Dist. 27, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/27/q/bon-sent-IV-d27-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning this definition: *Matrimony is the marital conjunction of a man and a woman, retaining an undivided manner of life.* For it seems that this definition is *false:* first, because it is not necessary that spouses always cohabit together: therefore it is not necessary, for there to be matrimony, that there be there an undivided manner of life. — Likewise, it seems to be *superfluous,* because, if there is a marital conjunction, it is indivisible: therefore if this is contained in the first member, it seems superfluous to add that.

**I respond:** It must be said that here matrimony is defined according to the *perfect* or consummated state; but that definition: *Matrimony is the marital conjunction of a male and a female,* is sufficient as regards the *being* of the thing defined, and there are touched upon *genus* and *difference.* But since the marital conjunction implies two things in itself, namely the legitimacy of the persons and the indivision of the persons; therefore for greater instruction there is superadded something else, namely *between legitimate persons,* etc.; and it is not of the *being* of the definition, but an explication of the first member. — Yet it could be said that there is noted there a fourfold kind of cause, namely the *formal,* in that it is said: marital conjunction; the *efficient,* in that it is said: of a man and a woman, who, insofar as they consent, stand in the account of the efficient cause; the *material,* in that it is said: between legitimate persons; the *final,* in that it is said: undivided [manner] of life, etc., where the good of the Sacrament is touched upon, which is the principal good of matrimony. — And through this the objections are made clear, because there is neither *superfluity* nor *falsity,* because there is no indivision as regards the *thing conjoined,* but as regards the *Sacrament*.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *But if by words they express what they do not will in the heart, if there be not coercion there or fraud,* etc. For it seems ill said, because, since it is impossible that something other be expressed in the mouth than is in the heart, *without fraud;* the Master seems to imply incompatible things.

**I respond:** It must be said that *fraud* can be twofold, namely *expressed outwardly through speech,* or *only in the heart;* just as *the intention of jesting* in giving baptism can be twofold: either so that it be only *in the heart,* or so that it be in some way expressed *in an outward sign.* Thus *fraud* is *in the heart,* when outwardly he does entirely as one does who simply consents; and of this fraud the Master does not understand [it]. There is another [kind], when *it is expressed through a sign,* as in a certain decretal, on Betrothals, there is set down the case of a certain man who, though he was called John, named himself Peter, in consenting saying: I [am] Peter, or something similar; and then the fraud is manifestly detected *outwardly;* and of such a one the Master speaks, not of hidden fraud. But this word must be understood to have truth according to the judgment

in the face of the Church, not according to the truth or in the forum of conscience.

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, which is said of Macarius, that *he chose the solitude of the desert;* whether his betrothed was released from him. And it seems that *not,* because he went into the *desert:* therefore since he did not give his power to another, but was of free will; he could return to the world: therefore it seems that the wife was not released. — On the *contrary* it is: because he did not sin, therefore he took away nothing from his wife: therefore it was permitted to her to pass to a second marriage.

**I respond:** It must be said that although hermits do not promise obedience, nevertheless, because they are religious persons, they have the vow of continence annexed; and by reason of the assumption of the habit and by custom the vow is understood to be solemnized in him, especially if it is with companions who have vowed chastity, and he in the reception of such a habit has bound himself to perpetual continence.

