Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/29/q/bon-sent-IV-d29-a1-q1
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### Article Unique. *On coerced consent.*
### Question I. *Whether a coerced consent effects marriage.*

Concerning the first it is shown that a coerced consent effects marriage; and that it is so, it seems:

1. Because Augustine says that "a coerced will is [still] a will": therefore, since consent is of the will, it is a consent; but "a cause being posited, an effect is posited": therefore, such a consent being posited, marriage exists.

2. Likewise, this seems so by an argument from a like case: because one who consents to be baptized out of fear of death is baptized and is held as baptized: therefore it is likewise in marriage.

3. Likewise, this seems so by reason: because consent cannot be coerced, but only induced; but just as it is induced by threats, so it is induced by blandishments; but if someone induced by blandishments consents to marriage, the marriage holds: therefore likewise if he is induced by threats.

4. Likewise, one who denies Christ out of fear of death sins; but no one sins unless free: therefore one who consents to something out of fear of death consents freely. But a free consent effects marriage: therefore one who consents out of fear of death, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Decretal, On Betrothals and Marriage: "Since consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes, it is necessary that, where a common consent is required, the matter of coercion be excluded": therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the matrimonial consent is a sign of the conjoining of the soul and God; but the soul is not conjoined to God by a coerced consent: therefore, if it is a fitting sign, marriage is not contracted by a consent coerced through fear.

3. Likewise, the soul never becomes the bride of God unless it is united through love: therefore the woman never becomes the bride of the man unless she is united through love; but a union which comes about through a coerced consent does not come about through love: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, in the consent of marriage a power is acquired over one another: therefore it is necessary that they be equal in consenting; but since one compels the other to consent, they are not equal: therefore marriage is not contracted by such a consent.

> **Conclusion.** A consent coerced either by force, or by fear falling upon a steadfast man, does not effect marriage, unless after the coercion consent is given to the carnal union.

**I respond:** It must be said that a coerced consent can be twofold, namely by force, or by fear. "Force is the onset of a greater thing, which cannot be repelled"; fear is the trepidation of an imminent danger. Now force occurs when one is seized, led, dragged unwilling, or bound, while he himself protests and resists; this is coercion in which there is no consent, and in this case there is absolutely no marriage. — There is also another coercion through fear, as when someone threatens or intends death unless [the other] consents; and concerning this coercion some distinguish, that one who thus consents either consents with the mouth but not with the heart, and then there is no marriage in any way; or he consents with the heart, although coerced, and then the marriage exists in the sight of God, because "a coerced will is [still] a will"; but it is not in the sight of the Church, which presumes that such a one has not consented with the heart; and therefore it so judges and pronounces, that each may marry the other in the Lord. — But surely this does not seem to agree with the aforesaid decretal, which says that "consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes."

And therefore it is distinguished otherwise, that fear is twofold, one light, another just: just, as being one "which can fall upon a steadfast man"; it is light when someone threatens a small evil, or when such a one threatens of whom it is presumed that he cannot carry it out; and such fear does not make the consent so defective as to impede the contracting of marriage, or to dissolve one already contracted, but a consent given under such fear effects marriage. Now the fear is just when someone threatens the harm of death, mutilation, servitude, and violation; and it falls upon a steadfast man when it is probably presumed that he who threatens can carry out the threats; for it would not need to be feared, if a simple rustic were to threaten to be led away. In this fear the laws say that consent does not effect marriage.

But the reason for this is taken by different people in different ways. For some say that this is from an indulgence of the law. For the laws indulge that such persons be separated, first, because they presume that one who consents with the mouth has not consented with the heart, and because he said the word only that he might buy off the penalty; or also by reason of the end, because coerced marriages are wont to have the worst outcomes. — Others say that this comes not from an indulgence of the law, but from a defect of a perfect and free consent, which ought to be present in marriage, because, as has been shown, a full consent ought to be there; and this seems more probable. If, however, after the coercion he consents to the carnal union, from then it begins to be a marriage.

*To the first.* To the first, then, which was objected, that a coerced will is [still] a will: it must be said that this is true; but such a will never suffices to do good, nor even to contract marriage, since it is the Lord's will that this Sacrament be contracted through a free consent, not a coerced one.

*To the second.* To that which is objected, that one who is coerced and consents to baptism is baptized: it is answered that baptism is a work of God, not of men, but marriage is from the consent of men. — It can be said otherwise, that it is not similar: because as much freedom is not required there as in marriage; for the whole being of marriage is caused by consent.

*To the third.* To that which is objected, that consent is induced through blandishments: it must be said that blandishments do not detract from the nature of consent as much as threats do, because blandishments incite to love, but threats to terror.

*To the fourth.* To that which is objected concerning one who denies Christ out of fear: it must be said that it is easier to sin than to do good, whence more is required for the building up of good than for the doing of evil. — Moreover, no fear with respect to the perpetrating of a sin can or ought reasonably to fall upon a steadfast man, but only with respect to some deed which is not contrary to our salvation; just as a steadfast man ought reasonably first to allow himself to be killed, rather than deny God; but he would not act reasonably if he allowed himself to be killed before consenting to something indifferent; but marriage is not among the things which are contrary to salvation or against salvation. And thus it is clear how this is to be understood concerning the fear which can fall upon a steadfast man.