Dist. 21, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/21/q/bon-sent-IV-d21-p2-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether one who knows something both through confession and through another way is bound to conceal it.*

Thirdly it is asked whether one who knows something through confession and through another way is bound to conceal it. And that he is, seems [shown]:

1. First, by a certain decretal of Innocent, *On Penances and Remissions*: « Whoever shall have presumed to reveal a sin disclosed to him in penance, we decree that he be not only deposed from the sacerdotal office, but also thrust into a strict monastery to do penance »: therefore if anyone knows some sin through confession, in whatever way he otherwise knew it, it does not seem that he can disclose that same thing on account of the confession.

2. Likewise, the seal of confession, as was proved above, is in no way to be broken; but it is broken when the confession is revealed; but it is impossible to reveal this sin heard in confession without the confession being revealed; but a confession is in no way to be revealed: therefore neither [is] that sin. And such a syllogism can be made: no confession is to be revealed; this sin is a confession, or a part of a confession, which he knows in two ways: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, such a one, who knows through confession and through another way, knows as a man and as God; but insofar as he knows as God, he is bound to be silent; insofar as [he knows] as a man, he can tell him who can be helped: therefore these two have opposed conditions. But whenever opposites are about the same thing, it is necessary that one or both fall away from its property: if therefore the greater dominates over the lesser and by dominating conquers, and the cognition by which he knows after the mode of God is simply greater; therefore it seems that he is bound to follow that one and so to conceal.

4. Likewise, the seal of confession is so strictly instituted on account of scandal, and lest evil priests be able to act malignantly, and the faithful thereby be drawn back from confession; but if it were so, that someone could reveal what he knows through another way, anyone under this pretext could reveal everything or for the most part,

saying that he knows it otherwise, and so no evil-doer could be convicted nor caught in his malice.

5. Likewise, the seal of confession is so annexed to confession that whoever hears confessions, by this very [fact] that he hears, binds himself to the keeping of the secret; but if you knew something and afterwards promised to the one reporting it that you would never tell it, you would be bound altogether to conceal [it]: then therefore it seems likewise that he is bound to conceal that which he knew otherwise than through confession.

**On the contrary** it is argued thus, and I here suppose five things which are known of themselves. The first supposition is that nothing is to be established nor observed in which prejudice is done to the truth. — The second is that « fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one ». — The third is this, that no one is bound to lie for the sake of anyone. — The fourth is this, that no one knowingly renders himself incapable of that to which he is bound, without mortal sin. — The fifth is this, that nothing ought to be established nor observed whereby an innocent person can reasonably be accused and condemned, and others be scandalized concerning him.

1. From the first I argue thus. Nothing is to be observed in which prejudice is done to the truth; but some priest can testify in a case, as one who together with another saw a thief or some such thing, by the withdrawal of whose testimony the truth will lie hidden and falsehood will reign: if therefore such a one hears a confession of the fault and on this very account is unwilling to testify, prejudice is done to the truth: therefore if this ought not to be done, he is not obliged to keeping silent.

2. From the second thus. « Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one »; but some sinner, knowing himself to be guilty and worthy of accusation, confesses for this alone, that he may shut the priest's mouth: if therefore he shuts [it] and thereby remains unpunished, fraud and deceit patronize him: therefore if this is unfitting, it is evident etc.

3. From the third thus. No one is bound to lie for the sake of anyone; but this man who knows otherwise than through confession cannot say: I do not know, without lying, because he knows as a man and as God: if therefore he swore to tell the truth, he is bound to reveal what he knows as a man, since to this the oath itself could constrain him.

4. From the fourth thus. Suppose that someone is bound to accuse his neighbor before the prelate, both by divine command and by the command of his prelate; this man saw him sinning and heard him confessing: if therefore he was bound from sight to tell and from the hearing of the confession rendered himself incapable, then when he heard his confession he sinned mortally; which in no way seems probable.

5. From the fifth thus. Nothing ought to be observed whereby an innocent person can reasonably be condemned; but so it is in the matter at hand, if he is bound to conceal what he knows otherwise: therefore etc. *Proof*: let the case be put that four go along the way; one sins in the sight of all, whence he is to be accused before the prelate and punished; he confesses to one of three; the two others accuse the one who sinned and testify against him and for the greater strength of testimony summon the third; the third is commanded to speak, and they accuse him unless he speaks, as though he were an abettor in another's fault, and the prelate reasonably punishes him on the testimony of two for disobedience: if therefore this whole is iniquitous, it seems that he is not bound to conceal. *If you say to me* that the priest ought to protest to the one confessing that he does not receive [it] under the seal of confession; *on the contrary*: I ask, when; either before he confesses, or after he has confessed. But *before* he is not bound, because he does not know what [the man] wishes to say to him; if *after* the confession has been heard, this is nothing, because from the [moment] the confession was [made], it had the seal: therefore by his protestation he cannot break it. And again, any priest could say to the one confessing: I do not wish to receive that under the seal. *Furthermore*, suppose that he forgets to tell that and holds [it] in his heart, although not in his mouth; it seems that the same ought to happen.