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *We wish the husband to be restored to her, even if he is already tonsured;* whether the *tonsured* one ought to remain in the world. And that yes, it seems: because he is not absolved from the vow, indeed after the death of the wife it is not permitted to contract [marriage], indeed he is again bound to be continent and to be compelled: therefore it seems that he is not absolved from the solemn vow: therefore it seems that he is bound to wear the habit. — *Against* this it is, because this would be to the reproach of the wife: therefore if she ought not to be punished, it is clear, etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that such a one, who entered religion, either entered while the wife was *unwilling* and not consenting, yet [while she was] existing in the world and contradicting; and such a one is not bound to religion, because he could not emit the vow, indeed if he is claimed back, he is to be restored to her; nevertheless he is bound, as far as in him lies, to preserve continence; whence since he cannot contract with another, because continence, as far as in him lies, he could preserve, but not enter religion, because he could not decline to demand [the debt], but was bound to render it. — Or he enters religion while the wife is *willing,* but nevertheless remaining in the world; and such a one is absolved from the vow *not simply,* but *for a time,* nor entirely, but only insofar as the vow was to the prejudice of the wife. And this is had in a certain decretal, on the Conversion of the married, *Ex parte*, where it is written that if someone vowed chastity and received the habit of religion, with the wife consenting, but afterward, she remaining in the world, he too remained; but she having died, the same man afterward contracted with another. And this indeed ought not to have been done, whence it is said that he is to be separated from her and to be compelled to enter religion. And the reason is given there, «because, while his wife remained in the world, he could not profess religion, yet she being taken away from the midst, without peril of salvation the vow which he made he could not vitiate». And thus it is clear that he is not bound to wear the habit, as long as the wife lives, both on account of scandal, and on account of the reproach of the wife.

### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says, that where there is *a promise of contracting matrimony, they are [only] betrothed man and betrothed woman.* For he seems to hold that it is not permitted to the betrothed man to pass to religion, the betrothed woman being unwilling, unless there be a betrothal *concerning the future;* otherwise his distinction seems to be of no value to the point. And this seems false, as is had in the third book of decretals, on the Conversion of the married, where it is said in that decretal *Verum* etc., that it is permitted to the one to enter, the other being unwilling, and to that one it is permitted to pass to a second marriage. And the reason is given there: «because, since they had not been made one flesh together, one can well enough pass to God, and the other remain in the world». — Likewise, that this distinction of the Master does not resolve [it], it seems: because Macarius and Alexius, each had consented *concerning the present;* for otherwise they would not have held the wedding-feasts: therefore it is permitted, after matrimony has been contracted, to dismiss the betrothed. And *again,* that it is permitted to marry, is had from the aforesaid decretal and by reason. For if this woman has not yet been made one flesh, and on account of this the man can pass over: therefore if she ought not to be punished, either her husband is to be restored to her, or she can contract with another.

**I respond:** It must be said that in truth, as that decretal expressly says, it is permitted to those who consented *concerning the present* to fly off to religion, and to the other it is permitted to marry; nor is it to be believed that the Master wishes to say the opposite; for otherwise he would run contrary to canon law and to reason, nor in this section is he to be

agreed with. Whence the jurists distinguish matrimony according to a threefold difference: for one [is] *initiated,* one *ratified,* one *consummated.* Matrimony is initiated *by betrothal concerning the future,* ratified in *consent concerning the present,* consummated in *carnal union.* And therefore the aforesaid authorities can be understood not only of the *betrothed woman,* but also of the *wife.* Yet certain authorities which follow are understood of her who is purely betrothed; and on account of this the Master distinguishes a twofold manner of betrothing. Yet there are also other manners, which will be shown below.

### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *He who is coupled to marriage should not further approach to sacred orders, when he has married a widow.* For it seems ill said, because such a one does not divide his own flesh nor did the wife divide [hers]: therefore in nothing does he seem to prejudice the Sacrament. — Likewise, such a woman, if she enter religion, is consecrated as a virgin: if therefore no prejudice is generated to the woman, it seems that neither [is there any] to the man. — But the *contrary* seems to be said in the text.

**I respond:** It must be said that what the Master and Pelagius say was of the rigor of the law, not on account of an obstacle which arises on the part of the Sacrament directly. Whence according to the new laws today he is not bound, because neither divided his own flesh, and he had the wife a virgin, which is attended to for the perfection of the Sacrament. And *if you object* to me concerning him who contracted with some virgin and consummated the matrimony, and afterward contracted with another, whom however he did not know, that he is judged a bigamist; it must be said that this is not on account of a *defect of the Sacrament,* but because he is presumed against as to *incontinence;* just as a deacon who contracted with a second [wife] in the diaconate — and understand: he contracted *in fact,* because *by right* he cannot, as is had in the twenty-eighth distinction, with the deed following — is punished as a bigamist, although the second was nevertheless not a matrimony.

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