Dist. 27
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/27/q/bon-sent-IV-d27-littera
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### Chap. I. *On what things are to be considered in marriage.*

After this it must be noted what marriage is, and what is the *efficient cause* of marriage, and the cause *on account of which* it ought to be contracted, and what are the *goods of marriage,* and how through them *carnal intercourse is excused,* and who are the *legitimate persons* for matrimony. There are also many other things to be considered in marriage, which we shall run through in brief compass.

### Chap. II. *What marriage is.*

« Marriage, then, or matrimony, is the marital union of a man and a woman between legitimate persons, retaining an undivided common manner of life. » « To the undivided common life it pertains that without the consent of the other neither can profess continence, or be free for prayer »; and that between them, while they live, the conjugal bond remains, so that it is not permitted to unite with an-

other; and that mutually the one render to the other what each [owes] to himself. By this description only legitimate and faithful matrimony is included.

### Chap. III. *On the consent which effects marriage.*

Now the *efficient cause* of matrimony is consent — not any consent whatever, but one expressed through words, and not concerning the future, but concerning the present. For if they consent regarding the future, saying: I will take you as husband, and I you as wife; this consent is not effective of matrimony. Likewise, if they consent *in mind* and do not express it *by words* or by other *certain signs;* neither does such consent effect matrimony. But if they express in words what nevertheless they do not will in their heart; if there be no coercion there or deceit, that obligation of the words by which they consent, saying: I take you as husband, and I you as wife, effects matrimony.

That consent effects matrimony is proved by the testimonies adduced below. For Isidore says: « Consent makes matrimony ». Likewise Nicholas the Pope: « Let the consent alone suffice, according to their laws, of those whose union is in question; which alone, if it happen to be lacking in the nuptials, the rest, even celebrated with intercourse itself, are frustrated ». Likewise John Chrysostom: « Matrimony indeed intercourse does not make, but the will; and therefore separation of body does not dissolve it ». Likewise Ambrose: « Not the deflowering of virginity makes marriage, but the conjugal pact ». — From these it appears that consent, that is the conjugal pact, makes matrimony; and from then on it is marriage, even if carnal union has not preceded or followed.

### Chap. IV. *When marriage begins to be.*

That from the very betrothal, in which the conjugal pact is expressed, they are *spouses,* the testimonies of the Saints prove. For Ambrose says: « When marriage is initiated, the name of marriage is taken on; when she is joined to the man, it is marriage, not when she is known by the man's intercourse ». Likewise Isidore: « They are more truly called *spouses* from the first pledge of betrothal, although as yet conjugal intercourse be unknown between them ». Likewise Augustine: « She is called *spouse* from the first pledge of betrothal, whom he had not known by intercourse nor was about to know. Nor had the appellation of *marriage* perjured itself nor remained false, where there neither had been nor was to be any mingling of flesh. On account of which both merited to be called the faithful marriage, the *parents of Christ,* not only that mother, but also that father of his, as the *spouse* of his mother — *both* in mind, not in flesh ». — From these it is evidently insinuated that from the time at which voluntary and marital consent intervenes, which alone makes marriage, the betrothed man and betrothed woman are true spouses.

### Chap. V. *On the opinion of certain persons who say that marriage does not exist before carnal union.*

Yet some assert that true marriage is not contracted before the handing-over and carnal union, nor are any truly spouses before the mingling of the sexes intervenes; but from the first pledge of betrothal the man is a *betrothed man,* and the woman a *betrothed woman,* not a *spouse.* But betrothed men and betrothed women, they say, are frequently called *spouses,* not because they *are,* but because they *are to be* so, of which thing they have made a mutual pledge. And according to this they hand down that the words of the aforesaid authorities are to be understood.

### Chap. VI. *That a betrothed woman can choose a monastery without the betrothed man's consent.*

But that between a *betrothed woman* and a *spouse* there is a great difference, they establish from this: that a *betrothed woman* is permitted, before carnal union, without consulting or against the will of the *betrothed man,* to choose a monastery; and this done, the betrothed man too is permitted to marry another. But a *married man* or *married woman* can neither observe continence, except by common consent, nor seek a monastery, unless both alike profess continence. That a *betrothed woman* is permitted to choose a monastery is proved by the authorities of the Saints. For Eusebius the Pope says: « A betrothed girl it is not permitted to the parents to hand over to another man, yet it is permitted her to choose a monastery for herself ». Likewise Gregory: « The legal decrees have judged that a betrothed woman, if she wishes to convert, be mulcted by absolutely no penalty ». « Jerome also relates that Macarius, foremost among the hermits of Christ, the wedding feast having been celebrated, when in the evening he was about to enter the bridal chamber, going out from the city sought lands across the sea and chose for himself the solitude of the desert. Blessed Alexius too, likewise called by divine grace from his nuptials, deserted his betrothed and began to serve Christ naked. — From these authorities and examples it is clear that it is permitted to betrothed men, without the consent of their betrothed women, and conversely, to profess continence ».

