Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/28/q/bon-sent-IV-d28-a1-q1
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### Question I. *Whether consent for the future makes marriage.*

Concerning the first it is proceeded thus, and it is shown that consent for the future makes marriage.

1. By this reasoning: as the present is related to the present, so the future to the future; but consent for the present makes marriage in the present: therefore consent for the future makes marriage for the future.

2. Likewise, it seems by a like case: as one who promises something in the present is obligated in the present, so one who promises something for the future is obligated for that time; but as a promise is the cause of an obligation, so consent is the cause of marriage: therefore it seems [so].

3. Likewise, consent for the future makes marriage, if carnal intercourse should follow; but carnal intercourse is not the cause of marriage, but follows upon it: therefore the marriage existed before they came together: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if one should consent for the future, and fornication should follow, such that one does not know [the other] with marital affection but with a fornicator's affection, [this still] makes marriage; but an oath obligates more than fornication [does]: therefore if one should consent together with an oath, she is his wife.

**On the contrary:**

1. The laws say that if someone consents to one woman by words of the future and to another by words of the present, the second is his wife: if therefore one man has one wife, the first was not his wife.

2. Likewise, it seems by reasoning: because what is future is not [yet]: therefore when he consents for the future, he does not yet consent: therefore there is not now a marriage. But that there is not one in that future [moment] either is plain: let us be in that future [moment], and let it be supposed that then he does not consent; there is no consent then, nor was there before: therefore there is no marriage, nor was there.

3. Likewise, one who has once consented to a certain woman ought not to consent again for this, that marriage may come about; but consent for the future, when it is said: I shall take you as mine, obligates one to consent again: therefore by words of the future there is no marital consent. That he does obligate himself is plain, because he obligates himself to taking [her] as wife, and he takes her in no other way than through consent.

> **Conclusion.** Consent does not make marriage, unless it is expressed by words of the present.

**I respond:** It must be said that consent does not make marriage unless it is expressed by words of the present. For if it is expressed by words of the future, in truth it is not consent then, but a promise of consenting. Hence if someone should say: I shall consent to you; then indeed he does not consent, but promises that he will consent. And because there is no consent there, therefore there is no contracting of marriage; but because there is a promise, therefore there is an obligation; on that account it is to be called not marriage, but betrothal; and this betrothal indeed is confirmed when an oath is added to the simple promise. For according to the laws the man is to be compelled to take the woman as wife, unless some circumstance intervenes that dissolves the betrothal.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected, that as the present is related to the present etc.; it must be said that this is true. Hence just as, if one consents today, marriage comes about today; so, if one consents tomorrow, it comes about tomorrow. But when he now speaks of the future, he does not consent, but promises to consent; and therefore marriage does not come about, neither for the present nor for the future, but only a betrothal is contracted.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that one who promises for the future is obligated for the future; it must be said that this is true, because a promise is present; hence when he says: I shall do this, he actually promises, and therefore he is obligated. Likewise this one too is obligated by pledging; but marriage does not thereby come about, just as a promise is not the discharge [of the obligation].

*To 3 and 4.* To that which is objected concerning carnal intercourse, it must be said that the laws presume that he himself consents, and this through an outward express sign, because he acknowledges her as his wife; and they presume further that he acknowledges her as his wife, "lest he should reap advantage from his own wrongdoing." Hence in truth, if he does not consent, but acknowledges her only as a prostitute, there is no marriage according to the truth. Because, however, that intercourse, together with the preceding pledge, is a probable sign of marital consent; therefore there is marriage according to the judgment of the Church, and such a one is to be counselled to consent, if he did not consent inwardly in his mind.