Dist. 25, Art. 2, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/25/q/bon-sent-IV-d25-a2-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether the condition of freedom is necessary for receiving an order.*

Fourth and last it is asked whether, for receiving an order, the condition of freedom is necessary. And that it is so, seems [to be the case]:

1. In distinction fifty-four: «Let no bishop presume to promote to the clerical state the slave of another».

2. Likewise, in the same decretal, chapter two: «Let none of servile condition be promoted to sacred orders, unless they first obtain lawful liberty from their masters».

3. Likewise, if a slave enters religion, he is restored to his master and cannot enter [it], unless he be made free: therefore by parity of reasoning, unless he be made free, he will not be able to be promoted to sacred orders.

4. Likewise, *no one can serve two masters*, as the Savior himself testified: therefore, since the clerical office requires the whole man to be dedicated to it, no one will be able to be promoted to this who is in the power of another.

**On the contrary:** 1. *A wise servant shall rule over foolish sons*, it is said in Proverbs, chapter seventeen: therefore it seems that where there is wisdom and goodness of life, nothing on the side of servitude stands in the way.

2. Likewise, an order bespeaks spiritual power, servitude bespeaks bodily subjection; but bodily subjection has no repugnance with that which is spiritual: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, *God is no respecter of persons*: therefore the service of a slave pleases him just as much as the service of a master: therefore, just as masters can be taken up for divine worship and the clerical state, so also can slaves.

4. Likewise, the other Sacraments can be received by slaves as freely as by masters, and to them they are admitted just as commonly: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [the same holds] as regards an order.

Alongside this it is asked, if a slave has been ordained, the master being unaware, whether he must be restored to him. Likewise, if he is restored, why not other consecrated things; and again, for how long a time [the master] can reclaim [him].

> **Conclusion.** A slave, on account of the honorableness of the Sacrament, ought not to be ordained.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that the Sacrament of order not only abounds beyond the others according to the character of a *sign*, on account of this, that not only the *Sacrament*, but also the one *receiving* the Sacrament holds the character of a sign; indeed it also abounds according to the character of a *remedy*: because not only is grace there ordained for healing the *subject* [ordained], but grace is also given which ordains toward the healing of *others*; whence it places a man not only in a state of *health*, but even in a grade of *honorableness* and dignity: and therefore for this Sacrament there is required not just any person, but an *honorable* person, to whom clerical honor and dignity are fitting. And since *honorableness* regards many exterior things; therefore not only on account of a defect of *life* does one become unfit for receiving this Sacrament, but also on account of a defect of *many other things*.

For, that a person be *honorable*, it is required that there concur in him honorableness on the side of *origin*, of *name*, of *body*, of *action*, of *condition*, and of *manner of life*. On account of a defect on the side of *origin*, the bastard son of a priest is unfit, or also any illegitimate person, Deuteronomy twenty-three. — On the side of *name* or reputation, the infamous and the publicly penitent are unfit, distinction fifty, *Ex poenitentibus*. — On account of a defect on the side of *body*,

those impaired in body and the possessed and epileptics, distinction thirty-three, *Communiter definimus*. — On account of a defect on the side of *action*, as when one falls into an enormous sin, whether a deed, such as homicide, distinction fifty almost throughout; and this is on account of the great horror which is in the shedding of blood, whether it be done justly or unjustly; or on account of this, that it divides the unity of soul and body. — On account of a defect of *condition*, such as a slave, distinction fifty-four. — On account of a defect of *manner of life*, such as courtiers, distinction fifty-one. — In all [these], however, the distinctions hand down exceptions; but those pertain to the lower science. Let it suffice to have said these things only in general: that, since the Sacrament of order considers not only the *merit* of the person, but *honorableness*, because a cleric is a public person, and order places [him] in a grade of dignity; there ought to be excluded those in whom the Sacrament and other things could consequently be dishonored. Since a *slave*, as long as he is in such a state, is ignoble and can be compelled to ignoble works; and therefore he cannot give himself over entirely, since he is subject to another: therefore he cannot be promoted to sacred orders, so far as pertains to the honorableness of the Sacrament, yet he does receive the order.

1. 2. 3. 4. To that, then, which is objected, that servitude does not impede, as to the whole the answer is clear from what has already been said.

Nevertheless, as to what he asks, whether a slave ought to be restored to his master; it must be answered that either he was ordained with his master *knowing* and *consenting*, or *unaware* and *unwilling*. If [with his master] *knowing* and *consenting*, or even not contradicting, he generates a prejudice against himself, so that he can no longer reclaim him. If [with his master] *unaware* and *unwilling*; or with the presenter and the bishop *unaware*, or one, or *both being aware*. If they are unaware, then the slave is bound to redeem himself, if he has the money; but if he does not have it, nor does the Church wish to redeem him, he must be restored to his master. But if [it was done] with the ordainer and the presenter *knowing*, they are bound to the master in money, or in another slave, or in double: but if they do not have [it], the master can take back the slave for himself. — Some, however, say that [he may] not, if he has attained to the priesthood; but concerning all [cases] it seems that the master ought to be kept indemnified, yet he has the right of seeking him within a year; and some say that [this holds] after ordination, some say that [it holds] after [his] becoming known. And all these things are proved by those laws which are stated in distinction fifty-four.

There are also many other things which are determined in law, which, I say, pertain to those to be ordained, which are drawn from various places of Scripture, and especially from the first [Epistle] to Timothy, chapter three, and all these things are determined from distinction twenty-three to the end of the first part. And since this distinction pertains more to the lower science, therefore for the present let these things suffice, lest we go beyond the bounds of our science. It is true, however, that all ordinations of this kind have their origin from sacred Scripture, and all could be reduced to it as to their origin, if one had expertise in canon and divine law.

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