### Chap. VII. *That a married person cannot profess continence without the spouse's consent.*

But this is by no means permitted to the married. For a man cannot take up a purpose of a better life without the consent of his wife, and conversely. Whence Gregory, writing

to Theoctista the patrician lady: « There are those who say that on account of religion marriages ought to be dissolved. But it must be known that, even if human law has conceded this, yet divine law has forbidden it. But if it be agreeable to both to lead a continent life, who would dare to accuse this? For thus we know many of the Saints both to have led a continent life with their spouses before, and afterwards to have passed to the governance of the holy Church. But if the continence which the man seeks, the woman does not follow, or which the wife seeks, the man refuses; marriage cannot be divided, because it is written: *The woman does not have power over her own flesh, but the man; likewise also the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman* ». The same: « Agathosa, the bearer of the present [letter], has complained that her husband against her will has been converted into a monastery. Wherefore we command your experience diligently to examine by careful inquiry, lest perhaps he was converted with her will, or she promised to change herself. And if this your diligence shall have found; let it provide both that he remain in the monastery and compel her, as she promised, to change. But if none of these is so, nor have you learned that the aforesaid woman has committed any crime of fornication, on account of which it is permitted to dismiss a wife; lest his conversion become for the abandoned wife left in the world an occasion of ruin, we will that you ought to restore her husband to her, even if he is already tonsured, all excuse ceasing; because save for the cause of fornication no reason grants that a man dismiss his wife. For after by the union of marriage of the man and the woman one body is made, it cannot in part be converted and in part remain in the world ». Likewise from the eighth synod: « If any married man wishes to convert to a monastery, he is not to be received, unless first he has been released by his spouse who professes chastity. Such then follow Christ without fault, the world being left behind, if they have from equal will the consent of chastity ». Likewise: « If a man and wife have consented among themselves to separate for the sake of religious life alone, let it by no means be done without the knowledge of the bishop, that by him, providing singularly, they be established in [their] place. For with the wife unwilling, or either of them, even for such a matter marriage is not dissolved ».

### Chap. VIII. *On adulterous unions.*

Likewise Augustine: « If you abstain without the will of your wife, you grant her license of fornicating, and her sin will be imputed to your abstinence ». Likewise Nicholas the Pope: « Thietberga the queen has written to us that she desires to be stripped of her royal dignity or [conjugal] union and to be content with a private life alone. To her we wrote that this cannot be done otherwise, unless her husband Lothar choose the same life ». — From these it is clear that the married, without common consent, cannot profess continence, or take up the habit of religion; and if they have done so, they must be recalled.

But betrothed persons can, without common consent, choose a monastery; whence it seems there is no marriage between a betrothed man and a betrothed woman. And therefore they assert that from the first pledge of betrothal they are called *spouses,* not by the reality of present things, but by the hope of future ones, since by the faith which from the betrothal they owe to one another, they are afterwards made spouses. The aforesaid authorities also, by which it is asserted that consent makes matrimony, they will to be understood thus: that the consent or conjugal pact does not make matrimony before intercourse, but in intercourse. For just as the deflowering of virginity does not make matrimony, unless the conjugal pact precede; so neither does the conjugal pact, before carnal union is present. From the conjugal *pact,* therefore, they become *betrothed man* and *betrothed woman* before intercourse, but in *intercourse* they are made *spouses.* For the conjugal pact brings it about that she who before was a *betrothed woman* becomes in intercourse a *spouse.*

To these things we respond thus. Sometimes a betrothal occurs where there is a mutual promise of the man and the woman concerning *contracting* matrimony, but there is not there consent of the *present;* and there is a betrothal having consent of the *present,* that is a conjugal pact, which alone makes marriage. In that betrothal, therefore, where there is a promise of contracting matrimony, they become *betrothed* only, not *spouses;* and to such betrothed persons it is permitted, without common consent, to profess continence and to choose a monastery. But in that betrothal where there is consent of the present, *marriage* is contracted, and from the first pledge of that betrothal they are called *true spouses.* According to this distinction of betrothal the doctors speak variously of the betrothed.

