Dist. 25, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/25/q/bon-sent-IV-d25-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the use of reason is necessary for receiving an order.*

In the second place it is asked whether the use of reason is necessary for receiving an order. And that it is, seems [to follow]:

1. Because the Sacrament of order is a nobler and more perfect Sacrament than the Sacrament of matrimony, and places [one] in a higher state; but the Sacrament of matrimony cannot be contracted by the insane and by those lacking reason, as is expressly had below: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this seems [to hold] *by [reason of] the form*: because no one offers something to one who does not understand; but in [conferring] an order the ordainer says to the ordained: "Receive the power," etc.: therefore he presupposes discretion in him. If therefore he does not have discretion, he does not seem able to receive the order.

3. Likewise, the use of this Sacrament can belong to no one except to one having the use of reason: therefore if it is given to another, it is given in vain: therefore if "God does nothing in vain," it seems that upon one who does not have the use of reason the Sacrament of order should never be conferred.

4. Likewise, if someone were to offer power to one refusing it, there would be no reception of power there, since, just as the *conferral* stands to the will of the *giver*, so the *reception* [stands] to the will of the *receiver*: therefore if the *giver* does not give unless he wills and intends, the *receiver* does not receive unless he wills and intends.

5. Likewise, the time and age are determined for the reception of an order in distinction seventy-seven; but this is not on account of anything else except on account of discretion and the use of reason, which is not had in the lesser years: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, to the sacred orders continence is of necessity annexed; but no one is bound to continence unless he has the use of reason, and through the consent of his own will: therefore at least to the sacred orders no one can be promoted before the years of discretion: therefore the use of reason is necessary.

**On the contrary:**
1. The other Sacraments which imprint a character, such as baptism and confirmation, can be given before the use of reason: therefore it seems by parity of reasoning that this Sacrament [can be given] too.

2. Likewise, this very thing seems [to hold from] the *Decretals, On the Cleric ordained by a leap*, where it is said that within the years of discretion he was promoted to the minor orders, and afterwards, without reiteration, it was granted to him to minister in such [orders].

3. Likewise, to a priest, when he is ordained, are given the keys of binding and loosing, even if the priest lacks knowledge: therefore much more strongly can an order be given to a boy, [even] if he lacks the use of reason.

4. Likewise, if someone, compelled by fear of death, should allow himself to be ordained and prefer to be ordained rather than to die, he is ordained, just as also in baptism can manifestly be had: therefore a coerced will suffices: therefore it is not necessary that he freely consent: therefore the age does not seem necessary.

5. Likewise, it belongs to the wise man to regard not only the present, but also what is future: therefore if many lack discretion, of whom it is presumed that they will at some time be discreet; it seems that at least the order could be committed to them, and its execution remain in suspense.

6. Likewise, if something on the part of the receiver were necessary in the ordination itself, it would be required that he at least express his consent, and that it be required of him, as is done in matrimony; but in this manner it is not done in [conferring] an order: therefore it does not seem that consent is necessary, and therefore neither the use of reason.

### Conclusion.

> For the reception of the seven orders the use of reason is not required by necessity of the Sacrament, but by necessity either of precept or of fittingness.

**I respond:** To this some say that for the reception of all the orders the consent of reason is required, for the reason that in every order an office is committed with respect to an act *elicited* by reason; and an office is committed to no one except to him who wills to receive it: and therefore they say that the use of reason is required in the ordained, otherwise nothing at all is done. — But nevertheless that seems to be contrary to the decretal *On the Cleric ordained by a leap*, where it is touched upon that he was promoted to the minor orders within the years of discretion. *Furthermore*, all day long we see little children promoted to the minor orders, who neither know what an order is, nor what is given therein. And *again*, the use of confirmation is not before adult age, and yet the Sacrament can be given.

And therefore there is another opinion of the greater [masters], that for something the use of reason is required by necessity of the *Sacrament*, for some order by necessity of *precept*, for some [orders] by [reason of] *honesty* and *fittingness*. For to the *episcopate*, since therein a spiritual matrimony is contracted, consent is necessarily required, without which no matrimony comes to be, neither spiritual nor corporeal, as will be seen below; and through this the use of reason and of discretion is necessarily required by necessity of the *Sacrament*, although many other things are required by necessity of *precept*. — But to the *sacred orders* the use of reason is required by necessity of *precept*, for the reason that to those orders none ought to be admitted except those who can be bound to continence; and therefore those who knowingly ordain those who cannot be bound, because they lack reason, act against the statute and precept of the Church; and therefore, if such are ordained outwardly, they receive the character *in fact*, because they do not contradict, although they do not consent. — But to the *minor orders* the use of reason is required by [reason of] *honesty*, because therein offices are committed which pertain not only to those having the use of reason, but even to those having a knowledge of letters. But nevertheless, since those orders are for a certain habituation; where from some utility or necessity it seems expedient, they can be promoted to the minor orders even before the years of discretion. But that they be thus promoted indiscriminately and enriched with ecclesiastical benefices can scarcely be without contempt of the canons and scandal of men and peril of souls. — The arguments, therefore, showing that the use of reason is not necessary for the *being* or the *receiving* of the Sacrament, but only as regards the *well-being* and the *worthy receiving*, are to be granted, speaking of the orders properly.

1. To that which is objected concerning matrimony, it must be said that it is not similar: because in matrimony the use of reason is not required on account of the dignity of the Sacrament, but on account of the signification of the joining of God and the soul, which is not [effected] except in mutual consent. *Furthermore*, this does not conclude generally concerning the Sacrament of order, but only concerning the dignity of the bishop.

2. To that which is objected, that it says: *Receive*; it must be said that that offering signifies rather the command and power of the *giver* than the exercise of the *receiver*. Hence it belongs to him not only to *offer*, but to *confer*; and unless there be an obstacle of a contrary will, so that he be altogether unwilling, he receives the Sacrament, according as is judged concerning the Sacrament of confirmation.

3. To that which is objected concerning use, it must be said that even if he does not have the use immediately, since nevertheless it is hoped that he will at some time have it, the Sacrament is not given in vain, just as the priesthood is also given to one who for a long time afterward defers to celebrate.

4. To that which is objected concerning the one refusing, it must be said that here there is a *fallacy of the consequent*: the one refusing does not receive: therefore it is necessary that the one receiving consent; because there is a mean between *one refusing altogether* and *one consenting*.

5. To that which is objected concerning time and age, it must be said that that determination of time is not as regards the *necessity of the Sacrament*, but rather as regards the *fittingness of reception* and its *solemnity*; which in the greater orders must be observed, at least as regards the years of discretion, on account of the vow of continence and the dignity of the orders; but a further prolongation of time, as regards priests, as regards modern times, is not demanded, because, just as in many [cases] "malice supplies for age," so in many goodness and sanctity supply [for it]. *Furthermore*, many are now ordained who are not set over a people, as religious; therefore it is not necessary in them so to observe the times, as in others, especially if there be sanctity of life and knowledge and maturity of character.

6. To that which is objected concerning continence, the response is already evident; for continence is in the sacred orders not of [their] *being*, but of [their] *well-being*.

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