Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/28/q/bon-sent-IV-d28-a1-q4
----------------------------------------
### Article Unicus.
### Question IV. *Whether a tacit consent brings about marriage.*

Fourth, the question is asked whether a tacit consent brings about marriage. And it seems that it does:

1. By the decretal of the fourth book, *On Betrothals*: "To your fraternity," etc.: "A marriage is truly contracted through the lawful consent of a man and a woman; but words are necessary, as far as the Church is concerned, for expressing consent as to the present." Therefore it seems that, as far as God is concerned, there can be marriage without a word.

2. Likewise, it seems so for another reason: because the sin of adultery or of fornication is judged to be consummated by interior consent alone, even without an external sign; therefore, if a chaste consent can do more than an incestuous one, the point is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, the consent of exterior words does not unite except through interior consent; but "where one thing exists on account of another, in both cases there is only one thing": therefore it seems that if a single interior consent is present, that alone will accomplish everything.

4. Likewise, some two persons consent equally intensely and fully both before the expression and after: therefore, if there is marriage after the expression, likewise there is marriage before it as well.

5. Likewise, if someone makes a vow interiorly only, he nonetheless vows and is bound to the vow: therefore likewise, if he consents interiorly only [to marriage, the same should hold]. If you say that it is not similar, because the vow is made to God, who sees hearts, whereas marriage concerns man, who does not know hearts — it is then objected that at least in the sight of God there ought to be marriage.

6. Likewise, this is shown by a similar case: because one who is truly contrite interiorly is judged, in the sight of God, to be truly a penitent, even if there is no confession by mouth: therefore likewise it is so in marriage.

**On the contrary:**
1. Marriage is a Sacrament; but every Sacrament is a sign, and a sign is that which offers itself to the senses: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, if interior consent alone made marriage, then, since a man cannot know another's hidden acts, he would not know whether he was that woman's husband, or not: therefore if he were joined to her outwardly, he would not know whether it was marriage, and thus he would place himself in danger.

3. Likewise, however much I may wish, with a full will, to give something to another, no right is acquired by that other from my will alone, unless I promise it outwardly by some sign; but in marriage the spouses acquire rights over one another: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because however much someone may believe and nod assent, unless he expresses it in speech — "I baptize you" — he does not baptize: therefore, by a similar argument, it seems that one does not contract marriage, however much he consents, unless he expresses it in speech. — And from this it seems to follow that a mute person could not contract marriage.

> **Conclusion.** Marriage is not contracted unless the interior consent is expressed outwardly, either by words, or by gestures, or in writing.

**I respond:** It must be said that for the being of every Sacrament, some signification or expression is necessarily required. For every Sacrament is a sign, and as a sign it is administered; and therefore this is necessary. But in some Sacraments the matter is determinate and the form of words prescribed, which have a force given to them for this purpose; and such Sacraments never come to be unless those words are pronounced. In others, however, the force does not come from an exterior word, but from within, as in penance as regards confession, and in marriage; and in such cases whatever expression is made suffices, whether by word, or in writing, or even by any other gesture. — It must therefore be granted that marriage is not contracted unless the consent is expressed outwardly, either through fitting words, or through gestures conveying the same thing.

1. And by this the first point as to the first part is clear, namely what was objected concerning the decretal. It is also clear that marriage can be contracted between mutes, though not without some sign. — Likewise for the last objection to the contrary, that it is not similar in the case of baptism.

2. To what is objected concerning adultery, or sin, it must be said that it is not similar: because sin consists in an interior disorder, whereas a Sacrament consists in an exterior signification.

3. and 4. To what is objected, that in that case one thing exists on account of another, therefore in both cases there is only one thing; it must be said that it is one thing to say "one on account of the other," and another to say "one through the other": because where one says "one through the other," there one posits two things, of which the one is like the efficient cause and the other like the instrument; and it is not true that the efficient cause by itself alone can do as much as it can with the instrument. But when it is said "where one exists on account of the other," etc., this speaks of the unity of the object, where "on account of" designates the formal cause, as: *I see the color, because it is bright*, and *I love the wine, because it is sweet*, and so in similar cases.

5. To what is objected concerning a vow, it must be said that it is not similar, for two reasons: one, because a vow is not a Sacrament; the other, because a man binds himself to God, for whom *to think* is *to speak*; whereas marriage is a Sacrament, by which a man is bound to another man.

6. To what is objected, that one who is truly contrite is called a penitent — it must be said that this is true of penance as a virtue, but not of it as a Sacrament; marriage, however, is a Sacrament, not a virtue; and moreover it always relates to another, not to oneself, as contrition does: and therefore it is not similar, as is evident.