### Chap. IX. *That "betrothed man" and "betrothed woman" are taken in multiple senses.*

For sometimes they call those *betrothed women* who have had such a betrothal where there was a conjugal pact of the present; and these are truly spouses. Whence Gregory: « If anyone has betrothed or pledged a wife to himself, although afterwards, the day of her death anticipating, he could not lead her as wife; nevertheless it is permitted to none of her kindred to take her in marriage; and if it be found to have been done, let them be entirely separated ». Likewise Julius the Pope: « If anyone has betrothed or pledged a wife, and, either the day of her death anticipating, or certain causes rushing in, has not known her; let neither his brother nor any of her kindred take the same to himself as wife at any time ever ». Likewise Gregory: « Whoever has taken in marriage the betrothed girl of his neighbor, let him be anathema, himself and all consenting to him, because according to the law of God he is decreed to die. For

it is the custom of the divine law to call betrothed women *spouses,* as in the Gospel: *Take Mary your spouse;* and in Deuteronomy: *If anyone has oppressed another's betrothed in a field or in any place, or has led her into his house; let him die, because he has violated the wife of his neighbor* — not her who was already a wife, but her who was to be made a wife by her parents ». — From these it is gathered that certain betrothed women are spouses before the mingling of the sexes. — But perhaps that moves [a difficulty] which is said at the end of the chapter: *Not her who was already a wife, but her who was to be made a wife.* Which ought not to be so understood as if she were truly not a wife, from the time the conjugal pact intervened; but because she had not yet been handed over, nor had the wifely reality intervened, namely conjugal intercourse.

She also is called a *betrothed woman* who has been thus betrothed to a man that consent of the present has not intervened, but [only] a pledge of the future. According to which mode that decree is understood: « If anyone has oppressed the betrothed of his son, and afterwards his son has married her; let the father afterwards not have [her as] wife, nor the woman [have] the man; let the son, who was ignorant of his father's crime, marry another ». If she had been a *spouse,* which she certainly would be, if in the betrothal a conjugal pact had intervened, the betrothed man would not be permitted to marry another. But upon adulterers the penalty of not marrying is inflicted by rigor, that others may be terrified. Likewise from the same: « A certain man betrothed a wife and endowed her and could not have intercourse with her, whom secretly his brother corrupted and rendered pregnant; it was decreed that, although she could not be married to the legitimate man, yet the brother may not have his brother's betrothed as wife; but let the adulterer and adulteress indeed bear the vengeance of fornication, yet let lawful marriages not be denied to them ». Of that betrothal this ought to be understood where there was no conjugal consent of the present, otherwise it would not be permitted to them to obtain other marriages. According to this also that ought to be understood: « It has been established by a sacred assembly that, if anyone has seized the betrothed of another, let him be mulcted with public penance and remain without hope of marriage. And if she has not been consenting to the same crime, let license of marrying another not be denied her ». « It appears that this woman had been betrothed without a conjugal pact of the present, and therefore had not been a spouse; to whom, the betrothed man living, license of marrying another is not denied ». For there are certain nuptial pacts of the future, from which they are called *betrothed man* and *betrothed woman,* nor thereupon are they spouses; and there is a certain conjugal pact of the present, which makes the *betrothed man* and *betrothed woman* even spouses. And each pact is sometimes called *betrothal* or *espousals,* yet *properly* are *espousals* called certain solemn nuptial pacts.

Concerning nuptial pacts, where there is only a *pledge of the future,* Augustine says: « It has been instituted that betrothed women already pledged be not immediately handed over, lest the husband hold cheap her given, whom as betrothed man he did not sigh for when delayed ».

### Chap. X. *Which betrothed woman is a widow when the betrothed man dies, and which is not.*

And it must be known that that betrothed woman who has only been pledged in the future, the betrothed man being dead, does not remain a widow, because he had not been her husband. Whence if anyone marry her, he is not prohibited from ascending to holy orders, because he has not married a widow. For the husband of a widow, equally as a bigamist, is prohibited from being made a priest; but from such a union no one is barred from holy orders. According to this must be understood what Pelagius the Pope says of him who, her betrothed man being dead, marries the betrothed woman as wife: « There is nothing, he says, as far as pertains to this article, which would stand in his way from the canonical institutes, but that he may be able to be promoted to holy orders ». But if she had been such a betrothed woman between whom and her betrothed man consent of the present had intervened, he being dead, she would have remained a widow; and one united to her in marriage would not further approach to holy orders, since he has married a widow. It is not therefore to be doubted that consent of the present alone effects marriage, and that thereupon they are called true spouses. Therefore after such consent, if anyone unite himself to another, even if carnal mingling should there follow, he must be recalled to the prior union.

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