### Conclusion

> A sin which is known through confession and through another way can be revealed without breaking the seal, scandal nevertheless being set aside.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is here a threefold manner of speaking.

The first is this. Some say that, from [the moment] someone knows something through confession, in whatever way he knows it and whenever he knows it, he truly cannot reveal it; because such a thing cannot be revealed, since it is a part of the confession, without prejudice being done to the seal of confession, which most of all and chiefly is to be kept intact. To the objections they reply, as has been touched on, that if prejudice seems to be generated, or evil to follow, he ought not to receive [it] under the seal of confession, but with a protestation that he does not wish to keep the secret. — Although this opinion seems pious, in that it attributes much to the seal of confession, nevertheless it could lead into great danger, namely that prejudice would be done to the truth and to in-

nocence and to obedience, and patronage would be furnished to fraud, as has been shown. And it is established that the seal of confession was instituted for avoiding scandal; « but truth ought not to be set aside on account of scandal ». And again, that protestation does not bring it about that he can reveal what he is otherwise bound to conceal. And again, if someone has heard the confession of another, and that man is of ill repute concerning that sin; is he called a breaker of the seal if he speaks of this matter with some persons? This seems too harsh and impious.

And therefore there is a second position, which seems to be more temperate, that confession shuts the mouth with respect to preceding cognition, not with respect to subsequent. And the reason for this is: because he who first knows and receives that in confession, shuts his mouth with respect to the preceding; but not with respect to the subsequent. — But this position is less reasonable than the first, although it seems more sober: first, because from this position prejudice is generated to the truth just as from the first. Further it says that the seal of confession can shut every antecedent cognition, and a subsequently supervening cognition can open it. For if confession therefore shuts what was first known, because to reveal what is known is to break the seal; since that is contained under the seal, how will subsequent cognition give the power of speaking or manifesting that which was shut under the seal? Or if to reveal what is known afterwards, insofar as it is known afterwards, does not prejudice the seal of confession; why [does it prejudice it] to reveal what was first known, since one and the same thing can be known by sight, then through confession, thirdly through others' revelation?

And therefore there is a third manner of speaking more consonant with truth and reason, that what is known by a twofold way is known by a twofold cognition. And just as it is known by a twofold cognition, so a man can forget one mode of knowing and remember the other, as is evident, because a man sometimes forgets that he saw, and recollects that he heard; or forgets that he heard through a report, and remembers that he heard in confession. And just as knowledge or the mode of knowing is twofold, so the mode of revealing is twofold; nor does the one prejudice the other, as if someone say: I saw, or: I learned in confession; nor does the one mode prejudice the other, and without breaking of the seal and without prejudice and without prejudice to the truth, that which is known through confession and through another mode can be revealed, in such a way nevertheless that the mode of knowing through confession always remains hidden. Yet because scandal could arise from this, especially with the penitent and with others, I believe that out of [a sense of] the good and the equitable he ought rather to conceal than anyone else. And therefore, for the avoiding of scandal to the penitent, he ought to protest to him in confession that he ought not to conceal that — not because that protestation acquires a right of revealing, but because it removes from the neighbor the ground of scandal. He ought also to permit himself to be compelled to speak; and he is compelled either because prejudice is generated to the truth, or by command; and from then on he can speak without any remorse. For another's sin is to be revealed with great maturity, even where the seal of confession is not annexed. — And this position seems more reasonable and safer, and the jurists more agree with this one.

1. To that, then, which is objected concerning the decretal, it must be said that it speaks of the revelation of a sin insofar as it is known through confession; whence it imposes a grave penalty, in which penalty it is said that he ought to be thrust « into a strict monastery »; and this is understood, not because it compels [him] to emit a vow, but because for so great a crime it compels [him] to be punished perpetually.

2. To that which is objected, that no confession is to be revealed; but this sin etc.; it must be said that there is there a fallacy of accident, in that to this sin, insofar as it is to be revealed, the confession is extraneous. For since it is known in two ways, according to one mode it can and ought to be revealed, but according to the other not at all; and therefore the first thing it proposes is false: this sin cannot be revealed without the confession being revealed.

3. To that which is objected, that these cognitions have opposition and degree; it must be said that it is true that they have degree; but nevertheless they do not have opposition, in that they are according to diverse ways; whence the same thing can be known and believed; so it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

4. To that which is objected, that occasion of acting malignantly is to be taken away from the wicked; it must be said that the approach of doing evil can never be entirely shut off from the wicked; nor ought it to be so shut off that thereby the way of acting rightly be shut off from

the good; nor ought the approach to be shut off from one evil, so that it be opened to another: and therefore that argument does not conclude that what is known in two ways must necessarily be concealed.

5. To that which is objected, that he promises to keep the secret when he hears [it]; it is true [that he promises] the *confession* itself, and that insofar as it is thus known; otherwise he does not promise, and even if he did promise, where truth or obedience should command, it can be revealed, and the promise or oath would be null — whence if I had seen my neighbor sinning in such a sin, [it is the case] that I am bound to tell the superior, nay I am loosed [from the promise], nay I have sworn: and so it is not only that contempt may be removed.

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