. For Gregory himself says in the Morals that «*some sins are remitted after this life*». And if you say that he understands [this] as regards the liability, as was objected; thus it could be understood of all faults. — Likewise, Isidore, treating that [passage] of Matthew, chapter three: *He will baptize you in the Holy Spirit and fire*: «*The sins which preceded the Holy Spirit will wash away through the baptism of water, and some of those which afterward follow upon crimes he will remit through purgatorial fire*». Since, therefore, the preceding sins are washed away not only as regards the penalty, but also as regards the fault: therefore in purgatory certain [sins] are to be remitted as regards the fault. Again, since grace has dominion in the soul at once at the very separation, why does it not purge from the dross or consequence of sin, just as from venial fault?

And on account of this there is here a second mode of speaking, which the Master approves in the [Sentences] text, and which the manifold authority of the Saints confirms. It must be said, therefore, that some sins, namely venial [ones], can be and are remitted not only in this world, but also in purgatory, when someone passes over with venial [sins], on the ground that grace was not finally assisted to blot them out, and therefore needs help. — Since, then, the will can be conformed to grace after this life, although it cannot be its helper, on the ground that the time of merit has ceased; therefore it needs an external help. And since there is no place for the Sacrament, it has the help of punitive or purgatorial fire; which is therefore called purgatorial, because the soul is purged from the dross of sin and from venial fault, if it pass over with that. And this is possible, because, as was shown in the preceding problem, for the blotting out of a venial [sin] it suffices that free choice conform itself to grace, nor is it necessary that it assist. — It must be granted, therefore, that some after this life can be purged from venial fault.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that after death pardon is sought in vain for that which is not corrected; it must be said that that is understood of mortal [sin]. — Or let emphasis be placed on this, that he says that in this life it is not corrected: it is true either in itself or in merit. But although some venial [sin] be not corrected, with which one passes over — not corrected, I say, in itself — yet he merited to be corrected, because he who departs in charity merited through it to be cleansed even after this state from those things which retard the reward of charity.

2. To that which is objected concerning the fall of the angels and the death of men, it must be said that it is similar as regards the invertibility of free choice, or as regards mortal sin, not as regards all things; for the evil angels can advance in penalties, although they cannot rise again from evil. Conversely, by reason of past good merit good men can be snatched from evil, although they cannot lapse into evil, because they are confirmed in the good in which they die.

3. To that which is objected concerning Gregory, it must be said that, as he himself adds, that is understood as regards mortal [sins], not as regards venial [sins], because he himself excepts those.

4. To that which is objected, that free choice holds a mean; it must be said that it is false for that state. For it is in a state in which it can be disposed for entrance into glory through the removal of an impediment, although it cannot merit; because for

the blotting out of a venial [sin] and for the remission of the liability of sin there suffices the presence of grace and of pain, with the consonance of free choice and the help of past merit.

5. To that which is objected, that it is easier to lapse into evil; it must be said that it is true as regards mutable free choice, not as regards the whole state of the soul.

6. To that which is objected, that, the tinder being removed, the venial [sin] is taken away; it must be said that it is true as regards the power of sinning in the future; nevertheless it is not necessary that a venial [sin] previously committed be taken away, because not every cause of introducing [something] is a cause of conserving [it], as is clear in many examples. For, the knife being destroyed, a wound cannot be inflicted; yet if the knife be destroyed, it is not necessary, on this account, that a wound previously inflicted be healed.