Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/29/q/bon-sent-IV-d29-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether he who consents to one who refuses him generates for himself a prejudice, such that he cannot contract marriage with another.*

Secondly it is asked, whether he who consents to one who refuses generates for himself a prejudice, such that he cannot contract marriage with another. And that it is so, is seen:

1. Because "each one can renounce his own right"; but it is of each one's right that he can consent matrimonially to another person; but a man renounces this right when he obliges himself to another by consent: therefore if one who consents renounces his own right in favor of an unwilling party, it is clear, etc.

2. Likewise, the power over one's own body is transferred by the consent of the mind, which has authority over it; but each one has authority over himself: therefore when he consents to some woman, he bestows on her the power over his own body: therefore he can no longer give it to another.

3. Likewise, this man consents to an unwilling and resisting woman, and afterward she consents; it is agreed that when she consents, the marriage stands ratified: therefore if the woman obliges herself to the man not from the fact that she herself consents — since the consent of one person does not oblige another — then this is on account of the prior consent which he had already given: therefore he was obliged beforehand.

4. Likewise, he consents more effectively and intensely who not only favors the one consenting, but also himself consents and compels another person to consent; but the first manner of consenting makes marriage and induces an obligation: therefore much more so does the second.

5. Likewise, charity is the bond of perfection, as is said in the third chapter to the Colossians; but this bond, although it is perfect, can nevertheless be from one toward the other, such that it is not mutual; by the same reasoning, so too the carnal bond: therefore also marriage: therefore it seems that someone can be joined matrimonially to another, if he consents with regard to her, or conversely, even if the other party dissents.

**Contra:**

1. Marriage is the conjunction of a man and a woman; but every such conjunction is a relation of equalization; but every such [relation] requires a correspondence between the extremes, since likeness is at least between two — hence if one of the two ceases to be like [the other], there is no likeness — therefore by a like argument in marriage, if one party dissents, there is no marriage nor betrothal: it stands, therefore, that there is no obligation there, nor any prejudice.

2. Likewise, where there is a matrimonial obligation, there are husband and wife; but a wife is so called in relation to a husband, just as a father in relation to a son, and conversely: therefore just as it follows: this one is not the son of this man, therefore this man is not the father of this one; so it likewise follows well: this woman is not obliged to this man as a wife, therefore this man is not obliged to this woman as a husband; nor in any other way: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the consent which transfers the power of the body to another is the consent which says: I take you as mine; but no one can take another as his own, unless she makes herself his own: therefore without the woman's consent there is no consent of the man.

4. Likewise, however much I may sell you something, no contract or binding arises, unless you buy it: therefore by the same reasoning the man's power is never transferred into the woman, unless the woman consents: if therefore she herself is coerced, there does not seem to be any obligation there.

### CONCLUSIO.

> One who consents to a resisting party, and who perseveres in dissent, does not create for himself a prejudice against consenting to another person.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that to ask whether a prejudice arises for one who consents to a resisting party is to ask whether the matrimonial bond limps, such that it is whole on one side and broken on the other; and this is to ask whether someone is a husband whose wife he is not, and some woman is a wife who has no husband. And this question is resolved in itself, for the reason that opposites are implied in it, on account of the nature of the matrimonial bond, which is relative and mutual — which very comparison and relation of wife to husband signifies. I say, therefore, that since marriage cannot be lame with respect to the bond, if the woman is unwilling and perseveres in dissent both in sign and in heart, there is no marriage at all; nor does the one party acquire any power over the other, for the reason that consent was lacking on the other extreme. Hence the first party does not stand in the manner of an efficient [cause], but of one disposing; and therefore, if the second should come along, then it perfects the marriage, for the reason that it now has mutual consent, which is its completed principle; and from then the man is obliged, and a prejudice is generated for him against consenting to another person.

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that he can renounce his own right: it must be said that he does not renounce this right except by vow or by marriage; and since in such a consent there is neither vow nor marriage, and there is no one to receive that right: therefore that consent cannot of itself generate any prejudice.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that power is transferred by the consent of the mind: it must be said that in this transfer of power there are two things, namely giving and receiving. As far as the giving is concerned, this is the consent of one's own; as far as the receiving is concerned, this is the consent of another; and since the other is not present there, therefore there is no transfer.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, if she should consent: it must be said that then he began to be obliged, not by reason of the other's consent alone, but by reason of his own, which had preceded in act and was present in habit — which, even if it did not oblige, was because there was no one to receive it — therefore, when the other's consent arrives, that [prior] consent has the force of obliging, although before it did not have it. — It could, however, be said that in such a case the man's consent ought to be renewed either by word or by sign.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that he consents more effectively: it must be said that if this man is not obliged, this is not on account of a defect of intention, as though it were not sufficiently intense, but because it is not mutual.

*To 5.* To that which is objected concerning the bond of charity: it must be said that charity, insofar as it is the bond which makes one spiritual body, is never such that it fails to be in both extremes, otherwise it would not make one; and in marriage husband and wife become one, and the conjunction of God and the soul is signified, which never limps: therefore there is no consent as regards the force of the Sacrament, if one person has liberty and the other coercion.

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