Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/29/q/bon-sent-IV-d29-a1-q3
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### Article, the Only One.
### Question III. *Whether someone can be compelled to marriage by a father's precept.*

Third it is asked, whether someone can be compelled to marriage by a father's precept; and I call this "compulsion" here in the sense that he is bound to obey. And it seems that he can, thus:

1. Because it is said in Genesis 28, Isaac called his son Jacob and commanded him, saying: *Do not take a wife* etc.; it is agreed that Isaac did not command anything except what he was able and bound to command: therefore a father can enjoin this upon his son.

2. Likewise, to the Colossians 3: *Children, obey your parents in all things*: therefore in all things that are not contrary to salvation, a son is bound to obey his father; whence the Gloss: "It is pleasing to God, if you obey in all things, provided, however, that you obey in the Lord": if therefore marriage is not contrary to salvation, it is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, as a spiritual father stands with respect to spiritual marriage, so a carnal father stands with respect to carnal marriage; but the lord Pope can command someone, under pain of excommunication, to accept a bishopric: therefore a carnal father [can command] that his son marry the woman he wishes.

4. Likewise, he is a fool who swears and binds himself on behalf of another who is not obligated to him — as if I should swear on behalf of a stranger that he himself would go to Saint Denis: if therefore parents swear on behalf of their children, it seems, therefore, that they can enjoin upon their children that they must fulfill their oaths.

5. Likewise, if someone contracts a betrothal with a woman, marriage is not yet contracted; nevertheless by ecclesiastical precept he is compelled to contract [marriage]: if therefore he can be compelled by a bishop, it seems by the same reasoning that he can be compelled by his own father.

**On the contrary:**
1. In that in which we are equals, one is not bound to obey the command of another; but as to the right of marriage, all are equals: therefore it does not seem that a father can command his son [in this].

2. Likewise, with a father commanding marriage, a son can vow chastity without sin: therefore he is not bound to obey his father.

3. Likewise, if a son wishes to enter religious life, he is not bound to obey his father determining a religious order for him — indeed he can enter whichever order he wishes without sin, because such a vow is spontaneous: if therefore marriage ought to be free, it is clear, etc.

4. Likewise, no one can compel me to perpetual servitude; but a husband, by the fact that he contracts with a wife, gives her perpetual power over his body: therefore it does not seem that anyone is bound in this matter to obey another.

5. Likewise, if one were bound to obey, then betrothals contracted by parents without the consent of the children who are to marry would be binding; but this is contrary to the canon and civil laws: therefore, etc.

> **Conclusion.** *The contract of marriage ought to be free, and is not ordinarily subject to a binding precept of parents.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the last-mentioned arguments show, the contract of marriage ought to be entirely free, both by reason of its *signification*, and also by reason of *the kind and greatness of the obligation* that consists in that contract; and therefore it is not to be enjoined upon a son by parents through a binding precept that he contract [marriage]; for he can remain continent, if he wishes, and again, if he wishes, contract [marriage]. — Further, by precept a father cannot bind his son to contract with this woman or with that one, unless charity, or a reasonable cause, binds him, or his own voluntary promise. A reasonable cause, moreover, binds when the father has enmities and cannot escape them except by his son contracting with a kinswoman of the enemy; or when the father forbids his son to contract with an evil woman. On account of a voluntary promise — as when he himself binds himself by contracting a betrothal — he generates a prejudice against himself in this, that he begins a marriage; whence he is bound to consummate it, and can be compelled to this by ecclesiastical mandate.

*To the first and to the last.* And by this the answer to the first of the contrary arguments and to the last is clear. For Isaac reasonably commanded that which Jacob was in any case bound to do, both on account of the wickedness of the women, and also because the seed of Canaan was to be destroyed from that land; and this is clearly suggested in the text, and more clearly in a certain little book which is called the Testament of the Patriarchs.

*To the second.* To that which is objected concerning obedience owed to a father, it must be said that that distribution ["in all things"] is understood only as regards those things that pertain to paternal honor, and as regards those things that pertain to the governance of the household. But if it is understood as regards other things, it is counsel, not precept; and this the Gloss suggests, which says: *It is pleasing to God*, etc.

*To the third.* To that which is objected concerning spiritual marriage, some reply that the Pope cannot command it, because consent must be free; but after its reception he can command its administration. — Yet this does not seem safe to say, since we see the contrary happen every day. And therefore others say that he can simply command it; nor is the case the same as with a carnal father, because the spiritual father has a fullness of power over his [spiritual] sons greater than a carnal father has. And moreover, there is not so great a servitude, nor so indivisible a bond, in spiritual marriage as in carnal marriage; and this is clear, because the Pope can depose [a bishop] and absolve him from his bishopric. A third way of speaking is that where there is a rational cause — namely necessity or the common good — it can be commanded, and then the subject is bound to obey; and since it must always be presumed that so great a father is moved by a reasonable cause, unless the contrary expressly appears, it must be believed that the subject is bound to obey. But if he knew himself to be unfit and unworthy, and saw that danger to his soul threatened him, it must be believed that he would not be bound to obey. For this obedience ought to have little or nothing of one's own [interest] in it, especially in modern times. Whatever the case may be, however, it is not the same with this marriage as with that [spiritual bond], for the reason already seen.

*To the fourth and fifth.* To that which is objected concerning an oath sworn on another's behalf, it must be said that, as will be clear below, it has no binding force, but is a matter of a certain comfort and solemnity, when parents swear on behalf of their small children: nor are they bound to anything else except that they will labor in good faith toward this, that the marriage be completed. — The last point is clear, because such a person generated a prejudice against himself by his own obligation.

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