Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/28/q/bon-sent-IV-d28-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether consent for a fixed time makes a marriage.*

Secondly it is asked, whether consent for a time makes a marriage, as when it is said: "I take you as mine up to ten years." And that it does, it seems:

1. Because here there is the consent of the husband toward the wife and of the wife toward the husband, the expression having been made through a word: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, this seems so by reason: because, as the simple stands to the simple, so a determinate time stands to a determinate time; but consent given simply makes a wife simply and a marriage simply: therefore likewise consent for a time makes a marriage for a time.

3. Likewise, just as someone becomes a slave simply, by submitting himself simply, so too he becomes a slave for a time, by submitting himself for a time: therefore it seems to be likewise in marriage, and so it seems that marriage can be contracted for a fixed time.

4. Likewise, whoever can give something simply can give it also for a time; but a man can give simply the power over his own body: therefore also for a time. But he cannot give the power over his own body except to a wife: therefore he can have a wife for a time. If you should say that the Lord instituted marriage to last forever; on the contrary: the Lord ought not to institute anything that could tend toward a diminishment of his own honor, or of our perfection; but if marriage were temporal, one could devote himself wholly to the service of God whenever he wished: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. In a certain decretal of Gregory IX, *On the Conditions Attached to Betrothals*, it is said: "If someone should say: I will contract [marriage] with you until I find another more worthy in honor or in wealth — a matrimonial contract, however favorable it may be, lacks effect."

2. Likewise, to this end is the definition of Hugh, who says that marriage "is a consent maintaining an undivided sharing of life."

3. Likewise, this seems so by reason: because indissolubility belongs to the being of marriage, as was shown above: therefore whoever consents to marriage obligates himself for all time: therefore if he expresses that he is obligated only for a time, it is in no way a marriage.

4. Likewise, no soul is united to God through betrothal unless it consents simply and purposes to be joined [to him]: therefore likewise in the sign, if this is a fitting sign; but marriage is a fitting sign: therefore a marriage does not come about unless the consent is expressed simply.

> **Conclusion.**
> In order for a marriage to be valid, it is necessary to consent simply and for all time, and to express such consent simply.

**I respond:** It must be said that, for there to be a marriage, it is necessary that the consent both *be* simply and *be expressed* simply — hence one ought to say: "I take you as mine" — but if one consents in some other way, it is not a marital or conjugal consent, but an adulterous one. Hence the true marriage is lacking, whether the simple consent is lacking in the heart or in the mouth; but when it is lacking in the heart, then [the matter stands] in the sight of God and according to the truth; when in the mouth, then in the face of the Church.

The reason, moreover, why it is necessary to consent simply, and why consent for a time is worth nothing, is that consent does not make a marriage except insofar as it presupposes the divine institution; but the divine institution regards a fitting signification. If, then, it is the signification of an indivisible thing, or of a union, the Lord therefore established such a union with a view to perpetuity; and to this the dictate of natural law also corresponds. And therefore, if the consent accords with the institution, it is necessary that it be for all time; otherwise the particular cause does not agree with the universal; and therefore nothing comes about, nor does he consent to take her as a wife, but rather as a concubine. — And the arguments for this must be granted, because in the form of the words something is implied that is "against the substance of marriage."

**To the arguments:**

*To the 2nd.* To that which is objected, that as the simple stands [to the simple, so a determinate time to a determinate time], etc.; it must be said that this is true where it happens that one finds "in a certain respect" in both extremes; but marriage is in no way "according to a time": and therefore that [argument] does not hold.

*To the 3rd.* To that which is objected concerning servitude, it must be said that it is not alike, because the bond of servitude can be temporal or perpetual, but marriage is perpetual.

*To the 4th.* To that which is objected, that the power over the body can be given for a time; it must be said that it cannot be given for a time, unless it is given simply; and it is similar [to the case of servitude]: for God does not accept anyone's good will or service, unless he is willing or purposes to serve him forever.

To that which is objected, that the Lord ought not to have instituted [marriage as perpetual]; it must be said that in the institution of this Sacrament, fittingness in signifying and necessity are considered more than anything else; and these require that it be perpetual.

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