Dist. 21, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/21/q/bon-sent-IV-d21-p2-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first about this, that he says, that *all mortal sins ought at least once to be expressed in confession.* For it seems false, because for contrition to be valid, it is not necessary to be contrite over each [sin] one by one; rather one is justified in contrition over all of them: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [the same] concerning confession.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is not similar, because contrition is in the sight of God, who sees all things with one glance; but confession is in the sight of man, who cannot fully know the disease except by hearing the individual mortal sins. And again, confession is made for shame, but contrition for the detestation of sin through justice. Now detestation is intensified in the gathering together of many evils, but shame in the unfolding of individual ones.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says, that *it suffices to confess venial sins in general, unless some be frequently repeated.* For it seems not to be well said, because repetition does not draw [a sin] into another genus: therefore however much they be repeated, they are venial: therefore it suffices to confess them in general, like the others.

**I respond:** It must be said that custom frequently leads into lust and contempt; therefore on account of the doubt and to avoid the danger, when it is probably feared [that there is] any of these, the venial sin is to be confessed, and it suffices to remain in generality, nor is it necessary to descend to particulars; if, however, he wishes to descend, it is very laudable and useful and most necessary for one wishing to ascend to perfection.

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *For the sake of humility one ought not to confess oneself guilty.* For Augustine seems to say the contrary in the book of the *Confessions*, where he says thus: *If you ask me whether I am just; I respond that [I am] not*; but it is certain that Augustine was just, and he said this out of humility, both well and meritoriously.

**I respond:** It must be said that to confess oneself guilty or unjust is twofold: either insofar as guilt and injustice simply deprive [one] of justice; and in this way one ought not to confess oneself guilty, unless he have the consciousness of mortal [sin]. In another way it is to confess oneself guilty and unjust, insofar as it deprives [one] of the perfection of justice; and according to this every man can confess himself unjust, according to that [text] of Isaiah sixty-four: *As a menstruous cloth is all our justice.* Nor is man justified compared with God, according to Job; and in this way Augustine said himself not to be just.

And note that a confession made in due manner ought to have sixteen conditions; whence the verses:

*Let confession be simple, humble, pure, faithful,*
*And frequent, naked, discreet, willing, modest,*
*Whole, secret, tearful, hastened,*
*Strong and accusing, and let it be prepared to obey.*

Now the sufficiency and number of these conditions can be taken thus. For certain conditions there are which are and ought to be in confession according to its right *quantity*; certain according to right *order* and *association*; certain according to right *quality*. — If according to right *quantity*, this [is] threefold: either as to *wholeness*, or as to *frequency*, or as to *duration*; and so there are three conditions, namely that it be *whole*, *frequent*, and *hastened*. — If as to *association*, thus it ought to have the company of two parts, namely of contrition and of satisfaction. As to contrition, thus *tearful*; as to satisfaction, thus *prepared to obey*; or as to both, and thus *strong*. — As to *quality*, either of the one confessing, or of the confession. If of the one confessing, thus there are five conditions: according to the rational power it is *simple*; according to the concupiscible it ought to be *willing*; according to the irascible *humble*, in speech *faithful*, and in sign *modest*; and so there are five. — If it be considered in itself, thus it ought to be *pure*, so that it mingle nothing in; it ought to be *naked*, so that it keep nothing hidden; as to circumstances it ought to be *discreet*, so that it add nothing; it ought to be *secret*, so that it harm not others; it ought to be *accusatory*, so that it punish itself. — And so there are three on the part of quantity, three by reason of the adjunct, five by reason of the subject, and five by reason of itself; and so in all there are sixteen.

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says in resolving: *But it is another thing to despise one's own priest out of favor or hatred* etc. For it seems to resolve badly, because from this solution anyone could confess to whom he wills, so long as he does not despise his own priest. — But the contrary is had in the decretal, where it is said that «if for a cause he wishes to go to another, let him first ask and obtain license, because otherwise [the other priest] cannot loose or bind».

**I respond:** It must be said that that word of Augustine is understood as to the choice of the priest, before the subject subjects himself to anyone and commits the care of his soul; but the word of Urban [refers to] *after* the commission; for from then on he is bound to confess to him and ought not [to confess] to another, unless he ask license. — Yet in five cases license is held as obtained. The first is, if he be a vagabond. — The second is, if he has renounced his domicile. — The third, if he has sinned or given offense in another parish. — The fourth, on account of the priest's ignorance, or malice, because he is a revealer of confession, or a solicitor to evil. — The last is in the case of necessity, as if he be in the article of death, or ought to enter a just war.