Dist. 21, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/21/q/bon-sent-IV-d21-p2-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether it is licit to add anything in confession.*

Secondly it is asked whether it is licit to add anything in confession. And that it is not, seems [shown]:

1. Because Augustine says in the book *On Penitence*, and it is contained in the text [of the Master]: « If for the sake of humility you lie, you become what you avoided »: if therefore someone for the sake of humility accuses himself more than he deserved; it seems that from this he incurs a fault.

2. Likewise, he is an unjust witness who accuses another in that in which he is not culpable, however good an intention he may have; but a man in confession testifies against himself: therefore if he accuses himself in that in which he has not sinned; it seems that he acts unjustly.

3. Likewise, nothing is to be alleged in a public judgment which cannot be manifestly proved: therefore by parallel reasoning nothing is to be imposed in the penitential judgment which cannot be proved by a right witness; but the witness is conscience: therefore nothing is to be said except that of which conscience accuses: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, confession is for directing the spiritual physician, just as the knowledge of bodily sickness is for directing the bodily physician; but he makes the physician err who says that he has a disease which he does not have, just as much as one who says that he does not have one which he has: therefore just as he sins who omits, so [does] he who adds.

**On the contrary:**
1. Gregory: « It belongs to good minds to acknowledge a fault there where there is no fault »: therefore if a man can and ought to accuse himself according as he acknowledges himself; and a good mind can reckon itself more culpable than it is in truth: it seems that he can accuse himself more than [the matter] is in reality.

2. Likewise, he who is contrite more than he deserved, and makes satisfaction by punishing himself beyond what he deserved, acts justly and laudably and well: therefore by parallel reasoning he who accuses himself beyond what he sinned acts well.

3. Likewise, confession is for the humiliation of the confessing one, and this through accusation; but no one can humble himself too much, even if he subject himself to all for God's sake: therefore by parallel reasoning no one can accuse himself too much.

4. Likewise, suppose that someone has committed some sin, about which he doubts whether it is mortal or venial; I ask in what manner he ought to confess it; and it seems [he should confess it] as mortal, because « in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen »; otherwise, if he confesses it as venial, he commits himself to risk; but it is possible that this sin is only venial: therefore he can confess a venial sin as mortal: therefore [it is licit] to add to the confession in accusing himself.

### Conclusion

> In confession it is not licit to add anything, when the testimony of conscience opposes; yet an addition beyond the truth of the matter, conscience however being in accord with the tongue, can be meritorious.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted beforehand that to lie and to say what is false differ. For to lie is when the voice expresses something other than the mind perceives, even if through the voice the truth is said in reality; to say what is false is when the voice is at variance with the thing signified. To lie indeed, because it always implies an abuse of the sign and a deviation of the man as to the intellective and the exterior power, between which there is discord, is always evil and so evil in itself, that it can be clothed by no good circumstance so that it be done well, as Augustine says in the book *Against Lying*. But to say what is false can frequently be meritorious, when the mind is deceived and so believes [it] to be as it speaks, as the Apostle said that he was about to set out for Spain, in Romans fifteen.

If therefore you ask whether it is licit to add to the confession; it must be answered that either you are speaking with respect to the testimony of conscience, or with respect to the conformity of truth in the thing. If with respect to conscience, so that conscience accuses less, and the voice more; thus it is a sin and a lie, and the merit of the confession is lost, in which there ought to have been a truthful word, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus thirty-seven: *Before all things let a true word go before thee*. A word is truthful when the tongue expresses that which conscience perceives. But if you understand of the addition with respect to the truth of the thing, in such a way that conscience is not at variance with the tongue; it must then be said that such an addition can be meritorious. For he who believes himself to have gravely offended in small matters, and so confesses, as though he had gravely offended; has without doubt profited much.

The arguments, therefore, proceeding to the first part conclude that one cannot nor ought to add beyond the testimony of conscience. — The arguments to the second part proceed insofar as in the addition the tongue agrees with conscience; and thus it is licit to add, because no prejudice is done to the truth, while the truth of the mind and of the mouth is joined together with the humility of the heart.

1. 2. And thus is understood that [saying] of Gregory: « of good minds » etc.; similarly also the following [argument] about contrition and punishment and addition. — Yet it could be said that contrition and punishment and confession are not alike: because confession is an act of truth and against this no one can say anything which is not false and a prejudice to the truth; it is not so concerning punishment, because one can justly bear a punishment, even one he did not deserve, for the glory of God, or for the salvation of the neighbor, or for his own greater progress; and this belongs to abundant justice. But truth ought neither to fall short nor to superabound, because it is the rectitude of the intellect, and this rectitude is indivisible; but the rectitude of the will has latitude, therefore [a thing] done is more and less just; but [a thing] said is not more and less true, unless that be called truer which is more lasting, as the necessary and perpetual [is truer] than the contingent and momentary.

3. To that which is objected, that confession is for humiliation; it must be said that it is not in every way for humiliation, but through accusation, which ought to have truth as its origin or companion to this end, that it be right. And it does not follow that if humility has no excess in self-estimation, that truth has no excess in speech.

4. To that which is asked about the doubtful sin, it must be said that, as Augustine says in the fifteenth [book] *On the Trinity*, it is not only a lie to say knowingly what is false, but also to assert a doubtful thing [as certain], because the tongue is at variance with the heart. When therefore he doubts whether it is mortal; it must be said that just as he doubts, so doubtingly ought he to confess; yet he ought to be contrite and to bear the punishment, as if it were mortal, and then the mind is reassured, and in nothing is the truth prejudiced. And thus the response to the objections is evident.

To that, however, which is objected last on behalf of the opposite part, that it makes the physician err etc.; it must be said that it is false, because the aggravation of penance does not aggravate nature, but relieves it; it is not so in temporal and bodily medicine; for it harms, if the matter of the disease be not present. But this is the reason: because the tongue is at variance with conscience; and that is required above all in that confession made rightly and in orderly fashion.

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