Dist. 27, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/27/q/bon-sent-IV-d27-a3-q1
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### Article III.
### *On the indissolubility of matrimony.*

Consequently, as regards the third article, inquiry is made concerning the indissolubility of matrimony; and about this two [questions] are asked. First, inquiry is made concerning indissolubility as regards a consummated marriage. Second, as regards a ratified marriage.

### Question I.
### *Whether a consummated marriage is indissoluble.*

As regards the first point, that such a marriage is indissoluble is shown:

1. By the word of the Lord, Matthew, chapter nineteen: *What God has joined together let no man put asunder*: therefore such persons, who are joined by God, are inseparable, because God separates none.

2. Likewise, whatever things are separable are several; but the Lord says that man and woman *are not two, but one flesh*: therefore they are not separable.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the definition of matrimony which the Master sets down in the [Lombard's] text: «retaining an undivided partnership of life».

4. Likewise, this marriage is a sign of the union of Christ and the Church according to conformity of nature; but that union is inseparable: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Every bond that can be repeated is dissoluble; but marriage can be repeated, since there can be second nuptials: therefore it is dissoluble.

2. Likewise, every perpetual Sacrament imprints some seal in a perpetual subject; but marriage imprints nothing in the soul: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every effect whose cause is dissoluble is itself dissoluble; but the cause of matrimony is mutual consent, and that is dissoluble: therefore etc. The *first* [premise] is evident from that saying of Chrysostom, that «by the same causes by which each thing is constructed, by the same it is destroyed».

4. Likewise, the husband is bound to render the debt to the wife by the bond of matrimony; but by mutual consent they can perpetually release each other: therefore likewise by mutual consent [they can] divide the marriage. Similarly, by the law of matrimony they are bound to cohabit together; and by common consent they can enter different religious orders: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *Marriage is an indissoluble bond while the extremes remain, but it is not perpetual.*

**I respond:** It must be said that marriage is indissoluble while the extremes remain; but when they, or one of the two, are destroyed, it is dissolved, because the binding does not remain unless the things that are bound also remain. Now the extremes are destructible, because they are extremes by reason of the sexes, not of the souls; and because sex regards a disposition on the part of the body, and thus corporeal life: I say that marriage is rightly called an indissoluble bond, but not a perpetual one.

1, 2. And by this the reply to the first two [objections] is evident; for [the objection] argues as though the bond were perpetual. Now the ground of this indissolubility comes *dispositively* from its *signification*, because it signifies an indissoluble union, namely that of Christ and the Church according to conformity of nature; but it comes *effectively* from the *institution*, because God so instituted it, that they be no longer loosed while they live.

3. And by this the reply to that objection concerning consent is evident: because [consent] is not the *whole* cause of matrimony — whence, if it were the whole cause, [the objection] would argue well — but beyond it there is present *divine institution*. — Nevertheless [the objection] does not resolve it well, on this account, that if two causes concur toward the same effect, when the one is destroyed the effect does not remain; and therefore, if consent concurs with divine institution toward matrimony, it seems etc. It must be said, then, that there is a cause that is *introducing only*, and [a cause that is] *both introducing and conserving*. When it is said that if the cause is destroyed, [so is] the effect; this is true of a *conserving* [cause], but it is not true of an *introducing-only* [cause]; consent introduces that bond, it does not conserve it: and therefore, when it ceases, [the bond] does not cease. And so that [objection] is evident.

4. To that which is objected concerning the rendering of the debt and cohabitation, it must be said that this is within the power of the married persons: because each has power over the body of the other; and since each can renounce his own right: hence it is that *cohabitation* and *the payment of the debt* can be divided; not so the bond, which God instituted, [and] which holds the character of a Sacrament.